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Since the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s inception, observers have
disagreed about how it would affect prospects for peace when it is involved in situations
of ongoing conflict. Therefore, I ask, why do some of the civil war peace negotiations
involving the ICC end with full peace agreements, while others end with resumed
violence? I argue that how the Court affects the occurrence and outcome of peace
negotiations is largely a function of the role that it plays in the situation. Due to its
institutional design, the Court has the capacity to play either an oversight or a
prosecutorial role in a conflict situation. Which role the Court actually assumes, however,
is about more than its institutional design. I argue that what role the Court plays is
conditioned by the combination of the formal nature of the Court’s involvement in the
situation, the Court’s public relations approach, and the public statements of human rights
and peace advocates about the Court’s involvement and normative commitments. To
provide systematic evidence that the Court might play a dual role in peace negotiations, I
conduct logistic regression analysis of 367 instances of peace negotiations to end civil
wars. The results confirm that international prosecution either makes peace negotiations
more likely to completely fail or more likely to end in a comprehensive peace agreement.
To advance a theory that explains this finding, I present three qualitative case studies of

peace negotiations in Uganda, Colombia, and Sri Lanka. These case studies suggest a
fundamental paradox of ICC prosecution: the ICC has the potential to act as a guarantor
of peace negotiations that is distinct among other international human rights promoters
precisely because of its capacity to prosecute culpable leaders, but that when the ICC
actually assumes the role of prosecutor, it becomes a spoiler of the peace. This suggests
that if the ICC aspires to promote the interests of peace and justice in conflict situations
where belligerents are attempting to negotiate peace, it should strive to play an oversight,
rather than prosecutorial, role, and promote post-conflict justice broadly, instead of
international prosecution specifically.
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CHAPTER 1 | INTRODUCTION
1.0 The puzzle
In 2008, on the last Saturday in November, a group of men stood in a clearing in a
forest, and waited. They waited all day and into the night, and when they were done
waiting, they knew that the fragile peace they had spent two years trying to build had
fallen apart.1
Two weeks before, they had agreed that Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA), would arrive at the clearing to sign the Final Peace Agreement,
the product of two years of negotiation in Juba, South Sudan, and the culmination of
twenty years of hostilities between the LRA and Uganda. As soon as it become clear to
all that Kony had no intention of coming to the clearing or signing the agreement, the
international delegation released a statement declaring the failure of the peace talks, and
the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) began planning renewed attacks on the
LRA.2 Just over two weeks later, on December 16, the UPDF commenced a bombing
campaign on LRA bases in northern Uganda. They called it Operation Lightening
Thunder.3
The LRA regrouped in the forests of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), where they coordinated an unprecedented attack. Over Christmas Eve and
Christmas day, in the Congolese province of Haut-Eule, the LRA executed the largestscale massacres of civilians that their long war had ever seen.4 In forty-eight hours,

1

Atkinson, Ronald Raymond. From Uganda to the Congo and Beyond: Pursuing the Lord's Resistance
Army. New York: International Peace Institute, 2009, p. 205.
2
Ibid, p. 222
3
Ibid, p. 222
4
Human Rights Watch. "The Christmas Massacres." Human Rights Watch, 16 Feb. 2009. Web. 05 May
2016.
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between eight hundred and a thousand civilians were brutally murdered, and hundreds
more kidnapped.5 An elderly man from the village of Doruma remembers:
The LRA were quick at killing. It did not take them very long and they
said nothing while they were doing it…I knew all these people. They
were my family, my friends, my neighbors. When they finished I
slipped away and went to my home, where I sat trembling all over.6
Not even a month before, LRA representatives were part of an international delegation
committed to brokering a deal to forge peace. What happened?
No one disputes that there is no unitary explanation for the breakdown of this
peace process. One of the many factors that observers point to was the involvement of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in the peace process.7 LRA leaders were reluctant to
come to negotiations at all because of outstanding ICC warrants against them, and posthoc explanations for their failure to arrive in the clearing to sign the final agreement point
to the fact that they thought that the peace agreement would not do enough to help them
avoid ICC prosecution.8
Less than a decade later, the Norwegian Nobel Committee chose to award
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos the Peace Prize for his work spearheading the
Colombian peace process.9 In its statement announcing the award, the Committee
highlighted the difficult work that the framers of the peace accord had done in creating a
system to provide justice for the victims of the conflict.10 Today, Colombia is working to
implement these systems.
5

Ibid
Ibid
7
Branch, Adam. "Uganda's civil war and the politics of ICC intervention." Ethics & International Affairs
21, no. 2 (2007): 179-198.
8
Quinn, Joanna R. "Getting to peace? Negotiating with the LRA in northern Uganda." Human Rights
Review 10, no. 1 (2009): 55-71.
9
The Nobel Peace Prize for 2016. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Media AB 2019. Sat. 16 Mar 2019.
<https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2016/press-release/>
10
Ibid
6
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Based on Uganda’s experience, observers might expect that Colombia’s peace
agreement struck the right balance between peace and justice because its framers were
able to operate outside of the ICC’s gaze. In fact, if anything, the opposite explanation
holds. Indeed, at a conference for peace advocates, the ICC Prosecutor said:
The situation in Colombia is a clear example where my Office determined
that a reasonable basis did exist to believe that war crimes and crimes against
humanity had been committed by all sides in the armed conflict in Colombia;
however, no investigation has been opened to date by my Office, because the
principle of complementarity of jurisdictions came into play. In fact, there are
also reasons to believe that the ‘Shadow of the Court’ induced prosecutors,
courts, legislators and members of the Executive Branch to make certain policy
choices in conducting investigations and prosecutions, and setting up
accountability mechanisms, starting with the Justice and Peace Law.
Representatives of my Office meet regularly with the Colombian authorities to
consult on justice issues.11
Far from spoiling the peace agreement, the Court’s oversight on justice mechanisms
played a key role in ensuring that they were factored into the final agreement, which was
ratified in November 2016, and is being implemented today.
How could the ICC have contributed to the utter failure of one peace process, and
less than a decade later, help promote a peace process that was recognized by the Nobel
Prize? This dissertation seeks to reconcile the stark differences between these two
outcomes, and illustrate how the same Court can promote each vastly different outcome.
In brief, I argue that the ICC can promote either the successful creation of a negotiated
settlement, or the resumption of hostilities, because due to both its institutional design
and situation-specific conditions, it can play either an oversight or a prosecutorial role in
a conflict situation. When it plays an oversight role, it promotes negotiated settlement,
but when it plays a prosecutorial role, it makes resumption of hostilities more likely.
11

Dziatkowiec, Paul, Christina Buchhold, Jonathan Harlander, and Massimiliano Verri. Oslo Forum 2015
Meeting Report: Peacemaking in the new world disorder. Oslo, Norway. 2015. Accessed 16 March 2019.
<http://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Oslo-Forum-2015-Meeting-Report.pdf>
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2.0 The research question
Broadly, this dissertation asks: How does the International Criminal Court affect
the onset and outcome of peace negotiations to end civil wars? This question can be
disaggregated into several other questions. Under what conditions does ICC involvement
in a conflict situation bring rebel and government leaders to the negotiating table, and
under what conditions does it deter them from negotiation? Under what conditions does
ICC involvement in a conflict situation make peace negotiations more likely to end in a
full settlement, and under what conditions does it make peace negotiations more likely to
end in resumption of hostilities?
By civil wars, I mean an armed conflict between a state government and a rebel
group that surpasses 1,000 annual battle deaths, following the conventional political
science definition.12 By the onset of civil war peace negotiations, I mean both parties’
decisions to come to public, formal peace negotiations with the aid of at least one
external mediator. It is important to clarify that this by no means captures the full scope
of actual civil war peace negotiations: in order to get to the point of public, formal peace
negotiations, extensive informal and secret negotiations take place. This dissertation
analyzes these phases of peace negotiations, but the first outcome I am interested in is
whether the ICC makes formalized peace negotiations more likely to occur.
The second outcome this dissertation examines is what kind of agreement, if any,
comes of these formalized peace negotiations. An absolutely crucial caveat for
contextualizing this scholarship is that this study does not examine whether the ICC
promotes lasting peace, but simply studies whether the ICC promotes the ratification of a
12

Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. "Correlates of war project: International and civil war data, 18161992 (ICPSR 9905)." Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(1994).
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comprehensive peace agreement that establishes a framework for peaceful government.
So, by outcome of peace negotiations, I mean a set of outcomes ranging from the
abandonment of talks with no agreement to the ratification of a comprehensive peace
agreement. I do not systematically examine the implementation of such agreements, nor
do I assess how well they do in securing peace.
Finally, this dissertation examines the effect of a specific institution: the
International Criminal Court. This is an important distinction, as the ICC is not the only
mechanism for international criminal accountability: there are various region-specific
international tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY), regional courts, such as the InterAmerican Court for Human Rights (IACtHR),
and hybrid courts, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Of these, the ICC is the
only accountability mechanism with a global reach, which allows for generalizability
across a greater variety of cases.
The ICC is central to understanding the role of international criminal
accountability in peace negotiations not only because its global reach gives the potential
for greater external validity, but, perhaps much more importantly, because its symbolic
importance to the global fight against impunity cannot be overstated. To understand this
importance, we need to review the historical context and political processes driving the
Court’s formation.
The ICC was formed in 1998 to try the worst perpetrators of the worst crimes.
The Court became operational in 2002, when its founding document, the Rome Statute,
was ratified by 60 states. Since then, 64 more states have signed the Rome Statute. The
Court is designed to promote individual criminal accountability for the gravest human

6
rights violations. The seat of the Court is in the Hague in the Netherlands, but it will also
set up offices in areas under investigation.13 The Court is funded by the states that are
party to it, and also receives donations from governments, international organizations,
and non-governmental organizations.14
The Court is composed of four bodies: the Presidency, the Registry, the
Chambers, and the Office of the Prosecutor.15 The Presidency administers the Court and
serves as its external representative, and is comprised of three judges elected by and from
the other eighteen judges on the Court.16 These eighteen judges are housed in the
Chambers, which consists of a Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appeals Chamber, and are charged
with conducting cases that are selected by the Office of the Prosecutor.17 All eighteen
judges are elected by the Assembly of State Parties to the Court.18 The Registry provides
administrative and operational support to the other parts of the Court.19 For this
dissertation, the most important arm of the Court is the Office of the Prosecutor. The
Office of the Prosecutor operates independently of the rest of the Court, and is tasked
with gathering information on alleged abuses, determining whether the Court should
pursue prosecution of offenders, and mounting investigations for the sake of issuing

13

International Criminal Court. Understanding the International Criminal Court. The Hauge: International
Criminal Court Registry. Accessed July 18, 2019. https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf, p. 4
14
ibid, p. 4
15
ibid, p. 8
16
ibid, p. 9
17
ibid, p. 9
18
ibid, p. 9.
19
ibid, p. 11
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arrest warrants and conducting prosecutions.20 The Prosecutor of the ICC is also elected
by the Assembly of States Parties.21
The Court investigates and tries genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity.22 The Rome Statute defines each of these crimes. Genocide is a crime
committed with the intent to destroy a group, or a part of a group; acts such as killing,
causing serious harm, inflicting life conditions designed to destroy the group, imposing
measures to prevent birth or forcibly transferring children are genocide if their intent is to
eliminate at least part of a group.23 War crimes are breaches of the Geneva Convention,
including killing, torture, inhumane treatment, intentionally causing grave suffering,
extensive destruction of property, depriving prisoners of war of rights, unlawful
deportations and confinement, and hostage-taking.24 Crimes against humanity are
widespread and systematic attacks against civilian populations, and include acts such as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, enforced
disappearance, apartheid, or acts that intentionally cause grave suffering.25 If convicted of
any of these crimes, the potential penalties include prison sentences up to and including
life imprisonment, and fines or forfeiture of assets gained through the commission of
crimes.26

20

ibid, p. 10-11. For much more complete description of these functions, please Section 4 of Chapter 2, on
pages 40-46.
21
International Criminal Court. Office of the Prosecutor. Accessed on July 18, 2019. https://www.icccpi.int/about/otp
22
UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July
1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html [accessed 25
March 2019], p. 9
23
Rome Statute Part 2, Article 6. For more extensive discussion of the crime of genocide, and of the
political issues surrounding attempts to address it, please see Power, Samantha. " A Problem from Hell":
America and the Age of Genocide. Basic Books, 2013.
24
Rome Statute, Part 2, Article 8, Section 2
25
Rome Statute, Part 2, Article 7, Section 2
26
Understanding the International Criminal Court, p. 31
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Advocates for international criminal accountability saw the formation of the ICC
as the culmination an international advocacy campaign that began with the effort to
mount the Nuremberg Trials and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.27
Both were military tribunals mounted by Allied nations after the end of the Second World
War to hold Axis leaders to account for massive atrocities committed during the war. At
Nuremberg, twenty-four men were accused of crimes, with seven sentenced to prison,
twelve sentenced to death, and the remaining indicted but not sentenced.28 At the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, twenty-nine Japanese leaders were
charged, twenty-six stood trial and were found guilty, with seven sentenced to death,
sixteen to life imprisonment, and three to shorter prison sentences.29 They are significant
in the development of international human rights law for many reasons; notably, the
Nuremberg indictments were the first time the word “genocide” was used in an
international judicial context.30 Further, this was arguably a crucial period for developing
the norm of individual criminal accountability for mass atrocity, as there was a
considerable, coordinated international effort to make clear that guilt for the atrocities lay
with individual leaders, rather than entire national publics.31
One of the many challenges of these tribunals was reconciling the various legal
principles and systems of the different countries that mounted them.32 These challenges

27

Schabas, An introduction to the international criminal court.
Taylor, Telford. The anatomy of the Nuremberg trials: a personal memoir. Knopf, 2012.
29
Ibid.
30
Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1 Indictment: Count 3. New Haven: The Avalon Project. Accessed on
July 18, 2019. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count3.asp
31
Steinacher, G. J. (2018). The Betrayal: The Nuremberg Trials and German Divergence Kim Christian
Priemel. In Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume 32, Issue 1, Spring 2018, Pages 123–124,.
32
The anatomy of the Nuremberg trials.; Jackson, Robert. The Influence of the Nuremberg Trial on
International Criminal Law. Robert H. Jackson Center. Accessed on July 18, 2019.
https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/the-influence-of-the-nuremberg-trial-on-internationalcriminal-law/
28
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led to an effort to create an international criminal tribunal that began during the
Nuremberg Trials and persisted until the creation of the ICC.33 Throughout the next three
decades, the United Nations (UN) supported the work of creating legal definitions of
crimes that could fall under international jurisdiction.34 Further, the continued occurrence
of mass atrocities, coupled with the persistent norm of sovereign immunity, reaffirmed
the need for an international criminal tribunal. In particular, the 1990s saw a resurgence
in mass atrocities that captured the world’s attention and—to many—made the case for
an institution to manifest the norms of international criminal accountability by
prosecuting culpable leaders.35 In response to mass atrocities committed during this war
that divided what was formerly Yugoslavia, the United Nations Security Council passed a
resolution to create an international criminal tribunal specifically to try culpable leaders
in this conflict.36 Then, in 1994, in response to the Rwandan genocide, the UN Security
Council voted to create a second situation-specific criminal tribunal: the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
The ICTY was particularly influential in the evolution of the norms and legal
concepts that undergird the ICC.37 The ICTY’s mandate explicitly concerned individual
criminal responsibility, as the Tribunal was designed to hold individuals, and not political
organizations, accountable.38 The mandate gave the ICTY jurisdiction over four
categories of crimes: violations of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws of war,
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crimes against humanity, and genocide.39 From 1994 to 2019, the ICTY indicted 161
people for these crimes, sentenced 90, and acquitted 18.40
The ICTY and the ICTR showed the international community that international
criminal tribunals could function effectively, and accelerated the effort to create a truly
international tribunal with global reach.41 Thus, in 1994, the UN General Assembly
created a process to take the same draft statute that undergirded the ICTY and the ICTR
and use it to formulate a global tribunal.42 Then, in 1997, the UN General Assembly
passed a resolution to convene a conference in Rome the following summer with the aim
of creating a treaty that would design such a tribunal and codify state support for it.43
Over 160 states, as well as hundreds of international and nongovernmental
organizations, sent delegates to the Rome Conference.44 The process was propelled
largely by NGOs,45 but also by a group of states that referred to themselves as “the likeminded group.”46 At the end of the conference, 120 states voted to adopt the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, and created a preparatory commission to
continue the work of creating the court.47
Even during this process, proponents of the Court used its potential to punish
culpable leaders as a central justification for its formation. For example, the Chairman of
the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court used the ICTY’s
39
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ongoing prosecution of former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic as a symbol of the
Court’s promise.48 More broadly, the late 1990s seemed to usher in a sea-change
regarding criminal accountability for culpable leaders, a phenomenon termed the “justice
cascade.”49 The arrest of former Chilean president Augusto Pinochet, just a few months
after the Rome Conference, further signaled a shift in accountability and impunity norms.
50

The ICC’s global reach and focus on culpable leaders are central to its founding,
and central to this dissertation. The conviction that leadership should not guarantee
immunity was actually accompanied by examples of leaders, especially former heads of
state, being prosecuted and punished for their crimes in international venues. This matters
tremendously because it shows that, from its beginning, the ICC did not just symbolize a
normative commitment, but was situated to continue a trend that was already occurring:
the prosecution of culpable leaders in internationalized venues.
The ICC’s central role in the international fight against impunity for leaders,51
both of states and rebel groups, is the reason that we need to understand how it affects the
specific period of peace negotiations, rather than just the general pursuit of peace. The
assumption that leaders are self-interested undergirds all political science research: they
will endeavor first to maintain power, and when that is in doubt, at least to secure
favorable exit options. More particularly, those who study civil war hold that both rebel
and state leaders’ calculations of their exit options are key determinants of whether they
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will continue the fight or seek peace.52 Since the ICC was created to hold leaders
accountable for the crimes they command, its involvement in a conflict situation stands to
significantly affect how leaders perceive the set of possibilities for their post-conflict
fates.53
3.0 The academic context
There are countless arguments about how the shadow of international criminal
accountability affects prospects for peace. More narrowly, since the ICC began its work
in the mid-2000s, social scientists, legal scholars, and advocates have examined how the
Court’s crusade against impunity affects prospects for peace in ongoing conflicts.
Initially, this literature could be divided into two opposing outlooks. The optimist
camp argues that accountability is a positive force: it promotes respect for human rights
and deters human rights abuses, although it has some limitations.54 A popular optimist
strain argues that international criminal tribunals have created a new age of
accountability, which in and of itself will serve as a deterrent to crimes against
humanity.55 As prosecutions of human rights violators increase in number and visibility,
political leaders become more and more aware that they too could be prosecuted for
52
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similar violations, and are thus deterred.
Skeptics argue that international criminal accountability is either unimportant or
detrimental. Some argue that even when states ratify human rights treaties and codify
commitments to accountability, they do not enforce them, and thus that the international
criminal accountability regime cannot have far-reaching effects.56 Detractors of
international criminal accountability contend that it can worsen human rights conditions
and make the commission of atrocities more likely.57
In more recent years, debates surrounding international criminal accountability
have evolved to account for the fact that tribunals’ effects are often conditional.
Correspondingly, the scholarship now more explicitly delineates between evaluating
tribunals as a whole and parsing out the conditions that affect how well they can fulfill
their mandates.58
One of the most obvious sets of conditions that influences how international
criminal accountability works is who mounts prosecutions and who their target is. At
times, the ICC can be seen not as a truly international intervener, but a tool of state
power,59 and can thus, in civil war contexts, dissuade rebels from engaging in
negotiations.60 However, others have found that, no matter the target, the effect of
international prosecutions cannot be disaggregated from the effect of international
56
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interventions more generally.61
An evolved optimistic understanding of the role of the ICC is that it can deter
potential human rights violators if they seek legitimacy.62 This might be an especially
salient factor for rebels, who do not possess the same avenues that states do to achieve
legitimacy, and thus can use their compliance with international human rights norms as a
selling point.63 Another version of this argument is that the ICC works as a “stigmatizer,”
and deters atrocity by advancing the notion that atrocity is unacceptable.64 The reasoning
goes that if the state or rebels care about being acceptable, promoters of international
criminal accountability can make them less likely to commit atrocity crimes.
These accounts tend to examine the ICC, and other international tribunals, as
either prosecutors or norm promoters. In other words, empirical work—especially strictly
positivist work—tends to operationalize ICC involvement in a situation only as formal
prosecution, or perhaps slightly more broadly as formal investigation.65 In this
perspective, the effects of ICC involvement are not holistically examined, only the effects
of the ICC as prosecutor.66 More positivist work that focuses on the ICC as an
investigator, and not just a prosecutor, is necessary to paint a fuller empirical picture of
how the Court affects ongoing conflict and peace negotiations.
Other accounts do examine international criminal tribunals more broadly, but tend
61
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to examine them in their capacity as norm promoters.67 These accounts fail to
comprehensively account for how the fact that an international criminal tribunal can
mount prosecutions conditions how it works as a norm promoter. These accounts tend to
simply point to the normative implications of the public prosecution of culpable leaders,
stating that prosecutions themselves, and their deterrent effects, are the main lever by
which international criminal tribunals promote anti-impunity norms.68 However, since
international criminal tribunals can embark on justice-promoting activities other than
mounting prosecutions, it is likely that these activities can also promote anti-impunity
norms; these accounts have yet to explore this. While these accounts tend to do a better
job of situating the ICC within a constellation of other human rights promoters,69 they do
not do enough to systematically account for the ICC’s uniquely global prosecutorial
function. The fact that the ICC is the only global human rights promoter with the mandate
and capacity to prosecute means that it occupies a unique place within this constellation70
and likely means that it cannot promote anti-impunity norms in the same way that nonprosecutorial promoters can.
Both approaches are valuable and necessary, but to fully understand the ICC’s
conditional effects on peacemaking, we need to marry them. That is, we need to
understand not only the ICC’s prosecutorial work, but also its non-prosecutorial work,
and we need to more systematically account for how the ICC’s prosecutorial capacity
67
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affects its non-prosecutorial work. Further, we need to better understand how the ICC’s
prosecutorial capacity conditions how it best interacts with other human rights promoters
even in situations where it is not prosecuting.71
This difference in empirical emphasis might explain the competing perspectives
on how ICC involvement affects attempts at peace. Those who argue that the ICC
prolongs conflict72 or spoils peace processes73 are often really referring not simply to ICC
involvement, but rather to ICC arrest warrants. Meanwhile, those who argue that the ICC
can promote peace tend to focus more on its role as a norm promoter74 or investigator.75
4.0 The contribution
All of this suggests that one of the most central factors that might condition the
Court’s impact on peace negotiations is the role the Court might play. Indeed, it is
possible that scholars have come to different conclusions about the ICC’s effect on peace
because they have been focusing on different functions that the ICC has. As the previous
section pointed out, an empirical focus on prosecution does not capture the full potential
of prosecutorial institutions. Put otherwise, examining the effects of the stick of
international prosecution is not the same as examining the broader impacts of the ICC.
Prosecution is just one tool in the ICC’s fight against impunity, and so examining the role
of the ICC as an institution cannot be conflated with examining the role of international
71

Mendeloff, David. "Punish or Persuade? The Compellence Logic of International Criminal Court
Intervention in Cases of Ongoing Civilian Violence." (2017): 395-421.
72
Escribà-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. "Human rights prosecutions and autocratic survival."
International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 343-373; Prorok, "The (In) compatibility of peace and justice?
The International Criminal Court and civil conflict termination."; Krcmaric, "Should I Stay or Should I Go?
Leaders, Exile, and the Dilemmas of International Justice."
73
Branch, "Uganda's civil war and the politics of ICC intervention."; Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm. "The
impact of criminal prosecutions during intrastate conflict."
74
Akhavan, Payam. "Are international criminal tribunals a disincentive to peace: reconciling Judicial
romanticism with political realism." Hum. Rts. Q. 31 (2009): 624; Dancy and Montal. "From Law Versus
Politics to Law in Politics: A Pragmatist Assessment of the ICC's Impact."
75
Daniels, "The International Criminal Court and the Rebels’ Commitment Problem."

17
prosecution. This dissertation examines both the role of ICC prosecution specifically, and
the ICC as an institution broadly.
However, it is impossible to consider the ICC’s role as an institution without
accounting for its role as a prosecutor. One of this dissertation’s central contentions is
that, even in its non-prosecutorial functions, the ICC plays a distinctive role in human
rights promotions precisely because it has the legal and material capacity to prosecute. In
other words, this dissertation accounts for the fact that the ICC can play different roles at
different times, or in different situations, and holds the ICC’s prosecutorial function as
central without only examining the effect of its prosecution. In doing so, it reconciles
findings that the ICC can both prevent leaders from coming to or staying at the table and
findings that the ICC can promote successful peace negotiations.
Secondly, much of the literature on how justice affects peace fails to explicitly
disaggregate peace into its constituent parts. However, especially after a conflict, making
peace is a sequential process, during which either the surrender of one side or negotiated
settlement is a necessary step. In only looking at the specific step of negotiated
settlement, this dissertation not only moves toward disaggregating peace into its
constituent parts, but also contributes to a necessary turn in the transitional justice
literature of more explicitly addressing scope conditions.76 Even more broadly, this
dissertation sees to identify the scope conditions in which the ICC works to promote
peace and thus prevent human rights violations.
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5.0 The argument
I argue that the ICC’s effect on the onset and outcome of peace negotiations
depends on whether it plays an oversight role or a prosecutorial role in conflict situations.
If the ICC plays an oversight role in conflict situations, and only represents a latent threat
of prosecution for leaders, it acts as a guarantor for peace negotiations. However, if the
ICC plays a prosecutorial role, and therefore represents an active threat of prosecution for
leaders, it acts as a spoiler of peace negotiations because it makes leaders more likely to
believe that battle is a better route to preferable exit options. Whether the ICC plays a
prosecutorial or oversight role is a function of an interplay of the ICC’s institutional
design and situation-specific conditions, such as the Court’s strategy and whether other
human rights promoters reinforce or contradict the Court’s anti-impunity norms.
It is crucial to note that the fact that the ICC is an international institution with the
power to prosecute violators of international criminal law undergirds its potential to act
both as a guarantor and as a spoiler. That the ICC’s capacity to prosecute leaders would
result in it spoiling peace is logical: its prosecutorial capacity can change leaders’
calculus of their exit options so as to make continuing the fight more attractive.77
What is less obvious is that the ICC’s international scope and prosecutorial
capacity are also crucial to its potential to be a guarantor. The ICC is unique among all
international human rights organizations in that it has the legal capacity to prosecute any
perpetrator in any country in the world. Therefore, the presence of the ICC in a conflict
situation has implications for leaders’ exit options that no other international institution
concerned with promoting human rights can have. When the ICC is overseeing a conflict
77
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situation, but has not yet assumed a prosecutorial role, leaders have incentives to dissuade
the ICC from initiating prosecutorial proceedings in order to neutralize a latent threat to
their post-conflict exit options.78
Whether the Court takes a prosecutorial approach or an oversight approach
depends not only on the actions of the Court itself, but on the actions of the other actors
around it, especially those who promote peace and human rights. I argue that whether the
Court acts as a prosecutor or an overseer is conditioned by four factors, broadly
articulated: legal classification of the Court’s involvement in a conflict situation, the
leadership style of the Prosecutor, the approach of domestic and international human
rights NGOs and the approach of other potential guarantors to the peace process.
The first two factors concern the Court’s approach, and condition whether the
Court represents a latent or active threat to leaders’ exit options. When the Court is only
investigating a conflict situation, and has not yet issued indictments, it is much more able
to play an oversight rather than prosecutorial role. However, the legal status of the
Court’s involvement in a conflict situation is not the only factor that conditions whether
the Court plays an oversight or prosecutorial role. The approach of the Prosecutor can
make even investigatory, non-prosecutorial phases of the Court’s involvement in a
conflict situation seem to pose a much more active threat of prosecution. Thus, when the
Prosecutor plays a public, vocal role in threatening prosecution, the Court is more likely
to play a prosecutorial role, and when the Prosecutor remains quiet on the prospect of
indictment, the Court functions more as an overseer. In other words, even if the Court is
only in an investigatory phase, an aggressive Prosecutor can make it play a prosecutorial
rather than oversight role.
78
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The second two factors concern the approach of other actors who seek to promote
human rights or peace. Domestic and international human rights NGOs are crucial to
whether the ICC plays a prosecutorial or oversight role. When these NGOs magnify the
ICC’s anti-impunity message, and use their public statements to consistently and
uncompromisingly promote the ideals of the Rome Statute, they allow the ICC to act
more as an overseer and less as a prosecutor. This is because non-prosecutorial actors’
statements against impunity do not carry the same kind of threat to leaders that ICC
statements against impunity carry, simply because these actors do not have the power to
actually prosecute leaders. However, their statements still matter because they serve as an
important reminder of the latent threat that ICC involvement represents and because they
make it less necessary for the ICC to remind leaders that impunity is unacceptable, thus
allowing the ICC to remain in an oversight rather than prosecutorial role.
Finally, it also matters whether other guarantors to the peace process reinforce or
contradict the normative commitment of the Rome Statute. When other potential
guarantors reinforce the normative commitments of the Rome Statute, as with human
rights NGOs, this allows the ICC to play a quieter role in the peace process,79 and thus
facilitates the ICC playing an oversight role. However, if other guarantors publicly
contradict the normative commitments of the Rome Statute, this might prompt the ICC
into public reminders that violators cannot be granted impunity. This is especially true if
these potential guarantors are powerful actors that could actually undermine the ICC’s
mission.80 For potentially culpable leaders, public ICC reminders of their commitment to
prevent impunity can amount to an escalation of the threat that the ICC poses to their exit
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options. The more often and more aggressively the ICC issues such reminders, the more
liable it is to slip into the role of prosecutor rather than overseer.
6.0 The empirical approach
I use mixed methods to advance this argument. My approach is mostly positivist
but is also very thinly constructivist in its theoretical foundation and qualitative method.
By thinly constructivist, I hearken to Hay’s definition of a mode of constructivism that
still prioritizes material factors over ideational factors, and causal over constitutive
logics.81 This contrasts with strict positivism, which does little to accommodate ideational
factors and constitutive logics,82 and thick constructivism, which prioritizes ideational
over material factors and constitutive logics over causal logics. To show that international
tribunals are systematically associated with both the comprehensive success and complete
failure of peace negotiations, I use statistical analysis of a cross-national dataset of peace
mediations from 1989 to 2010. I specify various logistic regression models that show that
the involvement of an international criminal tribunal in a peace process makes both
comprehensive success and comprehensive failure of a peace agreement more likely.
This quantitative analysis, however, is not at the heart of my empirical analysis. It
simply provides a data-grounded justification for the need for a comprehensive theory of
the involvement of international criminal tribunals in peace negotiations. It also shows
that there is some empirical basis for claims that international prosecution spoils peace
81
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negotiations, as well as for claims that the involvement of international tribunals can
promote a comprehensive peace agreement that goes beyond single cases.
Then, in order to move beyond the singular focus on international prosecutions, I
turn to three qualitative case studies where I analyze the role of the ICC in peace
processes. In these chapters, I analyze how the ICC affects the informal and formal peace
processes surrounding the LRA insurrection in Uganda, the Colombian Civil War, and
the Sri Lankan Civil War. These case studies use a thinly constructivist approach to build
the theory that the role that the ICC assumes in a conflict situation conditions whether it
helps to spoil or guarantee the peace. The slight constructivism arises out of analytical
necessity, because I find that whether the ICC plays a prosecutorial role is not only a
function of whether it has formally initiated prosecution, but of the role it assumes
through its public posturing in the conflict, and the role that other actors assign to it. The
fact that whether the Court plays an oversight role or a prosecutorial role is not purely a
function of a formal, institutionally defined category, but is also a function of posturing
and perception, means that a slightly constructivist frame is necessary to deduce these
roles from the empirical evidence and to understand their effects.
The chapter that contains each qualitative case study contains an explanation of
how data was collected and analyzed for that case, as well as a justification of the case
selection. However, a more systematic justification of the qualitative case selection is
also in order, especially given that the Court has been involved in far more countries than
Uganda and Colombia. (Please consult Figure 1 for a map indicating all the countries that
have seen an ICC preliminary examination or investigation.) In brief, I chose to focus on
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Uganda because it is the classic case of the ICC spoiling peace negotiations,83 and on
Colombia because it is held up as an example of how the ICC might act as a peace
promoter,84 or even as a guarantor.85 Since one of this dissertation’s central objectives is
to reconcile the two divergent narratives of the Court’s effects on peace negotiations, I
chose to include the two most quintessential cases of its failure and success in order to
show that they can be accommodated within one theoretical framework.
Figure 1.6. Map of ICC Situations and Cases86

I include the case of Sri Lanka precisely because the ICC was not involved. In my
theory, as well as in the evidence on the Ugandan and Colombian case, the role of human
rights and peace advocates emerges as central to conditioning whether the Court plays the
role of overseer or prosecutor. Indeed, the importance of civil society organizations
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advocating against impunity is so apparent in the Colombian case that the important
question arises of whether the Court’s role actually matters as much as the advocacy of
the constellation of human rights advocates that it works within. In Sri Lanka, the full
constellation of these actors—minus the ICC itself—was present in the civil war and
peace negotiations, and they advocated vociferously against impunity for culpable
leaders. Indeed, if anything, Sri Lanka saw more of these advocates, and many had much
more international clout than those operating in Colombia. The fact that there was no
comprehensive peace agreement in Sri Lanka, and that these actors’ advocacy against
impunity did not affect leaders’ conflict behavior at all, helps build the theory that in the
absence of ICC involvement, the notion of international criminal accountability can
neither spoil peace negotiations nor promote a more robust peace agreement.
7.0 The roadmap
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 outlines a theoretical framework,
and contextualizes this framework within the literature on transitional justice and civil
war peace negotiations. Chapter 3 conducts a quantitative cross-national analysis of data
on 367 civil war peace negotiations, and finds that international prosecutions make
negotiations either more likely to completely fail or more likely to result in a
comprehensive agreement. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 consist of qualitative case studies of civil
war peace negotiations that attempt to make sense of the quantitative findings of Chapter
3 and illustrate the theory articulated in Chapter 2.
Chapter 4 examines the case of Uganda, and argues that the ICC acted as a spoiler
of the Juba Peace Process when it began to play the role of prosecutor rather than of
overseer. Chapter 5 turns to the case of Colombia, and argues that, as Prosecutor

25
Bensouda asserted, the ICC was a guarantor of this peace process because it played the
role of overseer, rather than prosecutor. Chapter 6 turns to the case of Sri Lanka, which
saw no ICC involvement, to illustrate that the ICC’s capacity to prosecute culpable
leaders means that it can act as a peace guarantor in ways that other international human
rights and peace proponents cannot. Chapter 7 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2 | THEORY
1.0 Introduction
This dissertation asks: How does the International Criminal Court affect the onset
and outcome of peace negotiations to end civil wars? Empirical evidence, both in the
literature and in the findings of Chapter 3 of this dissertation, shows that international
tribunals can matter for the outcome of peace negotiations,87 and that they matter
differently than both domestic courts and non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms.88 In
general, non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms—whether they are mounted by a domestic
or international actor—do not affect peace negotiations.89 Prosecutions matter, but
domestic and international prosecutions matter differently. In general, domestic
prosecutions make peace negotiations more likely to fail.90
These findings contain several puzzles. Why might international prosecutions
affect peace negotiations differently than domestic prosecutions? Why do international
prosecutions affect the outcome of peace negotiations, while other international attempts
to advance non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms do not? And most of all, how can
international tribunals promote complete failure of peace negotiations in some cases, and
yet contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive peace agreement in other cases?
This chapter articulates a theoretical framework to answer these questions.
Concentrating my focus on the ICC, the only international tribunal with a global reach, I
argue that the ICC plays a distinctive role among other international institutions, and
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especially among other international institutions designed to promote human rights. This
is because, as an court designed to ensure international criminal accountability by ending
impunity for leaders, it is the only international institution that can remove amnesty as a
legal exit option for leaders. When the ICC issues an indictment for a leader, offers of
amnesty to that leader, or state protection of that leader, become violations of
international law. No other international institution or international organization
promoting human rights has this power. Therefore, the ICC is distinct among
international institutions and international human rights promoters in the way that it can
constrain leaders’ exit options. For this reason, the ICC’s unique institutional design and
prosecutorial function explain why it affects peace negotiations in ways that domestic or
non-prosecutorial actors cannot.
The ICC’s institutional design also undergirds the reason it can have such
different effects on the outcome of peace negotiations. In this chapter, I argue that by
virtue of a combination of the various formal modes of involvement the ICC can have in
a conflict situation, the discretion the Court has in its public signaling surrounding
situations, and the public stances of other human rights and peace advocates, the Court
can act both as an overseer and as a prosecutor in conflict situations. However, it cannot
assume these roles simultaneously. The difference in these roles accounts for the
differential effects the Court can have on peace negotiations: when the Court acts as an
overseer, it promotes successful negotiations, and when it acts as a prosecutor, it makes
negotiations more likely to fail.
The ICC can have this conditional effect because when leaders’ exit options are
constrained, they can either be propelled to or repelled from the negotiating table. How
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leaders perceive their exit options depends on a plethora of conflict conditions, many of
which have been well-explored.91 At a baseline, the possible exit options for leaders
engaged in a civil war depend on whether they win the war. If they win the war, they
maintain or achieve political incumbency. Leaders who are defeated, or who fail to
achieve decisive military victory, have a several exit options: death,92 imprisonment,93
exile,94 peaceful transfer of power,95 and a guarantee of immunity from prosecution.96
The last three can and often do occur in various combinations. The unfavorable prospects
of all of these exit options, compared to the much more favorable outcome of political
incumbency, often incentivize leaders in civil war to cling to power at all costs, and to
double down in the conflict in order to gamble for resurrection.
91

Fearon, James D. "Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?." Journal of peace research
41, no. 3 (2004): 275-301; De Rouen Jr, Karl R., and David Sobek. "The dynamics of civil war duration
and outcome." Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 303-320; Bapat, Navin A. "Insurgency and the
opening of peace processes." Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 6 (2005): 699-717; Hultquist, Philip.
"Power parity and peace? The role of relative power in civil war settlement." Journal of Peace Research
50, no. 5 (2013): 623-634; Clayton, Govinda. "Relative rebel strength and the onset and outcome of civil
war mediation." Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 5 (2013): 609-622; Hartzell, Caroline A. "Settling civil
wars: Armed opponents’ fates and the duration of the peace." Conflict Management and Peace Science 26,
no. 4 (2009): 347-365; Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. "Stabilizing the peace
after civil war: An investigation of some key variables." International organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 183208; Hoddie, Matthew, and Caroline Hartzell. "Signals of reconciliation: Institution-building and the
resolution of civil wars." International Studies Review 7, no. 1 (2005): 21-40; Hartzell, Caroline A., and
Matthew Hoddie. Crafting peace: Power-sharing institutions and the negotiated settlement of civil wars.
Penn State Press, 2007; Glassmyer, Katherine, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Rebel—military integration and
civil war termination." Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 3 (2008): 365-384; Werner, Suzanne, and Amy
Yuen. "Making and keeping peace." International Organization 59, no. 2 (2005): 261-292; Fortna, Virginia
Page. "Scraps of paper? Agreements and the durability of peace." International Organization 57, no. 2
(2003): 337-372; Fortna, Virginia Page. "Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the
duration of peace after civil war." International studies quarterly 48, no. 2 (2004): 269-292; Howard, Lise
Morjé. UN peacekeeping in civil wars. Cambridge University Press, 2008; Murdie, Amanda, and David R.
Davis. "Problematic potential: The human rights consequences of peacekeeping interventions in civil
wars." Hum. Rts. Q. 32 (2010): 49.
92
Goemans, Hein E. "Which way out? The manner and consequences of losing office." Journal of Conflict
Resolution 52, no. 6 (2008): 771-794.
93
Ibid.
94
Escribà-Folch, Abel, and Daniel Krcmaric. "Dictators in exile: Explaining the destinations of exrulers." The Journal of Politics 79, no. 2 (2017): 560-575.
95
Sutter, Daniel. "Settling old scores: Potholes along the transition from authoritarian rule." Journal of
Conflict Resolution 39, no. 1 (1995): 110-128.
; Baturo, Alexander. Democracy, dictatorship, and term limits. University of Michigan Press, 2014.
96
Escribà-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. "Human rights prosecutions and autocratic
survival." International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 343-373.

29
I argue that the involvement of the ICC is one such conflict condition that needs
to be better understood because it can affect leaders’ exit options. In this chapter, I
outline that when the ICC plays an oversight role in conflict situations, actors can be
propelled to and incentivized to stay at the negotiating table long enough to come to a
comprehensive agreement settling the conflict and establishing a new framework for
government. However, when the ICC plays a prosecutorial role in conflict situations, it
increases the chance that the peace process will fail. This is because it instills a fear of
arrest that deters leaders from effectively engaging in peace negotiations and because it
changes the panoply of leaders’ exit options so as to make continuing the fight more
attractive.
By an oversight role, I mean that the Court acts as a monitor of the human rights
situation in the conflict and an advocate for the indispensability of justice in the peace
process. Crucially, the ICC is not perceived to act as an investigator or potential punisher
of specific leaders, and is instead perceived as a monitor of the conflict situation in
general. By a prosecutorial role, I mean that the Court acts as the institution that will
either put culpable leaders on trial, or that will ensure that they stand trial in a venue it
deems legitimate. It emphasizes that its investigatory capacity is a function of this
mission, and that the information it collects will be used as evidence to hold culpable
leaders to account.
Whether the Court acts as an overseer or a prosecutor is not entirely at the Court’s
discretion, and is largely but not entirely a function of the broader political context. The
role of domestic civil society, domestic justice mechanisms, regional courts, and the
Court’s own evolution and learning throughout its twenty year history are all key factors
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here. This chapter will articulate the contextual factors that condition whether the Court
acts more as a overseer or as a prosecutor.
This chapter proceeds in six subsequent sections. The next section discusses the
theoretical relationship between the onset and outcome of peace negotiations, and why
we cannot and should not understand them independently of each other. The third section
reviews what we already know about how the ICC shapes leaders’ behavior, particularly
in conflict, and what we know about how leaders’ exit options shape prospects for peace.
The fourth section provides a brief overview of how the ICC works, as the ICC’s
institutional design is crucial for this theory. The fifth section articulates the theory itself,
first by articulating how the ICC can both propel leaders toward and keep them from the
negotiating table and then by articulating how the ICC can alternately act as either a
spoiler or guarantor of subsequent formal peace negotiations. The sixth section addresses
alternative explanations, especially the argument that the ICC does not impact conflict
termination. The seventh section concludes, and points the way towards the empirical
chapters.
2.0 Why peace negotiations’ onset matters for their outcome
Since this study’s objective is to understand how the ICC conditions possibilities
for civil war peace agreements, and since it situates its contribution in terms of a narrow
focus on one component necessary for lasting peace—a robust peace agreement—it is
worth asking why it should also consider the onset of peace negotiations. The answer is
that we cannot understand what happens at the negotiating table without understanding
how leaders got there. The onset and outcome of peace negotiations of civil wars should
not be understood independently of each other for several reasons.
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First, actors’ experiences, priorities, and constraints in the onset of peace
negotiations—that this, the liminal period during which two warring sides build enough
mutual understanding to agree to begin formal talks—are unavoidably carried on to the
talks themselves. It is easy to anticipate how actors’ interests and constraints during the
conflict would affect formal talks, but this dissertation will show that actors’ experiences
during the informal peace talks can also shape their interests and constraints during
formal peace talks. This can be especially true for rebel groups, for whom the period of
negotiating the beginning of formal talks often marks the period when they transition
from not only a militant actor, but a diplomatic, legalistic actor as well, and where rebels
become informed and sensitized to the full spectrum of political issues undergirding
peace negotiations.97 This often includes the specter of the ICC.
Second, this dissertation will not only show how the priorities and apprehensions
that define leaders’ approaches to formal peace negotiations are often heavily influenced
by what happens in the period leading up to the onset of formal peace negotiations, but it
will show how what happens during this period can heavily influence how human rights
actors, especially the ICC, approach formal peace talks.
Third, a key factor in the success of formal peace negotiations is whether leaders
find themselves to be sufficiently empowered during the negotiations—that is, whether
they feel they have the role that they deserve.98 The groundwork for leaders’ role in peace
talks is inevitably laid during the lead-up to the onset of peace negotiations.
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Finally, the way the ICC functions and the way leaders view the ICC before the
onset of formal peace talks can significantly influence how they percieve the Court
during formal negotiations. At the onset phase, the involvement of the ICC can
incentivize or deter leaders from participating in peace negotiations. ICC involvement
can incentivize leaders to participate in talks if they understand peace negotiations to be a
potential forum for “pre-arrest bargaining.”99 That is, if leaders have or fear arrest
warrants, and they think they are likely to be apprehended, ICC involvement in the
conflict might incentivize them to become involved in peace negotiations to attempt to
negotiate the degree of international accountability they can expect.100 However, if
leaders do not anticipate a flexible ICC that is willing to bargain over such issues, ICC
involvement will deter leaders from participating in negotiations.101 This dissertation’s
theory affirms this insight, but goes further by specifying the conditions under which
leaders can anticipate a flexible ICC. However, to better understand why the ICC stands
to matter so much for the outcome of civil conflict, I turn to the extant literature on how
the ICC shapes leaders’ behavior, and how leaders’ behavior shapes how civil conflict
ends.
3.0 The literature review
3.1 The ICC and leader behavior
Since the ICC’s foundation, scholars and practitioners have advanced many
explanations for how it shapes state behavior. Indeed, understanding state behavior
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regarding the Court is crucial to its mission, as its ability to operate hinges on state
cooperation.102 Therefore, it is perhaps good news for the Court that states have
incentives to cooperate with it. Cooperation with the Court can serve as a strategically
advantageous signal of cooperation with human rights and the rule of law.103 Cooperation
with the Court can also function as a signal that a given state complies with its treaty
obligations, another advantageous reputation.104 This reputation is advantageous because
it can help the state enhance its position when negotiating future treaties or signaling
about future foreign policy action.105 Having a reputation for complying with treaty
obligations also establishes a state as trustworthy within the international community,
which increases its chances of being included in higher-level negotiations.106
State leaders can also use the ICC as a tool to further their own political ends.
Therefore, the way that the ICC affects state behavior is often contingent on domestic
political incentives. When leaders see the Court as a helpful tool to constrain their
political opponents, they will cooperate with it.107 For example, leaders might see the ICC
as an “international legal lasso” with which they can remove a political foe: in such cases,
state leaders will cooperate with the ICC if the ICC investigates people outside of the
ruling coalition, and if the ICC agrees to investigate and indict opposition figures before
investigating and indicting anyone else in the country.108 However, if state leaders fear
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that the Court’s involvement will constrain—or even punish—them before it constrains
their opponents, they are less likely to cooperate with it.109 In peacetime, these opponents
are domestic political opposition, but during civil wars, they can be peaceful political
opponents, or they could be rebel leaders. The next section exclusively considers
scholarship that pertains specifically to the context of civil wars.
3.2 The ICC and leader behavior in civil conflict
The literature on international criminal accountability in conflict can be divided
into three camps: some say it makes conflict worse, some say it increases prospects for
peace, and some say it does not matter. The most optimistic camp argues that
international criminal accountability is a positive force: it promotes respect for human
rights and deters human rights abuses, in spite of some limitations.110 One optimist strain
argues that international criminal tribunals have created a new age of accountability,
which in and of itself will serve as a deterrent to atrocity crimes in war.111 The logic goes
that as prosecutions of human rights violators become more common and visible,
political leaders will become increasingly aware that they too could be prosecuted, and
will thus be deterred from committing violations. Further, there is some evidence that the
ICC affects how belligerents choose to fight. When actors want the international
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community to consider them politically legitimate, the involvement of the ICC in their
conflict will prompt them to curtail their targeting of civilians.112
Two camps of skeptics argue that international criminal prosecution is either
detrimental or of negligible impact. Some point out that even when states ratify human
rights treaties and codify agreements to enforce international accountability standards,
they do not adhere to these obligations, and argue that this means that the international
criminal accountability regime cannot have far-reaching effects.113 Detractors of
international criminal accountability contend that it can worsen human rights conditions
and make atrocities more likely to occur.114 They argue that when a state chooses to use
an international prosecution instead of offering amnesty to rebels, they prolong the
conflict, leading to more deaths.115 Others argue that even if they occur after the conflict
has ended, international prosecutions worsen human rights conditions because they
heighten divisions in the country, which could exacerbate conflict or undermine attempts
to create democracy.116
An important branch of the literature on international courts’ effects within the
context of conflict focuses on how they affect leaders’ exit options. Scholars agree that
the involvement of an international court reduces leaders’ exile options—if indicted, a
leader is less easily able to seek refuge in friendly bordering states, and also is less able to
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expect an offer of amnesty.117 However, they disagree on the implications of these
limited exit options.
Gilligan posits that international criminal tribunals can prevent some atrocities
“on the margins” because they reduce exile options for culpable leaders, thus making
them more likely to be quickly apprehended by tribunals and therefore less likely to
commit atrocity crimes.118 However, empirical tests of this reasoning show that
diminishing prospects for the safe exile of culpable leaders actually make those leaders
more likely to commit atrocity crimes,119 because diminishing exile options increase
leaders’ incentives to violently gamble for resurrection.120 To understand why the ICC’s
effect on leaders’ exit options is so crucial to its effect on prospects for peace more
broadly, we need to turn to the literature on the importance of leaders’ exit options on the
duration and termination of civil conflict.
3.3 Leader exit options and conflict termination
Conflicts end when leaders decide they should end, or when leaders can no longer
fight. All conflicts—including civil wars—necessarily end either in negotiated settlement
or decisive victory; the fighting only stops when both sides decide to stop fighting, or
when one side can no longer fight. For this reason, negotiated settlement is the only path
to conflict termination—and perhaps to the hazier, less easily operationalized outcome of
peace—that does not necessarily involve the overwhelming military destruction of one
side. These peace negotiations almost always involve external overseers—that is,
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mediators who are nationals of the country in conflict. These overseers are often
representatives of foreign governments, international organizations, and occasionally
influential NGOs.
Leaders’ perceptions of their exit options are key to understanding when
belligerents come to the table in civil wars, and when they arrive at negotiated
settlements. Most explanations for the onset of civil war peace negotiations assume that
leaders will fight until it is no longer rational for them to do so. Part of this calculus has
to do with the balance of power between the belligerents: evenly matched opponents tend
to fight longer, as they each have a decent chance of winning.121 Indeed, the onset of
peace negotiations is likeliest at a specific, limited threshold of rebel strength: the warring
parties are most likely to negotiate when the rebels are too strong to be entirely
suppressed by the government, but too weak to overthrow it entirely.122
All of these explanations take for granted the fundamental mistrust between
governments and rebels that underlies all civil wars. This mistrust is not just a function of
the grievances that led the rebels to take up arms, but is inherent to the asymmetry
between rebels and governments. At the end of a civil war, there can only be one army
left, and it must be controlled by the government; therefore, for a negotiated settlement to
be successful, rebels must lay down their arms, while the government can retain its armed
forces.123 This makes credible commitments between governments and rebel groups
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particularly difficult, and means that rebels, and especially rebel leaders, have extremely
acute fears about their post-war fates.
Coming to the negotiating table is a meaningful concession by the government of
the rebels’ power, and coming to an agreement is an inevitable risk to rebels’ postconflict fates. Leaders are likely to feel the impacts of these concessions and risks the
most acutely, and the more apprehensions leaders have about their postwar fates, the less
likely they are to come to the negotiating table.124 An important source of fear for leaders
might be international prosecution. Indeed, there is not only a well-known argument,125
but empirical, quantitative evidence that international prosecution makes leaders more
likely to continue fighting because they would rather gamble for resurrection than face
prosecution.126
3.4 Leader exit options and peace agreements
The same power asymmetry and fears about exit options that makes it difficult for
rebels and governments to credibly commit to formal negotiations leads to credible
commitment problems throughout negotiations.127 Thus, it is basically canon that the
involvement of third party mediators can mitigate this credible commitment problem and
promote the creation of a negotiated settlement.128 Much of the literature on civil war
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peace negotiations is dedicated to understanding the conditions under which such
mediations are likely to succeed, and the characteristics that successful mediators share.
Many of these explanations hinge on leaders’ exit options. In particular, postconflict power-sharing mechanisms are key because they provide rebels with increased
assurance that they will be safe after they lay down their arms129 and that they will be
incorporated into post-war institutions, which would further enhance their safety.130 The
involvement of third party guarantors can also affect leaders’ perceptions of their exit
options. International monitors can reduce fear, uncertainty and information asymmetries
between the parties,131 which helps reduce leaders’ temptation to abandon peace talks and
resume fighting in a gamble for resurrection.132
However, this literature does not disaggregate third party guarantors beyond basic
typologies. The only actor that is systematically analyzed as an individual, unique actor,
and not merely as one of a broader type, is the United Nations. Indeed, the literature on
the role of UN peacekeeping in civil wars is a literature all its own.133 The literature on
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civil war mediation stands to gain significantly from studies that focus on specific
guarantors, so that they can be understood beyond type. This dissertation helps to fill this
gap by arguing that the ICC can act as a guarantor of peace negotiations, but only under
certain conditions.
4.0 The ICC’s institutional design
The ICC is designed to promote individual criminal accountability for grave
human rights violations: its purpose is to try the worst perpetrators of the worst crimes.
The aspect of the Court’s institutional design and legal mandate that is perhaps most
central to this theoretical framework is the fact that it assumes individual criminal
responsibility, and focuses not so much on all people who have committed atrocity
crimes, but on the leaders who command and coordinate the commission of large-scale
human rights violations. Article 15 articulates a broad standard of individual criminal
responsibility,134 saying that individuals can be held accountable when they not only
commit but order, solicit, induce, incite, facilitate, aid, abet, or “contribute to the
commission of” a crime.
Central to the Court’s formation is the intention that it be a court of last resort.
The ICC was designed to be used only in situations where there is no other option. The
Rome Statute codifies this as the complementarity principle in Article 17, Section 1,
which states that a case will be not be admissable before the Court when:
(a)The Case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unable or unwilling genuinely to carry
out the investigation or prosecution;
(b)The Case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely
134
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to prosecute;135
In other words, in any case of competing claims for jurisdiction between the ICC
and a legitimate, competent domestic court, the domestic court’s claims always win.
Indeed, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the first Prosecutor of the ICC, repeatedly expressed that
crimes that fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction are ideally prosecuted on the domestic level
by a competent and fair domestic judiciary.136 When the Court was first formed, many
within and outside of the Court hoped that it would have a catalyzing effect on domestic
prosecutions: that the Court’s effects would be best seen not in the cases it took on itself,
but rather in the domestic prosecutions that would supplant potential ICC cases.137
Implicit in the complementarity principle is the contention that, no matter the
venue, perpetrators must be held accountable for their crimes. This is made explicit in
Article 98 of the Rome Statute, which prohibits states or any other actors from granting
suspects immunity.138 Since states that have ratified the Rome Statute are also legally
obligated to uphold its standards, this means that states that have signed the Rome
Statute, or states that have an ongoing ICC preliminary examination or investigation,
cannot promise amnesty to leaders. Indeed, only the ICC has the ability to revoke an ICC
arrest warrant—once an arrest warrant is issued for a leader, no state can nullify the arrest
warrant, even if it wants to.139 This represents a significant potential constraint on
negotiators.
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In spite of the complementarity principle, the Court still gets involved in the
domestic affairs of states. It has escalating modes of involvement: it can open a
preliminary examination, open an investigation, issue an indictment for leaders accused
of war crimes, bring an apprehended suspect to trial in the Hague, and conduct the trial.
A preliminary examination is the ICC’s softest mode of formal involvement. It is
initiated by the Prosecutor to gather information to see if a full investigation into a
situation is necessary. The Prosecutor will decide to initiate a preliminary examination
based on referrals from states, referrals from the UN Security Council or information
from individuals, states, IGOs, or NGOs. During this phase, the Court gathers evidence
and interviews suspects, victims, and witnesses. Importantly, the Court sends teams of
investigators to the country under examination, and to the areas where the crimes were
alleged to have occurred, and expects state cooperation in gaining access to necessary
areas, people, and resources. The objective is to assess whether there is enough
information to show that grave crimes occurred, that the case is within the Rome
Statute’s jurisdiction, that the case is admissable before the Court, and that it is in the
“interests of justice” to open an investigation.
Two factors bear noting here. The first is that complementarity is a major factor in
determining a case’s admissability. If there is a legitimate and competent domestic
judicial system, the case will likely be deemed inadmissable, as it could be tried
domestically. The second is that the requirement that the case be in the “interest of
justice” serves to prevent the Court from proceeding with a situation where its
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involvement could do more harm than good.140 This decision is at the discretion of the
Prosecutor, and is absolutely crucial.141
Practically speaking, the “interests of justice” provision accounts for the fact that
the Court simply does not have the capacity to prosecute every potential violator,142 a fact
that is extremely evident upon a simple comparison of the number of culpable leaders
enjoying impunity and the number of investigations the Court has opened. It also
accounts for the fact that the Court was designed to promote accountability generally, and
not international prosecution specifically. Indeed, prosecutorial discretion to only bring a
case if it is in the “interests of justice” evidences Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s claim
that the Court’s success will be best demonstrated by the lack of international
prosecutions, coupled with a rise in domestic accountability.143
This means that leaders can use the period of preliminary examinations to
demonstrate to the Court that opening a formal investigation—thus going further down
the road towards arrest warrants—is not in the “interests of justice.” One of the best ways
of doing that is engaging in peace negotiations and making credible, costly attempts to
instituitonalize post-conflict accountability. The rationale is that if the ICC percieves its
involvement to be detrimental to the development of these accountability measures, it
will defer further investigation in the “interests of justice.”
If, after conducting a preliminary examination, the Court determines that a
situation meets those four requirements, it will open an investigation. It is important to
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note that the Court first investigates situations where atrocities are believed to have
occurred, not cases against specific suspects. If the ICC has gathered sufficient
information during an investigation, it will issue indictments for suspected perpetrators.
Thus far, the ICC has issued 42 indictments, and 33 of those were followed by arrest
warrants.144 Of these, 9 have appeared before the Court at the Hague, and 4 have been
convicted of charges brought by the ICC.145
There are several important differences between a preliminary examination, an
investigation and an indictment that determine the nature of the Court’s involvement in a
conflict situation. When the Court has a preliminary examination in a situation involving
a civil war or peace negotiation, its formal role in the situation is primarily that of
oversight. By this, I mean that the Court functions to remind the conflict parties that an
international institution with the capacity to prosecute is monitoring the situation, is
assessing not only their history and ongoing actions in the conflict, and is committed to
ensuring that any political solution to the conflict includes justice mechanisms. However,
if the Court has not opened an investigation or issued an indictment, it does not
immediately constrain leaders’ exit options, as it is only monitoring the human rights
situation.
However, when the Court opens a formal investigation, it begins to collect
information to build cases against leaders. At this juncture, it is much more likely to
assume a prosecutorial role, as it is operating with the explicit goal of bringing charges
against culpable leaders. This distinction is important for how leaders consider their exit
options after conflict. It is one thing if the Court is simply gathering information on the
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human rights situation; it is another if it is gathering information on specific instances of
human rights violations with an eye towards prosecuting leaders.
When the Court issues arrest warrants for leaders, it is definitively acting as a
prosecutor in the conflict situation, and cannot remain in an oversight role. The nature of
its relationship with the conflict parties also changes once warrants are issued—instead of
only requesting information from conflict parties, the Court also relies on them to
cooperate in executing arrest warrants. These obligations apply particularly to states:
once a state is party to the Rome Statute, it is legally obligated to cooperate with the
Court in both the investigation and the prosecution of crimes.146 The Court can make
formal requests that states cooperate with it in various ways, such as providing
documents, providing logistical support for the investigation, or assisting with protecting
witness confidentiality. These obligations to cooperate may not significantly onstain state
behavior when the ICC is engaged in a preliminary examination or investigation, but state
obligations increase once the ICC has issued arrest warrants. Once the Court issues arrest
warrants, all states that have ratified the Rome Statute are legally bound to arrest those
named and turn them over either to the Court or to their domestic judicial system for
prosecution.147 The ICC does not have its own police force, and particularly relies on
state cooperation at this stage.
In practice, this cooperation does not always occur. A banner instance of a state’s
failure to comply with this Rome Statute obligation occurred in June 2015, when South
Africa, a state party to the Rome Statute, allowed Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir,
who had been indicted by the Court for genocide, to leave a diplomatic summit without
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being detained.148 Nonetheless, although states can and do violate this treaty obligation, it
still means that once an ICC arrest warrant is issued for a leader, states can always
legitimately arrest him, and that his arrest will always have the backing of a major
international human rights institution. This is why ICC arrest warrants always remove
credible offers of amnesty from the table. Even if the negotiating parties would like to
offer amnesty, the fact that only the ICC can remove an arrest warrant, coupled with the
fact that it is always legal for someone to be arrested on an outstanding ICC warrant,
means that no matter the approach of other actors in peace negotiations, an ICC warrant
means that amnesty is no longer a viable exit option for the indicted leader.
5.0 The theory
The ICC has conditional effects on the onset and outcome of peace negotiations
because by virtue of its institutional design, the discretion of the ICC Prosecutor, and the
actions of the constellation of human rights and peace advocates that coalesce around it,
it has the potential to play two different and mutually exclusive roles: prosecutor and
overseer. In this dissertation, I argue that when the ICC plays the role of prosecutor, it
deters leaders from coming to the negotiating table, or, once they are there, it spoils peace
negotiations. On the other hand, when it plays the role of overseer, it compels leaders to
come to the table, and, once they are there, acts as a guarantor of the peace process. In the
following section, I describe the elements of this theory that apply both to the onset and
outcome of peace negotiations. Then, in two subsequent sections, I flesh out how these
concepts specifically apply to the onset of peace negotiations, and then how they apply to
their outcome.
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The Court plays an oversight role when it positions itself as a monitor of the
human rights situation in the conflict, and an advocate for the indispensability of justice
in the peace process. The Court’s prosecutorial capacity is crucial to its oversight role,
but in playing the oversight role, the Court does not wield the stick of prosecution.
However, the Court’s latent capacity to prosecute means that leaders must pay attention
to the fact that the Court is monitoring the situation, and are compelled to include justice
mechanisms in any political solution to the conflict. Further, for the Court to play an
oversight role, advocates, external mediators, the people affected by the conflict, and
especially culpable leaders must percieve the Court to be monitoring the entire conflict
situation, closely tracking the human rights record of both sides, and pushing the agenda
of justice rather than prosecution.
The Court plays a prosecutorial role when it positions itself as the institution that
will either put culpable leaders on trial, or make sure that they are tried somewhere. It
construes its investigatory work as a function of a prosecutorial mission: it portrays the
point of investigation to be gathering evidence to hold culpable leaders to account.
Whether the Court plays a prosecutorial role is not completely up to it, however. It is also
about how it is perceived by the other actors in the conflict situation. When these actors,
including human rights and peace advocates, external mediators, the people most affected
by the conflict, and especially potentially culpable leaders, see the Court only as a
prosecutorial, rather than justice-promoting, institution, the Court is consigned to play the
role of prosecutor.
Whether the Court acts as a prosecutor or an overseer depends on the Court’s
formal and informal approach, as well as the public stances of the human rights and peace
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advocates also working in the conflict situation. When the Court’s formal and informal
approach emphasize prosecution narrowly, rather than justice broadly, and when
advocates publicly contradict the Court’s anti-impunity norms, it plays a prosecutorial
role. However, when the Court’s formal and informal approach emphasize justice
broadly, and when advocates publicly reinforce the its anti-impunity norms, the Court
plays an oversight role.
By formal approach, I refer to the formal status of the Court’s involvement in a
conflict situation, or whether the situation is in the preliminary examination,
investigation, indictment, or trial stage. When the Court has issued arrest warrants, it is
impossible for it to function in any role outside of the role of prosecutor; however, when
it is still in the preliminary examination or even the investigation phase of a situation, it is
possible for it to play the role of overseer.
By informal approach, I refer to how much the Court’s public facing officials, and
more than anyone, its Prosecutor, emphasize the specific prosecution of leaders relative
to the broad pursuit of justice in their public statements. There are several ways that the
Court’s public relations style can emphazise a prosecutorial rather than simply a justicepromoting approach. The most basic is that the Court can publicly promise to make good
on indictments or arrest warrants issued for certain leaders. The Court can repeatedly and
publicly remind states of their Rome Statute obligations to not offer amnesty under any
circumstances, and to apprehend and arrest any indicted leaders. Short of that, the Court
can also make public statements of its commitment to prosecute and prevent impunity for
culpable leaders. The volume of these statements matters: repeated, insistent public
reminders of the norms codified in the Rome Statute and the Court’s commitment to
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pursue them, especially when indictments have been issued, amount to an affirmation of
the Court’s prosecutorial role.
On the other hand, the Court can maintain an oversight role in its public relations
style by making fewer statements, and by emphasizing its commitment to justice broadly,
and not only to international prosecution narrowly. Further, the Court can downplay its
prosecutorial capacity—and avoid casting itself in the role of prosecutor—by
emphasizing the complementarity principle, thus affirming its role in promoting
accountability through various means and venues, instead of simply by international
prosecution. Lastly, if the Court is still in the preliminary examination phase, it can
emphasize its commitment to act in the “interests of justice,” subtly reminding its
audiences that although it can mount international prosecutions, it is not consigned to do
so, and will decline to pursue prosecutions if it decides that justice can be better pursued
by other means.
I also argue that the public positions of human rights and peace advocates
condition whether the ICC assumes the role of prosecutor or overseer. In brief, I argue
that when advocates contradict the Court, the Court falls into more of a prosecutorial role,
but when advocates amplify the Court’s normative message, they enable it to play an
oversight role. To unpack how this works, we need to understand who these advocates
are and why their voices matter.
By human rights or peace advocate, I mean any political organization of any size
and scope who is involved in the conflict situation either to promote human rights or
make peace. Most typically, these advocates are either domestic and international NGOs
fighting for respect for human rights and the rule of law. They can also be states and
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international organizations working to bring about a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
Although all of these advocates fit into my theory the same way, NGOs are especially
important because of their relationships to the Court.
Since literally before its inception, the ICC’s relationships with NGOs have been
extremely important to its basic functions.149 NGOs are also absolutely crucial for
amplifying the ICC’s argument about preventing impunity: according to the convener of
the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), thousands of NGOs have staff
dedicated to promoting the ICC’s work.150 Crucially, these NGOs are committed to the
norms upon which the Court was founded much more than they are committed to the
Court itself; in other words, most NGOs see themselves as promoting the Rome Statute,
not the Court.151 Since NGOs are often not constrained by their relationships to states—
whereas the ICC overwhelmingly depends on states for its budget and operating reach—
NGOs can afford to be bolder in their public advocacy of these norms.152 Indeed, NGOs
can act as a voice for the Court before the Court itself speaks, thus amplifying the Court’s
voice while also shielding it from the political ramifications that could have come if the
Court had spoken for itself.153 My argument is that when human rights NGOs do so, they
are helping the ICC to assume an oversight role in peace negotiations.
The reason for this is simple, but bears elucidation. When a civil society
organization—or indeed, any organization that is not an international court—makes a
public statement either railing against impunity or explicitly calling for the prosecution of
149
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culpable leaders, it does not pose the same threat to leaders’ exit options as when the
Court itself makes that statement. This is simply because no other human rights promoter
has the mandate to prosecute any leader, anywhere in the world. As has been previously
detailed, when the ICC itself makes such strong anti-impunity statements, it casts itself in
the role of prosecutor. However, when another organization makes a strong anti-impunity
statement in an situation that the ICC is involved in, that organization cannot cast itself as
a prosecutor because it does not have the capacity to prosecute. In brief, nonprosecutorial human rights and peace advocates are better positioned than the Court to
remind leaders of the terms of the Rome Statute without simultaneously making them
feel threatened by these terms.
Thus, when advocates take up the mantle of strongly advocating against
impunity, they are reminding culpable leaders of the ICC’s latent capacity to prosecute
without actually threatening their exit options. This clears space for the ICC to continue
to advocate for justice during the peace process without disincentivizing leaders from
participating, and thus allows it to continue to act as an overseer and avoid assuming the
role of prosecutor. Further, if advocates promote prosecution while the ICC promotes
justice more broadly construed, then leaders will take the task of addressing questions of
post-conflict justice more seriously in the peace process because they will be more
consistently mindful of the fact that doing so could help them to neutralize the latent
threat of ICC prosecution.
However, human rights and peace advocates do not necessarily have to advocate
on behalf of the Court or its anti-impunity norms. For one thing, not all countries have the
same constellation of human rights NGOs that are equipped to advocate for the Court’s

52
principles and work. One important factor that conditions the role NGOs can play is the
previous involvement of regional human rights courts in the country or conflict situation.
Regional court systems matter because they can condition the way that both states and
civil society organizations are used to interacting with Courts.154 The existence of a
regional court can sensitize states to the practices required to cooperate with courts, and
can especially sensitize state leaders to interactions with supranational courts.155 For
example, the IACtHR has more institutional mechanisms to allow NGOs to play a role,
which has contributed to the evolution of a strong network of civil society organizations
with considerable experience and expertise in international legal institutions and human
rights law.156
However, in some cases, human rights and peace advocates are not sensitized to
the accountability norms that undergird the Rome Statute, or do not know how to best
coordinate their advocacy with the Court’s work. Indeed, advocates can also be vocally
critical of the Court or can publically ask it to reduce its involvement in conflict
situations. When human rights or peace advocates publically contradict the Court’s
normative commitment against impunity, they enhance its role as prosecutor, and its
effect as a spoiler, in two ways.
First, statements that publicly call the anti-impunity norm into question can
provoke public reaffirmations from the ICC of the need for accountability. These
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reaffirmations can often be the kind of public statements that cast the Court in a
prosecutorial role, especially when the Court has issued indictments or arrest warrants.
Thus, when advocates’ critiques of the Court or its mission prompt it to publicly defend
itself, this often results in it backing further into a prosecutorial corner.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, when advocates—especially human rights
advocates—question the role and normative commitments of the Court, this can increase
leaders’ uncertainty about their exit options. Leaders will routinely consult with external
actors on peace negotiations, and rebel leaders in particular will often rely on civil society
organizations to understand the legal and political issues at play during peace
negotiations. When these organizations’ statements contradict the Court’s, this increases
leaders’ uncertainty about their exit options. However, these contradictions would not
increase leaders’ uncertainty about the viability of resuming the fight in hopes of
gambling for resurrection. Indeed, they might make it a more attractive option.
A broad sketch of the concepts used in this theoretical framework, and an
explanation of why they matter, do not do enough to explain how the ICC can both
propel and prevent leaders from making peace, and how the Court can both spoil and
guarantee peace negotiations. The following two subsections illustrate how these
concepts condition the ICC’s role first in the onset of peace negotiations, and then in their
outcome.
5.1 How the ICC affects the onset of peace negotiations
If there is a canon of conventional wisdom in the perennial peace-justice debate, it
surely includes the notion that rebel leaders, who are already in a position of insecurity
relative to their government counterparts, find it difficult to enter peace negotiations in
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good faith if there is an imminent threat of prosecution and punishment.157 This is why
advocates of amnesty argue that amnesty is a bedrock of successful peace negotiations.158
However, prosecution might not always be a deterrent to formal peace
negotiations. Indeed, the empirical evidence shows that while domestic prosecutions
might hinder belligerents from coming to the negotiating table, international prosecutions
do not always prevent them from coming to the table. Thus, in this section I argue that,
depending on the other conditions of the conflict situation, the ICC can either propel
actors to or deter them from participation in formal peace negotiations.
Whether the ICC brings actors to or keeps them from the table depends on how
the involvement of the ICC affects leaders’ calculations of their exit options: if ICC
involvement means that leaders have a long-range concerns about prosecution but no
immediate fear of arrest, it will incentivize them to come to the table. However, if ICC
involvement makes leaders fear arrest, it will deter them from participating in peace
negotiations. I argue that when the ICC assumes a prosecutorial role, it deters leaders
from coming to the table precisely because they will have immediate fears of arrest, and
when the ICC assumes an oversight role, it compels leaders to come to the table in order
to neutralize a possible threat of prosecution.
This theory, as well as the set of factors that condition whether the ICC plays a
prosecutorial or oversight role, is summarized in the following figure. Then, two
subsections flesh out how the ICC assumes a prosecutorial role that deters leaders from
the table, and how it assumes an oversight role that compels them to negotiate.
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Figure 2.5.1. How the ICC affects the onset of peace negotiations
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5.1.1 How the ICC prevents peace negotiation onset
When the ICC plays a prosecutorial role in a conflict situation, it can stop peace
before it even begins. When there is an ICC indictment or arrest warrant for leaders, the
threat of immediate threat of arrest can override whatever incentives leaders might have
to come to the table to negotiate peace. If leaders do not believe that they can use peace
negotiations to create more favorable exit options, they will not engage in peace
negotiations. Then, it is obvious that if leaders believe that engaging peace negotiations
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will lead to their prosecution in an international court—a very suboptimal exit option—
they certainly will not engage.
Whether the ICC serves as a deterrent to leaders arriving at the table largely
depends on whether the ICC plays the role of prosecutor. If the ICC has issued arrest
warrants for rebel leaders, it inevitably plays the role of prosecutor. However, the ICC
can also cast itself in the role of prosecutor through its public stances. If it casts itself
principally as a prosecutor, and less as a promoter of justice, broadly construed, and
signals that it is unwilling to compromise on the indictment, arrest, and international
prosecution of leaders, this diminishes leaders’ potential to use engagement in peace
negotiations to create better exit options for themselves.
The public stances of human rights and peace advocates also condition whether
the ICC deters leaders from coming to the negotiating table. When advocates publicly
contradict the ICC, and especially when they contradict the Rome Statute’s anti-impunity
norms, they can deter leaders from coming to peace negotiations by prompting the ICC to
further assume the role of prosecutor, and by increasing leaders’ uncertainty about how
the ICC will affect their exit options. Further, these mechanisms can be interrelated: if the
ICC reaffirms its commitment to prosecute even in the face of criticism or contradiction
from human rights and peace advocates, this shows leaders that any efforts they make to
create a peace agreement with post-conflict justice provisions might not help them secure
good exit options because the ICC seems determined to prosecute them regardless.
An important subset of this outcome is that an ICC investigation or indictment
might incentivize leaders to participate in negotiations from a distance while sending
varyingly equipped and intentioned representatives to appear at the table on their behalf.
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While in some sense this represents participation in negotiations, when leaders are not in
effective communication with their representatives, it can effectively constitute a failure
to arrive at the table.
5.1.2 How the ICC promotes peace negotiation onset
This mechanism is founded on the contention that when ICC involvement in a
conflict situation makes leaders fear the long-range prospect of international prosecution,
but does not make them immediately fear arrest, they will be more likely to participate in
peace negotiations. This logic seems counterintuitive—how can someone fear
prosecution without fearing arrest?
Part of the answer lies in the nature of the ICC, and in its escalating modes of
involvement in a conflict situation, and part of the answer lies in how the ICC can choose
to shape its own role in a conflict situation. Recall that the ICC can be involved in a
conflict situation in several ways: it can have a preliminary examination to determine if a
situation meets the criteria for a formal investigation, it can open a formal investigation to
assess whether it can charge leaders with crimes, it can issue indictments of leaders for
crimes, and it can bring leaders to trial. All of these different levels of involvement
constitute escalating threats of prosecution. Recall also that, due to the principle of
complementarity, there is only one surefire way for leaders to avoid international
prosecution: designing a competent and legitimate domestic justice system to whose
jurisdiction the ICC will defer. Recall finally that the Rome Statute gives the ICC
Prosecutor the discretion to not escalate its involvement in a conflict situation if the
Prosecutor determines that it is not in the “interests of justice” to do so.
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Therefore, when the ICC is involved in a preliminary examination of a situation,
leaders are sensitized to the possibility of international prosecution, but international
prosecution is not an imminent threat. Leaders have two clear pathways to remove the
possible threat of prosecution: the principles of complementarity and the Prosecutor’s
discretion on the “interests of justice.” Even at this stage of ICC involvement, leaders
have incentives to take measures to prevent the initiation of a formal ICC investigation
which could result in the issuance of arrest warrants. One way for leaders to stave off a
formal ICC investigation is to show that they are working toward resolving the conflict
and ceasing hostilities.
The material differences between preliminary examinations and investigations
matter here. During a preliminary examination, the Court does not have full investigatory
powers, and the scope of the investigation is only meant to determine whether a case can
be brought before the Court.159 This is good news for leaders, because during the
preliminary examination phase, leaders can use their involvement in peace negotiations to
show the Court that it might not be in the “interests of justice” to mount a full
investigation into specific individuals, thus ensuring that the Court’s focus remains on the
conflict broadly rather on them specifically.
State leaders have a particular incentive to prevent the escalation of an ICC
preliminary examination, as an ICC investigation might be perceived to bring with it
reputational costs: the club of states under ongoing ICC investigation is not a club of
which most states want to be a member. Indeed, while all leaders have incentives to
ensure that the ICC’s involvement in a situation does not escalate beyond a preliminary
159
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examination due to concerns about their own exit options, state leaders also might have
enhanced incentives to protect their state’s international reputation.
Rebel leaders also have a distinct incentive to come to the table when the ICC is
involved in a conflict situation. When the ICC is involved, rebel leaders are assured that
an international institution is overseeing the negotiations, which can serve as a check to
the state. This is especially important for rebel leaders, who fear that once they
demobilize, the state can renege on any promises regarding their post-conflict fates. The
involvement of an international institution, and especially an international institution that
promotes human rights and has the mandate to prosecute culpable state leaders, makes it
more difficult for the state to do this, thus providing assurances to rebel leaders.160
Thus, when the ICC has a preliminary examination in a state, this creates a clear
incentive for leaders to come to the negotiating table. Appearing to make progress in
resolving the conflict and halting hostilities can signal to the Court, and to the
international community, that the actors are committed to getting their proverbial houses
in order and to improving the human rights situation.
However, the Court’s formal mode of involvement is not the only aspect of its
role that affects leaders’ decisions to come to the table. If the Court emphasizes that its
objectives are to promote justice in the conflict situation, and if it has a chorus of
advocates echoing its normative commitment to do so, this further incentivizes leaders to
come to the negotiating table. These advocates’ statements serve to remind leaders that
they can use involvement in peace negotiations to neutralize the latent threat of
prosecution that the ICC poses, whereas if the Court itself made these statements, it
would cast itself more in the role of prosecutor. Still, it is Court’s involvement in the
160
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situation that makes these statements matter to leaders, as they remind leaders that
engaging in peace negotiations and taking the question of justice seriously throughout can
help them avoid international prosecution.
When the ICC has a formal investigation or indictments, this can also incentivize
leaders to come to the negotiating table, but due to the escalated threat of prosecution that
these stages represent, a set of additional conditions can determine whether an ICC
investigation or indictment will compel leaders to come to the table or keep them away
from it. Particularly important is how the ICC frames its role in the situation: if its public
relations style emphasizes its commitment to justice, and leaves open the possibility that
justice includes outcomes where culpable leaders are not prosecuted in the Hague, ICC
involvement can incentivize leaders to come to the negotiating table even if its formal
role in the situation is closer to prosecution.
A caveat is in order here. I assume that a formal ICC investigation amounts to a
significant threat of prosecution—a much more escalated threat than a preliminary
examination represents—because the ICC can move from a formal investigation to
issuing an indictment quite quickly. The Libyan case is an instructive example. In
response to a referral from the UN Security Council on February 26, 2011,161 the ICC
opened a formal investigation into the Libya situation on March 2, 2011.162 On May 16,
2011, the ICC issued arrest warrants for three Libyan leaders, including Muammar al
Gaddafi, the president.163 Thus, in the space of two and a half months, the ICC opened an
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investigation and issued arrest warrants, showing that the opening of a formal ICC
investigation can represent a fairly immediate threat of arrest for leaders.
Since a formal investigation or indictment can represent a fairly immediate threat
of arrest, it is important to outline the conditions under which they can compel leaders to
come to the negotiating table, rather than deterring them from arriving to it for fear of
arrest. Again, part of the explanation here rests on the notion of complementarity, which
can explain why international prosecution promotes participation in peace negotiations in
a way that domestic prosecution does not. Once the ICC issues an arrest warrant, the only
way that leaders can be assured that the ICC will drop the warrant is if their case is
brought to a domestic justice system whose legitimacy and competence the ICC will
accept. Indeed, if an ICC arrest warrant is issued for a leader, every state signatory to the
Rome Statute is legally obligated to act on that warrant, which significantly lowers the
indicted leader’s chances of safe exile in a third country once the conflict has ended.164
Further, even if the state does offer amnesty to the indicted leader, it will be reneging on
its Rome Statute commitments, will likely face censure from the international community
for doing so, and will certainly always have the legal option to renege on this promise of
amnesty.
Peace negotiations represent an important opportunity for leaders to shape the
post-conflict justice system that could serve as the only legally viable alternative to ICC
prosecution. Indeed, a crucial function of civil war peace negotiations is to begin to create
new post-conflict government institutions, and an ICC investigation or indictment gives
leaders a particularly heightened interest in shaping post-conflict judicial institutions.
Therefore, in some cases, when the ICC opens an investigation or issues an arrest
164
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warrant, peace negotiations become a much more attractive exit option for leaders
because they give them an opportunity to pursue a post-conflict future that does not
involve standing trial at the Hague by shaping post-conflict domestic justice institutions
in which they would be less likely to face punishment.
Still, there are a few conditions that must apply for an ICC investigation or
indictment to encourage leaders to come to the negotiating table in hopes of avoiding
international prosecution. First, leaders need to understand the principle of
complementarity, which presupposes a fairly sophisticated understanding of the Rome
Statute and of how the ICC works.165 Leaders who understand the Court will also
understand that the Court does not have the means to prosecute or even exert significant
pressure on every human rights situation, and they will take the Court’s political and
material constraints into account in their approach to peace negotiations.166 They will also
understand that the Court endows the Prosecutor with considerable discretion, which
means that the Rome Statute is not consistently or universally applied.167
A key conditioning factor here is whether leaders believe the ICC’s role to be
inevitably that of prosecutor, or whether they think they can dissuade it from playing the
role of prosecutor and instead engage with it as an advocate for justice. When the ICC,
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especially through its public signalling, casts itself in the role of overseer, and its signals
convey a broad commitment to ensuring justice, rather than a narrow commitment to
prosecution, then leaders will see an opportunity to use the peace process to neutalize any
potential threat of ICC prosecution. When the Court emphasizes its broad commitment to
justice, it leaves leaders room to consider peace negotiations an opportunity to negotiate
what that justice would look like, especially regarding their post-conflict exit fates.168
Based on this understanding, informed leaders who are under investigation or
indictment by the ICC but who see the ICC more as an overseer than a prosecutor, far
from being driven away from peace negotiations out of fear of arrest, are in fact
incentivized to join peace negotiations in hopes of shaping a more favorable, and equally
legal and legitimate, alternative to international prosecution.
5.2 How the ICC affects the outcome of peace negotiations
Once negotiations are underway, the ICC’s involvement in a conflict situation
significantly affects both rebel and state leaders’ calculations of their exit options, and of
the political situation more broadly. Even when leaders engage in peace negotiations, the
threat of the escalation of a preliminary examination into an investigation, an
investigation into an indictment, or an ICC arrest warrant do not disappear. Thus, at this
phase of the peace process, the ICC also affects the outcome of peace negotiations largely
in how it changes leaders’ calculations surrounding their own exit options.
In particular, ICC involvement at this phase of peacemaking might significantly
constrain what leaders can offer to their counterparts as incentives to make peace. The
ICC was founded based on a normative commitment to prevent impunity after atrocity, so
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whatever its level of involvement in a situation, it can and will work against leaders who
seek to promise impunity to their counterparts as an incentive to negotiate, or who use
negotiations to advocate for themselves. Then, once an arrest warrant has been issued,
unconditional amnesty is not a legally viable option, and any promise of amnesty during
negotiations can significantly damage the state’s credibility.
Indeed, the central mechanism by which the ICC affects leaders’ calculations of
their exit options during this phase is predicated on the fact that its involvement
complicates offers of amnesty, a key incentive for leaders to make peace. This affects
leaders’ exit options, but it also conditions leaders’ trust in their negotiating counterparts,
and their perceptions of each other’s credibility. However, ICC involvement can also
enhance leaders’ trust in the negotiating process, as the ICC can function as an external
monitor of the peace process, and as one that is specifically committed to preventing
human rights violations. Therefore, in some situations, the ICC’s commitment to
preventing impunity can serve to enhance leaders’ investment in the negotiating process,
as they know they have a monitoring organization that is invested in holding their
opponents accountable for any post-ratification violence.
The ICC’s commitment to preventing amnesty and impunity should be uniform
across all the situations in which it is involved. In reality, however, this is not the case,
partially because the Court’s limited material capacity forces it to make political
decisions about where to pursue prosecution.169 Its public conveyence of this anti-
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impunity commitment, correspondingly, is not always uniform. When the Court
construes its commitment as to justice, rather than to prosecution, it better posititions
itself to play an oversight role and thus be a guarantor of peace negotiations. When
human rights and peace advocates amplify the Court’s normative commitment against
impunity, they enable it to emphasize justice over prosecution. However, when advocates
contradict the norms of the Rome Statue, they can prompt the Court to reaffirm its
commitment to end impunity, and thus prompt it to play a more prosecutorial role.
Depending on the relative balance between these conditions, the ICC can
alternately act as a guarantor or as a spoiler of the peace process. If the ICC plays the role
of overseer, it can enhance leaders’ trust in the peace process, and thus act as a guarantor.
However, if the ICC assumes the role of prosecutor, and thus makes indispensable
leaders fear imminent prosecution, it damages prospects for peace by incentivizing those
leaders to stay away from the table. These two pathways are summarized in the following
chart, and are then further detailed in two subsections.
Figure 2.5.2. How the ICC affects the outcome of peace negotiations
EXPLANATORY
FACTORS

CAUSAL MECHANISMS

COURT ROLE

COURT EFFECT

PROSECUTOR

SPOILER

Prosecutorial
style
Court emphasizes
prosecution
Indictments
Advocates contradict
anti-impunity norm

Prosecutorial
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style
Court emphasizes
justice
Preliminary
examination

OVERSEER

GUARANTOR

Advocates reinforce
anti-impunity norm
Regional courts

5.2.1. How the ICC spoils peace negotiations
There are a few key conditions under which ICC plays the role of prosecutor and
thus spoils peace negotiations. The first is when a situation is under investigation or
especially when indictments have been issued for rebel leaders who are key stakeholders
in the peace process. The second is when the ICC emphasizes prosecution narrowly over
justice broadly in its public statements. When the ICC does so, it risks spoiling peace
negotiations because an ICC investigation coupled with signals of the ICC’s commitment
to prosecution reminds leaders that, if the ICC issues arrests warrants for them, they
cannot legally be offered amnesty and therefore cannot be guaranteed a post-conflict fate
that does not involve prosecution at the ICC.
Amnesty can be a key building block of good faith and an important costly signal
of intent for peace negotiations. ICC indictments—or frequent reminders of the
possibility of indictments—lessen the effectiveness of amnesty, and change leaders’
calculus about their exit options. Further, if the ICC signals that the domestic court
system is not capable of carrying out a trial that the ICC would accept as legitimate, it
further reduces leaders’ perceptions of their exit options. If leaders calculate that they
cannot expect amnesty, or a fair domestic trial that the ICC would accept as an alternative
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to international prosecution, withdrawing from peace talks to resume the fight in hopes of
victory might seem to be a more viable exit option.
The ICC’s signals of a commitment to prosecution can be especially detrimental
to peace negotiations when they contradict the signals of other key actors in the process.
For instance, if a state government offers rebels amnesty in spite of ICC’s threats or
issuance of arrest warrants, or especially their repeated signals pursuant to those warrants,
the state damages its own credibility in negotiations, as once an ICC warrant is issued,
the state can always legally apprehend the leader on the basis of the ICC warrant. Thus,
the state is making a promise it cannot keep, which will call into question all other offers
it makes—this stands, no matter the perceived intentions behind the offer of amnesty. In
this case, rebels might lose faith either in the state’s commitment to and understanding of
its prior treaty obligations, or in the state’s commitment to simply not double-cross them.
Further, when ICC signals contradict the public statements of civil society actors
invested in post-conflict justice outcomes, this increases leaders’ uncertainty about their
own exit options. However, these contradictory signals would not increase leaders’
uncertainty about the viability of gambling for resurrection. Therefore, increased
uncertaity about the likelihood of international justice could make resuming the fight a
more attractive option.
5.2.2 How the ICC guarantees peace negotiations
The ICC be a guarantor of peace negotiations by playing an oversight role. It can
signal its commitment to preventing impunity by advocating for justice broadly rather
than international prosecution specifcally, so that leaders do not fear their own
prosecution; in other words, the way the ICC signals its commitment to ending impunity
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can enhance leaders’ faith that they can use negotiations to improve their exit options.
Further, playing an oversight role also situates the ICC as a guarantor of respect for
human rights and a barrier against state excesses post-conflict, which especially enhances
rebel leaders’ faith that engaging in peace negotiations does not necessarily threaten their
post-conflict exit options.
The ICC can act as a guarantor in situations when an indictment has not yet been
issued, but in which the ICC is conducting a preliminary examination, or even perhaps an
investigation. In this case, leaders’ desire to avoid prosecution at The Hague can help the
ICC serve as a guarantor of the peace process. Leaders will be committed to the peace
process because it can help them shape a set of domestic judiciary institutions that they
can use to avoid trial at The Hague and maximize their chances of avoiding punishment
at home as well. Further, if ICC involvement is still in the preliminary examiniation
stage, leaders can use peace negotiations to show the ICC Prosecutor to that it would not
be in the “interests of justice” to open a formal investigation.
The ICC’s public stances are also crucial determinants of whether it can act as
guarantor in peace negotiations. When the ICC emphasizes its commitment to justice
broadly over its capacity to prosecute, this reaffirms to leaders that, drawing on the
principle of complementarity or on prosecutorial discretion on the “interests of justice,”
they can use the peace process to convince the Court that domestic accountability
mechanisms would be preferable to international prosecution. Consistent ICC emphasis
on justice over prosecution also enhances its role as a guarantor because it reminds
leaders that they need to take the role of justice seriously in any peace agreement they
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sign, which can help promote credible commitments on post-conflict justice that mitigate
leaders’ fears about their post-conflict fates after the peace agreement is signed.
The ICC’s role as a guarantor in peace negotiations is contingent on human rights
and peace advocates’ public support for the Rome Statute’s anti-impunity norms. This
support is absolutely crucial because it reminds leaders of the implications of ICC
involvement in the situation—that the ICC has the capacity to prosecute culpable leaders,
and if leaders do not take questions of post-conflict justice seriously in peace
negotiations, they run the risk of the ICC escalating its involvement. When the ICC itself
reminds leaders of these realities, it casts itself in a prosecutorial role. However, since
other human rights advocates do not have the capacity to prosecute culpable leaders,
when their public statements remind leaders of these realities, they allow the ICC to
continue playing an oversight role, while also reminding leaders of their incentives use
the peace process to neutralize the latent threat of ICC prosecution.
6.0 The alternative explanation
An important potential alternative explanation for the role of the ICC in civil war
peace processes is that the ICC does not play a significant role at all. Indeed, it is possible
that whatever relevance the ICC appears to have is actually epiphenomenal, and that it is
not the ICC itself that has the effects articulated above, but the constellation of other
actors that mobilize around it, such as domestic and regional courts, NGOs, other
international institutions, and states. Others argue that when the Court appears to matter,
it is actually due to the influence of powerful states, and not the Court as an actor in and
of itself.170
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To evaluate the extent to which the Court’s role is epiphenomenal—that is,
whether it is the constellation of actors that might coalesce around the Court, instead of
the Court itself that matters— we should consider a situation where the Court was absent,
but these actors still behaved the same way. In other words, if the Court is
epiphenomenal, in situations where the same constellation of human rights and peace
advocates campaign vociferously against impunity and call for culpable leaders to be held
accountable, even in the absence of the Court, we should still see successful peace
negotiations with justice as an important item on the agenda. My theory argues that the
presence of the Court in a conflict situation makes this advocacy matter the way it does;
however, if the alternative explanation that the ICC is epiphenomenal holds, this
advocacy should matter regardless of ICC involvement.
7.0 Conclusion
This chapter set out a theoretical explanation for previous empirical findings that
the ICC has both spoiled and promoted the success of peace negotiations. I account for
this discrepancy by theorizing that the way that the ICC affects peace processes depends
on the role that it plays: when it plays the role of overseer, it promotes successful peace
processes, and when it plays the role of prosecutor, it makes peace processes more likely
to fail.
When the ICC plays an oversight role, its involvement in the conflict situation can
promote the onset of peace negotiations by propelling leaders to the negotiating table.
When leaders believe that they can use peace negotiations to shape better post-conflict
exit options, they will come to the table. If the ICC is involved in a conflict as an
overseer, it can make leaders more likely to see peace negotiations as an opportunity to
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improve their post-conflict fates because they will see peace negotiations as an
opportunity to neutralize the latent threat of ICC prosection, and will also see the
potential of the ICC to enhance their opponents’ credible commitments on post-conflict
justice. When the ICC plays the role of prosecutor, ICC involvement will deter leaders
from coming to the negotiating table when they believe that coming to the table
constitutes too great a risk of arrest and international prosecution, and therefore that their
exit options are better if they continue the fight.
Once peace negotiations are underway, the ICC can also assume the role of an
overseer or a prosecutor, which determines whether it functions as a guarantor or a
spoiler. When a situation has a strong, united coalition of domestic civil society actors
that remind belligerents of their Rome Statute obligations, the Court can effectively
assume the role of overseer, because it can rely on other actors to consistently convey and
reinforce its message. However, when the constellation of civil society actors does not
consistently reinforce the norms of the Rome Statute, or even contradicts the Court’s
stance on impunity, the ICC’s involvement will increase belligerents’ uncertainty about
their post-conflict fates. In such situations, the ICC acts as a spoiler of peace negotiations.
By presenting a real threat of arrest and trial, it gives leaders more reason to fear their
post-conflict exit options, and when its signals contradict those of other human rights
proponents, it gives leaders more reason to be uncertain about their post-conflict exit
options.
The next chapter of this dissertation uses a quantative analysis of 367 peace
mediations from 1989-2010 to illustrate that there is a systematic, empirical trend of
peace negotiations involving international prosecution either ending in full settlements, or
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with no settlement at all. The following three chapters illustrate the causal mechanisms
undergirding this finding, as articulated in this chapter, through three qualitative case
studies of peace negotiations in Colombia, Uganda, and Sri Lanka. In Colombia, the ICC
assumed the role of overseer, which propelled actors to the negotiating table and helped it
act as a guarantor of the 2016 peace agreement. The ICC functioned as a guarantor of the
peace process because it provided assurance—in concert with civil society actors—that,
in keeping with the norms of the Rome Statute, post-conflict justice would not be a tool
that the state used to punish rebels.
In Uganda, the ICC first acted as an overseer, and therefore its investigation
helped propel the LRA to participate in peace negotiations with the Ugandan
government. However, the ICC then issued indictments and took an increasingly
prosecutorial stance. It then stopped functioning as an overseer and began functioning as
a prosecutor. I argue that the ICC’s role as a prosecutor kept LRA leaders from
participating in the peace negotiations that were already underway, and constrained their
perception of their post-conflict exit options so much that it significantly contributed to
their decision to abandon peace negotiations and resume the fight. Thus, when the ICC
assumed a prosecutorial role, it became a spoiler, and was one of several reasons that
Uganda and the LRA failed to reach a peace agreement.
Finally, I use the case of Sri Lanka as a counterfactual to evaluate the alternative
explanation that the ICC is epiphenomenal. The Sri Lankan conflict saw the involvement
of all of the actors that typically interact with or magnify the work of the ICC: powerful
external states, major human rights NGOs, a robust domestic civil society, and several
intergovernmental organizations, including the UN. However, the ICC was not involved
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in the conflict between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka. Many other
international human rights organizations were involved, and sent strong signals on
international efforts towards post conflict justice. Numerous human rights promoters—
including the UN and major NGOs—advocated for post-conflict accountability, including
by calling for the prosecution of culpable leaders. However, with no international court to
back them up, these advocates did not affect belligerents’ decision to arrive at the table,
or their conduct while they were there. Therefore, I use this case to show that the ICC’s
function in peace peace processes is distinct from other international proponents of
human rights, because the Court in and of itself carries the threat of international
prosecution, and in the absence of the Court’s involvement, other actors’ calls for
accountability cannot matter in the same way.
Chapter 3 contains a quantitative analysis of 367 peace negotiations that occurred
from 1989 to 2010. The findings of this chapter provide additional empirical justification
for the ICC’s conditional effects in conflict: in brief, this analysis shows that the
involvement of an international criminal tribunal makes both complete failure of peace
talks and the creation of a comprehensive peace agreement more likely than a partial
agreement. This upholds this chapter’s theoretical contention that the ICC can function
alternately to spoil and guarantee peace negotiations, and shows that the theorizing here,
as well as the findings of the qualitative cases, may be generalizable beyond a few cases
of ICC involvement.
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CHAPTER 3 | THE DUAL EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION
1.0 Introduction
In this dissertation, I argue that the ICC has a conditional effect on peace
negotiations: in different situations, it can act both as a spoiler and as a guarantor of
peace negotiations. There is already empirical evidence demonstrating international
tribunals’ conditional effect on conflict termination, but there is no systematic
quantitative analysis of the ICC’s effect on peace negotiations. This chapter fills that gap,
provides an empirical justification for the necessity of a theory explaining the ICC’s
conditional effects, and thus sets the empirical stage for the three subsequent qualitative
case studies.
Although the ICC’s effect on peace negotiations specifically has not yet been
assessed through large-N quantitative analysis, there are several such studies examining
how international criminal tribunals or international prosecution affect conflict
termination broadly. These studies also find that the specter of international prosecution
has conditional effects on how conflicts end. Krcmaric finds that the prospect of
international prosecution takes away the exile option for culpable leaders, which in terms
of anti-impunity norm promotion might be a positive step, but which empirically means
that these culpable leaders become more likely to stay in the conflict and fight.171 Prorok
corroborates these findings,172 and in another study also finds that the specter of
international prosecution prolongs conflict, but that this effect diminishes slightly when
there is a credible domestic mechanism for prosecuting culpable leaders.173
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Some studies, have, however, focused on how the involvement of an international
criminal tribunal specifically affects attempts to negotiate peace agreements to end civil
wars. All of the current empirical work on this focuses on single cases of ICC
involvement in peace negotiations, so there is no systematic evidence of the theorized
dual effect on peace negotiations. Still, these single case studies yield such different
findings that they point the way towards the conclusion that the ICC has a conditional
effect. Some of these studies argue that the ICC spoils peace negotiations. In a seminal
2007 paper on ICC involvement in the Juba Peace Process in Uganda, Adam Branch
argues that the Ugandan government “politically instrumentalized” the ICC in the civil
conflict, and moreover that the ICC allowed itself to became the government’s political
instrument, which effectively prolonged the conflict and raised the costs for the rebels of
coming to the negotiating table.174 A much more recent 2018 analysis of the ICC’s
involvement in the Colombian peace process argues that, counter to conventional
wisdom, the ICC can and did act as a guarantor of peace because it reduced the rebels’
credible commitment problem by providing oversight that can act as a check against
potential state human rights abuses.175
Therefore, the current literature points the way towards what I found in this
chapter: when international prosecution is a factor in a peace mediation, the peace
mediation becomes both more likely to either completely fail, or to end in a
comprehensive peace agreement. To get to that finding, I specified several logistic
regression models on a dataset of the outcomes of 367 civil war peace mediations. I
compared the effects of four kinds of justice mechanisms: international prosecution,
174
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international non-prosecution, domestic prosecution, and domestic non- prosecution.
International prosecution was the only justice mechanism that has a conditional effect on
the outcome of peace negotiations, and made both the collapse of negotiations and the
creation of a comprehensive peace agreement more likely. This conforms to quantitative
studies’ previous findings on how international criminal tribunals affect civil war
termination, and qualitative findings on how the ICC affects the resolution of civil wars.
This chapter’s findings on the effects of domestic prosecution, domestic nonprosecution, and international non-prosecution also conform with previous findings in the
transitional justice literature. The results show that domestic prosecutions and domestic
non-prosecutions make the failure of peace negotiations more likely, while international
non-prosecutions make peace negotiations more likely to succeed. These findings are
summarized in the following table.
Figure 3.1.1. Summary of findings

NONPROSECUTORIAL

Justice mechanism type

PROSECUTORIAL

Scope of institution mounting justice mechanism
INTERNATIONAL
Conditional
Promotes complete failure of peace
negotiation or promotes comprehensive
peace agreement

Positive
Promotes better peace negotiation outcomes
and more comprehensive peace agreements

DOMESTIC
Negative
Promotes peace negotiation
failure and weaker peace
agreements

Negative
Promotes peace negotiation
failure and weaker peace
agreements.
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This chapter proceeds in the following parts. The first section details how I created the
dataset used in this analysis. The second section details the operationalization of the
dependent variables, independent variables, and control variables. The third section
details the quantitative method used, and explains the models I specified and why I
specified them. The fourth section presents the results of the analysis. The fifth section
analyzes the results, contextualizes them in terms of the current literature, and explains
what they mean for this dissertation. The sixth section concludes and points the way for
the next three empirical chapters.
2.0 The dataset
The unit of analysis of these data is attempts at peace mediations for civil wars.
The list of cases is drawn from the Civil War Mediation Dataset, which in turn draws
from the UCDP Armed Conflict Termination Dataset, and therefore employs the
UCDP/PRIO definition of civil war:
a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government
of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.176
The Civil War Mediation dataset has a key limitation: it only comprises conflicts in
which territory is the main contested issue. All of the conflicts in the dataset are wars of
secession or autonomy, and the conclusion drawn from it may not be generalizable to
other kinds of conflicts.
The Civil War Mediation dataset specifically covers mediation attempts, which
means that it only comprises attempts at peace negotiations that included an actor besides
the rebel group and the government. It is possible to have peace negotiations that include
176
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no external mediators, but the literature suggests that this is highly uncommon, meaning
that most peace negotiations are also peace mediations.177 The dataset uses the following
definition of mediation:
A process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or
accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or state, or organization to
settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical
force or invoking the authority of law.178
To be included in the dataset, the peace negotiation needed to include an external
mediator. Many civil war peace negotiations involve mediators, to the extent that the
Civil War Mediation dataset is regularly used to analyze peace negotiations more
broadly, not only peace mediations.179
There are two additional important notes about the unit of analysis. First, the Civil
War Mediation dataset codes negotiations between the government and at least one rebel
group. Although some peace negotiations occur between a government and multiple rebel
groups in the same venue over the same issues, there are also instances where the
government conducts different negotiations with different rebel groups. When the
government is engaged in the same negotiations with multiple rebel groups, these
negotiations are coded as one observation. However, when the government is engaged in
parallel but separate negotiations with different rebel groups, these negotiations are coded
as separate observations.
Second, the Civil War Mediation Dataset codes each attempt at peace negotiations
as a separate peace negotiation. If the parties attempt to negotiate, but cancel the
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negotiations with no plans to resume talks, and then make a new attempt at negotiations
shortly thereafter, these are coded as two separate observations of peace negotiations.
However, if parties suspend negotiations with immediate plans to return to the table—
that is, if one round of talks end, and both parties agree to resume another round of
talks—this is coded as one observation of peace negotiations.
I dropped two observations from the original Civil War Mediation dataset. Both
were of Ethiopia, and both were dropped because no rebel group was specified for either
negotiation. It is also important to note that 16 observations lacked start dates for
negotiations, and 25 observations lacked end dates. I retained all of these observations in
the final dataset, and treated these observations as if the peace negotiations had lasted one
day. The final dataset includes 367 observations of peace negotiations between a total of
48 states and 89 rebel groups.
3.0 The variables
3.1 The dependent variables
This chapter uses two dependent variables. The first is a categorical measure of
mediation outcome, coded into seven categories. This variable describes first, whether
both the rebels and the government arrived at the negotiating table with the help of a
mediator, and then, if they did, it describes the comprehensiveness of the agreement that
the rebels and government arrived at when negotiations ended. The second is a dummy
indicator of whether peace negotiations succeed or failed. The following two sub-sections
describe each dependent variable in more detail.
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3.1.1 Peace negotiation outcome
The indicator for the outcome of peace negotiations is coded into seven possible
outcomes—no mediation offered, offered only, unsuccessful, ceasefire, partial settlement,
full settlement, and process agreement.180
When no mediation was offered, no external mediator agreed to oversee peace
talks, and there is no recorded observation of talks taking place. When the outcome is
coded as offered only, an external mediator and one side in the civil war arrived at a
previously agreed-upon site for formal peace talks and the other side(s) in the conflict
failed to arrive for formal peace talks. When the outcome is coded as unsuccessful, each
side in the conflict engaged in formal peace negotiations, but no agreement was reached.
When the outcome is coded as a ceasefire, both sides engaged in formal peace talks with
mediation, and agreed upon a ceasefire, but did not agree on a more comprehensive peace
agreement. When the outcome is coded as a partial settlement, the sides agreed on a
peace agreement that addressed some, but not all, issues of contention in the civil
conflict. When the outcome is coded as a full settlement, the sides agreed on a peace
agreement that addressed all issues of contention in the conflict. Finally, when the
outcome is coded as a process agreement, the sides agreed on a peace agreement that
addressed all issues of contention in the conflict and contained provisions for changing
the government or political processes during peacetime to accommodate rebel grievances.
Data for this indicator are drawn entirely from the Civil War Mediation Dataset.
The outcomes are summarized in Figures I and II, and are fairly well dispersed. As the
percentages in Figure I indicate, each outcome is coded as being mutually exclusive; for
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example, even if a partial agreement that addresses some issues of contention in the
conflict includes a ceasefire, it is only coded as a partial agreement.
Figure 3.1.1.1. Frequency Table of Mediation Outcomes
Outcome
No mediation
Offered only
Unsuccessful
Ceasefire
Partial settlement
Full settlement
Process agreement

Count
2
12
73
104
106
42
28

Percentage
0.54%
3.27%
19.89%
28.34%
28.88%
11.44%
7.63%

Figure 3.1.1.2. Histogram of Mediation Outcomes
150
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0

3.1.2 Peace negotiation success
The second dependent variable in this chapter is a measure of successful
mediation. I imposed a theoretically high threshold for success, as conceptualized by the
extent of the agreement that the parties came to, as it is outside of the scope of this study
to consider the duration of the peace. Thus, the success of the agreement is
conceptualized as a function of the extent of the agreement, or the amount of issues of
contention that it addresses.
The variable for successful peace negotiations is a binary indicator constructed by
recoding the measure for mediation outcome. If the mediation outcome is a full peace
agreement or a process agreement, the peace negotiation is coded as successful. If the
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mediation had any other outcome, it is coded as a failure. The observations of successful
peace negotiations are summarized in Figures III and IV.
Figure 3.1.2.1. Frequency Table of Successful Mediation
Outcome Count Percentage
Success
70
19.07%
Failure
297
80.93%
Figure 3.1.2.2. Histogram of Successful Mediation
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Success

Failure

3.2 The independent variables
This chapter uses four independent variables, all of which are binary indicators of
whether various kinds of justice mechanisms were used towards rebels either during
peace negotiations or in the 6.47 years preceding them. I constructed these indicators by
recoding observations from the During Conflict Justice Dataset. Since my theory is
principally concerned with two dimensions of justice mechanisms—whether they are
domestic or international, and whether they include prosecution or not—these four
indicators are domestic non-prosecution, domestic prosecution, international nonprosecution, and international prosecution. It is extremely important to note that multiple
kinds of justice mechanisms could be used preceding or during one peace negotiation;
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therefore, these indicators are not mutually exclusive. Figure V provides summary
statistics of the number of observations for each independent variable.
Figure 3.2.1. Frequency Table of Justice Mechanisms
Justice Mechanism
No justice mechanism
Domestic Non-prosecution
Domestic Prosecution
International Non-prosecution
International prosecution
3.2.1

Count Percentage of Peace
Negotiations
95
25.89%
252
68.66%
216
58.86%
49
13.35%
8
2.18%

Domestic non-prosecution
This indicator is meant to comprise any justice mechanism that was mounted by

the government towards the rebel group, and that did not include the initiation of
prosecution. Therefore, this indicator includes a wide range of justice mechanisms, as
coded in the During Conflict Justice dataset—truth commissions, amnesties, reparations,
purges, and exiles.
Truth commissions are defined as “officially-sanctioned, temporary investigative
bodies that focus on a pattern of abuse over a period of time.”181 In the 367 observations
of peace negotiations covered by this chapter, 38 of them had domestic truth
commissions take place preceding or during. Amnesties are “a promise (or in some cases
formal legislation” on the part of the ruling party to not prosecute or punish violators.”182
In the data analyzed here, there are the government initiated amnesty proceedings for
rebels in 208 peace negotiations, with 65 of these explicitly initiated under the aegis of
peace negotiations. Reparations are operationalized as “compensation given by the state

181
182

Codebook, p. 9. Cited from Hayner 2011, p. 14.
Codebook, p. 12.
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to an individual or group who was harmed in some way by the conflict.”183 There were
83 recorded peace processes with reparations preceding or during the peace negotiations
analyzed here, and 6 of these were explicitly associated with the peace process. Purges
are operationalized as “the act of removing politicians, members of the armed forces or
judiciary, or other members of society for their (alleged) collaboration with or
participation in a conflict and limiting their influence accordingly.”184 There are 50 peace
negotiations involving purges, with 1 of these explicitly associated with a peace process.
Finally, exiles are operationalized as “a period of forced absence from one’s home
country,” and there are 45 peace negotiations that had at least one exile take place before
or during negotiations.
Whenever there was an instance of a domestic truth commission, amnesty,
reparation, purge, or exile, a domestic non-prosecution is recorded in the dataset. Since
the indicator used here is a binary indicator, it does not account for the type of domestic
non-prosecution, nor the amount of domestic non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms that
took place. Figures 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.2 capture some of the variance in observations of
domestic non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms in the data analyzed here.
Figure 3.2.1.1. Frequency Table of the Disaggregated Observations of Domestic NonProsecution
Justice Mechanism
Truth Commission
Amnesty
Reparation
Purge
Exile

183

Count
78
208
83
50
45

Percentage
21.25%
56.68%
22.62%
13.62%
12.64%

http://www.justice-data.com/pcj-dataset/PCJ%20codebook%20%20Binningsb%C3%B8%20et%20al%20JPR_49(5).pdf, p. 12
184
Codebook, p. 14
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Figure 3.2.1.2. Histogram of Incidences of Domestic Non-Prosecutorial Justice
Mechanisms, by type
250
200
150
100
50
0
Truth
Commission

Amnesty

Reparation

Purge

Exile

Overall, there are 252 peace negotiations in the dataset that have at least one instance of
domestic non-prosecution, comprising 68.66% of the observations in the dataset.
3.2.2. Domestic Prosecution
This indicator captures any prosecution initiated by the government toward a
rebel that takes place in a domestic venue. It is coded from the During Conflict Justice
Dataset’s observations of trials, operationalized as “the formal examination of alleged
wrongdoing through judicial proceedings within a (quasi-) legal structure,” and “can
include domestic prosecutions, military courts (by either the government or rebel group),
ad hoc tribunals, or international prosecutions.” In this dataset, if the trial is initiated by
the government and takes place in a domestic law court, military tribunal, or domestic adhoc tribunal, it is coded as a domestic prosecution.
It is important to note that there are some domestic trials that are conducted with
international support, but that do not take place in an international venue and are not
coded as international trials. This international support often includes legal personnel,
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such as lawyers, judges, or staff; however, it can also include funding. This support is
theoretically distinct from international prosecution, however, because even if the lawyer
prosecuting the case or the judge handing down the verdict is from an international
venue, the institution prosecuting the case and handing down the judgment is not an
international institution, but the state. There are 57 such instances in these data, and they
are coded as domestic prosecutions in this dataset.
Figure 3.2.2. Frequency Table of Disaggregated Domestic Prosecutions
Description
With International Support
Without International support

Count
57
208

Percentage
15.53%
56.68%

Overall, there was at least one domestic prosecution in 216 out of 367 peace negotiations,
or in 58.86% of peace negotiations.
3.2.3

International non-prosecution
Conceptually, this indicator is meant to comprise any justice mechanism that was

mounted by an international institution towards the rebel group (and perhaps other
actors), and that did not include the initiation of prosecution. Therefore, this indicator
could include the same range of justice mechanisms comprised in the domestic nonprosecution indicator: truth commissions, amnesties, reparations, purges, and exiles.
However, empirically, these data contain no observations of internationally initiated
amnesties, reparations, purges, or exiles. Therefore, this indicator comprises truth
commissions initiated, implemented or supported by international actors towards rebels.
International non-prosecutions can include international investigations. This
introduces an area of overlap with international prosecutions, as international tribunals
need to conduct investigations in order to be able to issue indictments and hold trials. The
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key conceptual difference between international investigations that fall into the category
of international non-prosecutions and investigations that fall into the category of
international prosecution is that the body carrying out the investigations in this category
does not have the capacity to issue indictments or bring culpable leaders to trial.
Therefore, investigations conducted as part of non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms are
analytically distinct from prosecutorial investigations because they are not designed to
lead to prosecution. There are international non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms in 49
out of 367 observations of peace negotiations, or in 13.35% of observations.
3.2.4

International prosecution
This indicator captures any prosecution initiated towards a rebel by an

international court or tribunal. The During Conflict Dataset records an international trial
when “the trial included international criminal prosecution, involved international actors
such as lawyers and judges, or whether the trial took place in an international tribunal.”185
8 out of 367—or 2.18%—peace negotiations in the data here included the initiation of at
least one international trial. The ICC was the venue of the international trial in two of
these observations—in Libya in 2011 and Uganda in 2006. However, it is important to
note that the trial variable only comprises cases where an ICC’s case has been
successfully brought to trial—when a warrant has not only been released for an offender
but he has been apprehended and brought to The Hague.
There are 8 observations of international prosecution, which is far lower than the
count of observations of other justice mechanisms. The low count of instances of
international prosecutions also pushes the traditional minimum of 10 observations per
independent variable included in a logistic regression model. However, Vittinghoff and
185

Codebook, p. 12.
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McCulloch suggest that this threshold can be lowered to 5-9 observations, and in logistic
regression models with a binary primary predictor, they only found problems in 7.2% of
analyses, most of which were concentrated in analyses with 2 predictors and fewer than
31 observations.186 This analysis has 4 predictors and 367 observations. Since this
analysis has 8 observations, which is well above the specified minimum of 5, and has
more than ten times the number of observations where most low-observation related
errors are found, there is reason to be confident that the low number of observations of
international prosecution will not lead to errors in the results of this analysis.
3.3 The control variables
3.3.1

Conflict intensity
This indicator is meant to indicate the extent of the conflict’s human cost, and is

operationalized as a binary indicator of whether there were over 1000 conflict deaths that
year. These data are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Dataset Version 4.187 The original unit
of analysis is the country year, and when the observation of peace negotiations spans
multiple years, I use the UCDP/PRIO observation from the first year of the peace
negotiation. This is the convention I use for all control variables recorded by country
year, and instances of peace negotiations that spanned multiple years are summarized in
Figure 3.3.1, below.
Figure 3.3.1. Peace Negotiations Lasting Longer than One Year
Country
Algeria
CAR
186

Rebels
Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat
Army faction

Negotiation Start
June 12, 2006

Negotiation End
June 12, 2007

August 1, 2001

November 2, 2002

Vittinghoff, E., & McCulloch, C. E. 2007. Relaxing the rule of ten events per variable in logistic and
Cox regression. American Journal of Epidemiology, 165(6): 710–718, p. 715
187
Kreutz, Joakim. "How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination
dataset." Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 243-250.
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CAR

Convention of Patriots for
Justice and Peace
Colombia
Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia,
National Liberation Army
Congo/Zaire Movement for the
Liberation of Congo, Rally
for Congolese Democracy
DRC
Bundu Dia Kongo
DRC
National Congress for the
Defense of the People
Ethiopia
Oromo Liberation Front
Georgia
Republic of NgornoKarabach
Guatemala
Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity
Indonesia
Fretilin
Indonesia
Free Aceh Movement
Israel
Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and
non-PLO
Ivory Coast Forces Nouvelles
Senegal
Movement of Democratic
Forces of Casamance
Sierra
Revolutionary United Front
Leone
Uganda
United Democratic Christian
Army/Lord’s Resistance
Army
3.3.2

December 15, 2009

August 25, 2012

June 11, 1999

November 25, 2002

July 20, 1999

February 13, 2001

November 19, 2008
November 19, 2008

December 20, 2009
December 20, 2009

August 20, 2008
August 10, 2006

October 27, 2010
August 14, 2008

January 11, 1994

June 16, 1995

August 5, 1998
January 7, 2001
October 8, 1997

August 30, 1999
December 9, 2002
November 20, 1999

October 19, 2002
January 2, 1992

June 29, 2005
July 8, 1993

February 21, 1999

May 28, 2000

June 8, 2006

April 26, 2008

Mediation previous year
This variable indicates whether a mediation between the same government and

rebel group(s) occurred within 365 days preceding the observed peace mediation. It is a
binary indicator coded based on the Civil War Mediation Data. I control for this variable
because it is the convention for research on peace negotiations, as the occurrence of
mediation within the previous year stands to affect the outcome of the current mediation.
If mediation took place within the previous year, the parties might be able to build on the
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progress that occurred within that previous mediation, and thus might be better situated to
come to a more comprehensive peace agreement.
3.3.3

Rebel capacity
This variable is meant to capture the military strength of the rebel group. It is an

estimate of rebel troop strength during a specified conflict period, which varies based on
the rebel group and the data available. This measure was taken from the Non-State Actor
Dataset Version 3.4.188 I control for this variable because it is the convention for research
on peace negotiations, as rebel groups and states are much more likely to come to
agreements when a certain balance of military power exists between them. If one side is
much more powerful than the other, negotiations are less likely to occur or continue
because the powerful side can reasonably decide to resume the fight, as they are likely to
win.
3.3.4

Government physical violence
This variable is meant to capture the extent to which the government uses

physical violence against its citizens. It is an ordinal, Bayesian-scaled measure of the
extent to which people enjoy “freedom from political killings and torture by the
government”189 in a given country year, taken from the Varieties of Democracy
dataset.190 I include this control variable because the literature on transitional justice and
particularly international prosecution has found that the specter of international
prosecution matters differently when governments are understood to be culpable of

188

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. "Non-state actors in civil wars:
A new dataset." Conflict Management and Peace Science 30, no. 5 (2013): 516-531.
189
Varieties of Democracy codebook
190
Lindberg, Staffan I., Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, and Jan Teorell. "V-Dem: A new way to
measure democracy." Journal of Democracy 25, no. 3 (2014): 159-169.
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human rights violations.191 In other words, the government’s human rights record is
likely to matter for how it deals with the prospect of post-conflict justice.
3.3.5

High court independence
This variable is meant to measure the extent to which the government deploys its

justice system for political purposes, and the extent to which the justice system serves the
interests of the people in power. It is an ordinal, Bayesian-scaled measure of how often
the high court rules according to government preferences, regardless of legal
interpretation.192 It is recorded by country year, and taken from the Varieties of
Democracy dataset. I include this control variable because it indicates the extent to which
domestic justice mechanisms can be used as a political tool by the governing
administration currently in power in the state. I control for this because it stands to
condition the effects of domestic justice mechanisms, particularly domestic prosecutions.
If domestic courts are perceived to merely be a tool of the government leaders who are in
power, then domestic prosecutions will likely damage the outcomes of peace negotiations
more than if domestic courts are perceived to be independent from the current
government. Therefore, in hopes of more accurately assessing how domestic prosecution
affects the outcome of peace negotiations, I try to control for the extent to which they are
a tool of the government in power.
4.0 The method
I employ two methods. First, I test a model specified with a binary dependent
variable that indicates whether peace negotiations were successful; peace negotiation
outcomes of full settlements or process agreements are coded as successful peace
191

Appel, Benjamin J. "In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court: Does the ICC Deter Human
Rights Violations?." Journal of conflict resolution 62, no. 1 (2018): 3-28.
192
Varieties of Democracy codebook
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negotiations, and all other negotiation outcomes are coded as failures. Due to the binary,
non-ordered categorical variable, I specify a binomial logistic regression model.
Next, I test a model specified with the categorical dependent variable of the
outcome of peace negotiations, coded as offered only, unsuccessful, ceasefire, partial
settlement, full settlement, or process agreement. Since these outcomes are not ordered, I
specify a multinomial logistic regression model, with no negotiation at all as the
reference category.
5.0 The results
The binomial logistic regression indicates that international prosecutions have a
distinctive effect on the success of peace negotiations. The results displayed in the
following table show that international prosecution is the only kind of justice mechanism
that has a statistically significant effect on the outcome of peace negotiations. Indeed, the
results show that the involvement of international prosecution in a conflict situation
makes peace negotiations about six times more likely to succeed.
Figure 3.5.1. Binomial Logistic Regression: Successful Peace Negotiation193
DNP
NP
INP
IP
Conflict intensity
Mediation previous year
Rebel capacity
Government physical violence
High court independence
Constant
193

Coefficient
-0.229 (0.343)
-0.443 (0.340)
0.344(0.456)
1.807 (0.982)
-1.532 (0.451)
-0.295 (0.342)
-0.000 (0.000)
-0.099 (0.132)
0.772 (0.504)
0.711 (0.621)

Odds Ratio
0.796 (0.273)
0.642 (0.218)
1.411 (0.643)
6.095 (5.986)
0.216 (0.097)
0.745 (0.255)
1.000 (0.000)
0.906 (0.119)
2.165 (1.091)
2.037 (1.265)

P-value
0.505
0.192
0.450
0.066*
0.001***
0.389
0.374
0.452
0.125
0.252

For the sake of legibility, in all results tables, I refer to the explanatory variables using
abbreviations. DNP refers to domestic non-prosecution, DP refers to domestic
prosecution, INP refers to international non-prosecution, and IP refers to international
prosecution.
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Number of observations: 365
Wald chi-squared (9): 27.32
Prob. > chi-squared: 0.0012
Log likelihood: -161.771
Pseudo R2: 0.0858
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
However, previous findings on how international tribunals can act as spoilers of
peace negotiations suggest that this is not the whole story. Therefore, to see the
conditional effect of international prosecutions on the outcome of peace negotiations, we
need to examine the full panoply of possible peace negotiation outcomes, instead of a
binary indicator of success or failure.
The results of the multinomial logistic regression also show that international
prosecution has a distinctive, conditional effect on the outcome of peace negotiations.
When compared to peace negotiations where there was no outside mediation offered, the
involvement of an international tribunal makes the failure of peace negotiations more
likely, but it also makes the creation of a process agreement more likely. The fourth row
of the following table shows this, and the table in its entirety shows that only
international prosecution has this conditional effect. The findings on the other kinds of
justice mechanisms conform to what the literature would lead us to expect: domestic
justice mechanisms, both prosecutorial and non-prosecutorial do not have a substantive
impact on the outcome of peace negotiations, while international non-prosecutorial
justice mechanisms promote the establishment of more comprehensive peace agreements.
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Figure 3.5.2. Multinomial Logistic Regression: Peace Negotiation Outcomes
(Coefficients)
Base Category: no mediation
Offered
Only
DNP -13.729
(1.788)**
*
DP -14.485
(1.551***
INP 1.050
(0.817)
IP 12.790
(1.129)**
*
Conflict 15.139
intensity (1.509)**
*
Mediation -0.223
previous (2.486)
year
Rebel 0.000
capacity (0.000)**
*
Government 0.017
physical (0.575)
violence
High court 0.208
independenc (4.373)
e
Constant 10.898
(3.798)**
*

Unsuccessf
ul

Ceasefire
13.021
(1.423)**
*
-14.448
(0.986)**
*
15.087
(0.714)**
*
0.587
(1.315)

Partial
Settleme
nt
-13.828
(1.390)**
*
-13.635
(1.036)**
*
19.956
(0.596)**
*
1.085
(1.713)

Full
Settlemen
t
-13.220
(1.434)**
*
-14.359
(1.046)**
*
15.257
(0.606)**
*
2.654
(1.989)

Process
Agreemen
t
-14.108
(1.467)**
*
-14.124
(1.100)**
*
14.184
(0.882)**
*
3.262
(1.625)**

-13.352
(1.788)***

14.125
(1.495)**
*
0.052
(2.389)

13.109
(1.482)**
*
0.414
(2.391)

11.856
(1.543)**
*
-0.427
(2.410)

12.362
(1.653)**
*
0.578
(2.437)

0.959
(0.470)**

0.000
(0.000)**
*
0.731
(0.467)

0.000
(0.000)**
*
0.955
(0.473)**

0.000
(0.000)**
*
0.564
(0.492)

0.000
(0.000)**
*
1.046
(0.494)**

-6.341
(4.111)

-2.685
(4.124)

-4.392
(4.118)

-3.765
(4.157)

-2.785
(4.181)

17.466
(3.621)***

15.560
(3.645)**
*

17.519
(3.615)**
*

18.345
(3.659)**
*

16.974
(3.782)**
*

-13.218
(1.045)***
12.608
(0.867)***
2.173
(1.201)*
13.234
(1.486)***
0.492
(2.397)
0.000
(0.000)***

Number of observations: 365
Wald X2 (36):
Prob.> X2:
Log likelihood: -522.81
Pseudo R2: 0.1133
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It is often easier to interpret the results of a multinomial logistic regression when
they are
presented as relative risk ratios. Therefore, the following table presents these results. This
table perhaps most clearly shows the magnitude of international prosecution’s conditional
effect. Even when compared to negotiations where there is no external mediator, the
involvement of international prosecution in a peace process gives negotiations almost
nine times the risk of failing. However, when compared to negotiations with no external
mediator, the involvement of international prosecutions gives peace negotiations 26 times
the risk of ending with a comprehensive agreement to create a new government.
Figure 3.5.3. Multinomial Logistic Regression: Peace Negotiation Outcomes (Relative
Risk Ratios)
Base Category: no mediation
Offered
Only

0.000
(0.000)**
*
DP 0.000
(0.000)**
*
INP 2.859
(2.335)

DNP

IP

Conflict
intensity
Mediatio
n
previous
year
Rebel
capacity

0.000
(0.000)**
*
3,756,298
(5,668,12
8)***
0.800
(1.989)
1.000
(0.000)**
*

Unsuccessfu
l

Ceasefire

Partial
Settlement

0.000
(0.000)***

0.000
(0.000)***

0.000
0.000
(0.000) *** (0.000)***

0.000
(0.000)***

0.000
0.000
(0.000) *** (0.000)***

299,012.3
(259,
226.1) ***
8.873
(10.551) *

0.000
(0.000)**
*
0.000
(0.000)**
*
3,565,472
(2,546,30
8) ***
1.978
(2.364)

3,127,510
(1,862,716)
***
2.960
(0.069)

4,228,666
(2,562,434)
***
14.212
(28.276)

1,445,970
(1,276,020
)***
26.095
(42.408)**

558, 959.2
(830,415)*
**
1.636
(3.921)

1,363,302
(2,037,64
5)***
1.053
(2.516)

493,209.4
(731,057.5)
***
1.513
(3.616)

140,953.5
(217,573.6)
***
0.652
(1.572)

233,767.1
(386,535.4
)***
1.782
(4.343)

1.000
(0.000)***

1.000
(0.000)**
*

1.000
(0.000)***

1.000
(0.000)***

1.000
(0.000)**

0.000
(0.000)***

Full
Settlement

Process
Agreement
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Govern
ment
physical
violence
High
court
indepen
dence
Constant

1.017
(0.585)**

2.608
(1.227)**

2.078
(0.971)

2.598
(1.229)**

1.760
(0.864)

2.845
(1.405)**

1.231
(5.384)**

0.002
(0.007)

0.068
(0.281)

0.012
(0.051)

0.023
(0.096)

0.062
(0.258)

5,721,995
20,900,00
0)***

40,600,000
(147,000,00
0)***

92,700,000
(339,000,0
00)***

54,094.86 38,500,000
(205,473. (139,000,0
8)***
00)***

23,500,00
0
(89,000,00
0)***

Number of observations: 365
Wald X2 (36):
Prob.> X2:
Log likelihood: -522.806
Pseudo R2: 0.113
Finally, because variance across a categorical outcome is sometimes easier to
observe by examining marginal effects, rather than relative risk ratios, the following
figures present the marginal effects of international prosecution on the outcomes of peace
negotiations. The graph also shows that international prosecutions are associated with
unsuccessful peace negotiations, or with peace negotiations that end in full settlements or
process agreements. Peace negotiations that end in ceasefires or process agreements are
comparatively less likely.
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Figure 3.5.4. Graph of marginal effects of international prosecution on outcomes of peace
negotiations

Figure 5.3.5. Table of marginal effects of international prosecution on outcomes of peace
negotiations

Peace negotiation outcome
No mediation (0)194
Offered only (1)
Unsuccessful (2)
Ceasefire (3)
Partial settlement (4)
Full settlement (5)
Process agreement (6)

194

Margin Standard Error
0.001
0.000
0.271
0.099
0.143
0.226
0.259

0.001
0.000
0.176
0.068
0.142
0.222
0.237

The numbers in parentheses correspond to labels of outcomes on the graph in Figure 5.3.4, to provide
reference for the names of these outcomes and the predicted probabilities plotted on the graph.
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At first glance, the fact that none of the confidence intervals in Figure 5.3.4 exclude zero
might solely indicate that the effect of international prosecutions on the outcome of peace
negotiations is not statistically significant, Figure 5.3.4 tells a more complicated story.
When predictive margins are calculated for logistic regression models, conditional effects
are often suppressed in the output of the predictive margin. Therefore, the fact that the
confidence intervals in Figure 5.3.4 include zero does not mean that international
prosecution does not mean that international prosecution does not have a significant
effect on the outcome of peace negotiations, but perhaps is further evidence that
international prosecutions’ have conditional effects.
6.0 The Implications
These results come one step closer to answering the question of how to reconcile
the disparate accounts of international prosecution both keeping leaders away from the
table and propelling them to the table, and both spoiling peace negotiations and
promoting more comprehensive peace agreements. These results indicate that this dual
effect might not simply be anecdotal, but systematic and generalizable to the involvement
of any international prosecutorial mechanism in conflict.
These results also suggest that, contrary to previous arguments, the impacts of
international prosecutions in conflict termination may not be endogenous with the
involvement of international institutions more broadly.195 When analyzing the
involvement of an international prosecutorial justice mechanism, these models control for
the role of non-prosecutorial international justice mechanism. Although the results show
that international non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms promote more successful peace

195

Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm. "The impact of criminal prosecutions during intrastate conflict."
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negotiations, even when controlling for this effect, the results still also show that
international prosecution promotes the establishment of a full process agreement.
Most importantly to this dissertation, these findings show that international
prosecutions have effects on peace negotiations that are distinct from international
institutions and from prosecutorial justice mechanisms. If international prosecutions’
conditional effects on peace negotiations were a function of their prosecutorial role, we
would see domestic prosecutions having the same conditional effect, instead of no effect
at all. Likewise, if international prosecutions’ conditional effects on peace negotiations
were a function of their international institutionalization, then we would expect
international non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms to have the same conditional effect,
instead of simply promoting more successful peace negotiations and more comprehensive
peace agreements. What this suggests is that international prosecutions’ conditional effect
is a function of the combination of their international scope and prosecutorial capacity.
This leads to the questions of why institutions that have international scope and
prosecutorial capacity are situated to have this conditional effect on peace negotiations,
what determines when they spoil peace negotiations, and what determines when they
promote more comprehensive peace agreements. The analysis presented in this chapter is
not sufficient to answer these questions; all it suggests is that these questions are
grounded in systematic patterns across a wide universe of civil war peace negotiations.
7.0 Conclusion
This analysis established that the conditional effect of international prosecution is
indeed systematic, and also found evidence that the conditional effect is due to the
combination of international institutionalization and prosecutorial capacity. Still, in order
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to understand why international prosecutions’ effect is conditional, we need to parse out
the conditions present when international prosecutions make negotiations more likely to
fail, and the conditions present when they make negotiations more likely succeed. This
chapter does not contain sufficient data to do this.
Instead, this will be the task of the rest of the dissertation. In the following three
chapters, I will present three qualitative case studies of three of the observations of peace
negotiations included in this chapter’s dataset. Chapter 4 presents the case of the Juba
Peace Process in Uganda, which involved international prosecution and which is coded in
this dataset as unsuccessful. Chapter 5 presents the case of the Colombian peace process,
which also involved international prosecution of the ICC examination into the situation,
and which is coded in this dataset as having achieved a process agreement, the most
successful possible outcome of peace negotiations. Chapter 6 presents the case of Sri
Lanka, which had international non-prosecution, but no international prosecution, and
which this dataset codes as having reached a ceasefire.
These three cases also show the conditional effect of international prosecution.
One case that involved international prosecution failed completely, while the other case
achieved a full process agreement. The case that did not involve international
prosecution, Sri Lanka, neither completely failed nor completely succeeded, because it
resulted in a ceasefire agreement.
This chapter’s results indicate that there is something about the nature of the
institutions that advance international prosecutions that gives international prosecutions
the potential to both enhance peace negotiations’ success and contribute to their failure.
The fact that neither all prosecutorial justice mechanisms nor all international justice
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mechanisms have the same conditional effect as international prosecutions suggests that
there is something about the combination of the international scope and the prosecutorial
mechanism that yields this conditional effect. Seeing as international prosecutions can
only be mounted a few institutions, to examine the conditional effects of international
prosecutions, the three qualitative cases all focus on the only institution with the legal
mandate to conduct international prosecutions for cases around the globe: the ICC.
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CHAPTER 4 | THE ICC AS SPOILER IN UGANDA
1.0 Introduction
In this dissertation, I argue that the ICC can alternately serve as a guarantor or a
spoiler of peace negotiations, and that the ICC’s effect on the outcome of peace
negotiations depends on whether it plays a prosecutorial or oversight role. Crucially, I
argue that whether the Court plays a prosecutorial role does not simply depend on
whether it has formally initiated prosecutions by issuing indictments, releasing arrest
warrants, or starting trial proceedings. Instead, I argue that the Court’s public approach to
the conflict situation, as well as how the Court’s role coincides with the actions of other
human rights promoters and potential peace guarantors, is key for determining whether
the Court acts as a prosecutor in the conflict, and thus a spoiler of the peace.
In the previous chapter, I showed systematic, cross-national empirical evidence
that international prosecution plays a dual role in peace negotiations: it can either
promote the creation of a more comprehensive peace agreement, or it can make peace
negotiations more likely to fail completely. This finding suggests that conditional factors
are at play, and that the factors that influence whether the ICC promotes better peace
agreements or spoils negotiations are situation-specific, and cannot entirely be parsed out
using cross-national quantitative data.
Therefore, to examine the factors that condition whether the ICC can spoil or
promote peace agreements, I turn to qualitative case studies of peace negotiations where
the ICC played a prominent role. I theorized that whether the ICC promotes peace
agreements depends on whether it plays a prosecutorial or oversight role. This chapter
examines a case where the ICC played a prosecutorial role, and where peace negotiations
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ultimately failed: the Juba Peace Process, where the government of Uganda (GoU) and
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attempted to negotiate an end to an almost twodecade long civil war.
Those familiar with the tired peace-justice debate, or who have followed the
ICC’s development since the signing of the Rome Statute, will recognize this case, as it is
often couched as the classic case of the ICC acting as a spoiler of the peace. Several
explanations have been offered for this. ICC arrest warrants for the LRA’s five most
powerful leaders precluded their full participation in peace talks, thus contributing to
their failure.196 The ICC’s focus on the LRA’s crimes, while the GoU also abused human
rights during the conflict, detracted from the Court’s legitimacy among northern
Ugandans and on the international stage.197 Indeed, the current understanding of the
Court’s role in the peace process is dominated by these two narratives: the first, of how
fear of ICC prosecution kept LRA leaders away from the talks, the second, of how its
involvement was indicative of a broader disconnect between the Ugandans who had been
directly touched by the war, and the international community that saw Uganda as a venue
in which to advance its own agenda. Indeed, all of these interpretations contribute to the
argument that there is no way that an institution like the ICC can issue indictments for
culpable leaders without spoiling fragile peace processes.
In this chapter, I too argue that the ICC served as a spoiler of Uganda’s peace
process, but I do not argue this out of a contention that the specter of prosecution
196
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inevitably spoils peace processes, or that leaders need to be completely secure of an
optimal post-conflict fate in order to make peace. Instead, I argue that the ICC spoiled the
Ugandan peace process because it played a prosecutorial rather than an oversight role,
therefore that the ICC spoiled the peace process because it represented an active,
uncontrollable threat to LRA leaders’ exit options. The ICC become one more check in
the column of reasons that it made more sense for LRA leaders to continue the fight than
to continue to make peace.
Crucially, I argue that the ICC spoiled the Ugandan peace process not because it
represented a threat of prosecution, but because it represented an active threat of
prosecution that LRA leaders decided that they could not use the peace process to
neutralize. I argue that this is about much more than the fact that the ICC issued arrest
warrants for culpable leaders. My case study shows that the ICC did not play a
prosecutorial role in Uganda until after those arrest warrants were issued, and the key
reasons that the ICC assumed this role are the ICC’s emphasis on international
prosecution over justice more broadly construed, and the fact that domestic and
international human right advocates, as well as other potential guarantors to the peace,
often publicly contradicted the ICC’s anti-impunity message, thus prompting the ICC to
issue public statements that constituted increased and repeated threats to leaders’ exit
options.
To illustrate this theory, this chapter examines the Juba Peace Process, which
formally began in July 2006 and ended in November 2008. It also examines four years of
LRA attempts at negotiations preceding the peace process, during which the ICC was
involved in the conflict, shows that ICC involvement in the conflict did not deter the
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LRA from engaging in peace negotiations. Especially notably, the LRA continued to
attempt to initiate a formal peace process that became the Juba Peace Process even after
the ICC issued arrest warrants for LRA leaders in late 2005.198 However, by the time the
Juba Peace Process was formally underway, the ICC played the role of a prosecutor
rather than an overseer, and thus contributed to the LRA’s abandonment of the
negotiations and the ultimate failure of the Juba Peace Process.
This chapter proceeds in six subsequent parts. In the second part, I provide
important context on the civil war between the LRA and the GoU, and then some notes
on case selection. Third, I detail the source material used in this chapter. Then, I present a
case study, beginning with attempts at peace negotiations that took place from 2002 to
2004, which were initiated both by the GoU and LRA. Then, I describe the LRA’s
endeavor to initiate peace negotiations with the Ugandan government in 2005, which led
to the Juba Peace Process of 2006-2008, and then I describe the Juba Peace Process, and
its failure in 2008. The sixth section explains this case’s implications for this
dissertation’s theory, and the seventh section concludes and points the way to the next
chapter.
2.0 The context
The conflict between Uganda and the LRA began in 1986, and persisted until the
LRA completely moved its operations into other states around 2010. The location of
Uganda is indicated below, in Figure 4.2. The LRA arose in northern Uganda, where, in
the late 1980s, the recently inaugurated President Museveni’s militia carried out reprisal
attacks against northern Ugandan ethnic groups who had opposed his ascension to the
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presidency. An armed resistance movement formed, led by Alice Lakwena, who claimed
to be a prophet who channeled Christian and local deities.
Figure 4.2. Map indicating the location of Uganda199

Joseph Kony, Lakwena’s nephew, assumed leadership of the group, and it
evolved into the Lord’s Resistance Army, claiming to fight both for Christian ideals, and
for northern Ugandans, who felt themselves persecuted and politically marginalized by
the more powerful south. In 1991, the central government of Uganda began a military
operation to defeat the LRA, which led to a first set of failed peace accords.
During the mid-1990s, the LRA was able to continue and intensify its fight due to
military support from Sudan, a regional rival of Uganda. During this time, the LRA’s
tactics included the strategic use of atrocity. Kidnapping children and forcing them to
serve as soldiers augmented LRA troops and also ensured coerced support from northern
Ugandans who feared for their abducted children’s safety. Mass murders of civilians
199
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created widespread fear throughout northern Uganda, and prompted the GoU to
undertake repressive protection measures, such as requiring northern Ugandan civilians
to live in internally displaced person camps.
In 2002, the GoU started Operation Iron Fist, a military initiative aimed at rooting
out the LRA’s bases in southern Sudan and decimating LRA military forces. In response,
the LRA increased their attacks on civilians living around the border between Sudan and
Uganda. It is in this military context that the chapter’s case study begins.
3.0 The case selection
In Chapter 1, I wrote that this case is included because it is, for many, the classic
case of the ICC acting as a spoiler of civil war peace negotiations. However, I also chose
this case because the questions of post-conflict justice and how it should be
institutionalized were present in the conflict well before the ICC opened its investigation.
Throughout the conflict, Uganda’s stance on post-conflict justice has been rife with
complications and switchbacks. Uganda has alternately supported ICC prosecution,
prosecution in domestic courts, and traditional justice practices of varying severity, with
some lenient enough to constitute amnesty. This variation lends analytical leverage by
which to examine the differential effects of human rights oversight versus international
criminal prosecution, and to show that the prospect of justice at the ICC matters
differently than the broader prospect of post-conflict justice.
The LRA has also demonstrated various levels of resolve and commitment to
negotiating peace, ranging from actual executions of those who attempt to start peace
talks to sustained, years-long support of delegations at international peace negotiations,
and efforts to reach out to civil society organizations, mediators, and the international
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community to communicate their dedication to working for peace. While virtually all
accounts of the conflict agree that the LRA’s willingness to work for peace is inextricably
linked with its trust in the Ugandan government to do the same, my theory posits that
ICC involvement should also condition rebels’ commitment to negotiating peace. The
fact that the LRA attempted to negotiate peace both before and after the ICC became
formally involved in the conflict situation gives analytical leverage to see how the ICC
might affect leaders’ propensity to arrive at the negotiating table.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that some consider the LRA rebellion to be
part of a proxy war between Sudan and the GoU, as Sudan funded, armed, and allowed
the LRA to have bases in its borders in an attempt to destabilize the GoU, while the GoU
also gave substantial support to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army to destabilize
Sudan. Therefore, there are legitimate questions about whether the conflict between the
LRA and Uganda can be considered a civil war in the same way that the Colombia and
Sri Lankan conflicts are. However, the characterization of the LRA insurrection as a
Sudanese proxy war is only true for certain earlier phases of the conflict, and largely
ceases to be the case after 2000, when Sudan and the GoU agreed to stop sponsoring each
other’s rebel groups.200 Furthermore, while the LRA certainly engaged with states besides
Uganda, its relationship with Uganda is consistently the most important for prospects for
peace.
4.0 The data and methods
This case study presents narratives of discrete, consecutive periods of peace
negotiations within the GoU’s decades-long conflict with the LRA: the LRA’s attempts at
200
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peace negotiations from 2002-2005, the onset of the Juba Peace Process, and the outcome
of the Juba Peace process. For each period, I construct a narrative that demonstrates the
effect of human rights oversight, ICC involvement, and GoU support for ICC
prosecution, on the rebels’ confidence in Uganda’s credibility, and on the outcome of
peace negotiations more generally.
I rely on various kinds of sources to trace what happened in each of the three
periods of peace negotiations analyzed here. Most central are the first-hand accounts of
those directly involved in negotiations, or those who directly observed them. During the
summer of 2017, I conducted confidential and anonymous interviews with key observers
of the Juba Peace Process, and I draw from the published accounts of mediators who
worked on behalf of the LRA, Uganda and third parties; they include James Alfred Obita,
Patrick Oguro Otto, Joyce Neu, Father Carlos Rodriguez Soto, King David Onen Rwot
Akana, Barney Afako, Julian Hottinger, and David Smock. I also draw from the
published accounts of journalists and researchers who were in South Sudan or northern
Uganda during key negotiations, including Matthew Green, Marieke Schomerus, Sverker
Finnstrom, Aili Marie Tripp, Adam Branch, and Chris Dolan. When the insights they
offer are directly derived from observations in the field, these accounts are used as
primary sources. I also use them to corroborate and contextualize the accounts of the
observers I interviewed.
For further corroboration, I also consulted USAID and NGO reports. I consulted
NGO reports to trace how NGOs’ public stances first reinforced and then contradicted the
ICC’s, as this is a key aspect of my theory of how the ICC can spoil or help guarantee
peace negotiations. Finally, I used the Ugandan newspapers New Vision and The
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Monitor, as well as international news services such as IRIN, Reuters, and the BBC, for
precise reporting of the dates of key events, especially concerning the military aspect of
the conflict. It is important to note that The Monitor is a Ugandan government
newspaper, and that New Vision’s reporting is sometimes constrained by government
control of information in Uganda, and so these sources should be considered accordingly.
5.0 The case study
5.1 The growing shadow of the ICC
In the spring of 2002, the GoU began to aggressively and publically advocate for
the creation of an international criminal court. In April, Uganda’s prime minister
publically called for the swift ratification of the Rome Statute and creation of the ICC
specifically so that the GoU could prosecute the LRA leadership for crimes against
humanity on an international stage.201 Two months later, in June 2002, Uganda ratified
the Rome Statute.202
Human rights advocates were initially positive about the ICC. In June 2003, AI
strongly advocated for the Rome Statute’s anti-impunity norms when it issued an open
letter urging Ugandan members of Parliament to refuse to ratify a Bilateral Immunity
Agreement (BIA) with the US.203 This BIA would contravene Uganda’s Rome Statute
obligations because Uganda would promise to turn over Americans wanted by the ICC to
the US, and not the Court.204 In urging Uganda not to ratify this agreement, AI was
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strongly advocating on behalf of Rome Statute norms, and reinforcing the ICC’s
normative commitment and international mandate.
Throughout this period, the LRA gave no indication that the GoU and civil
society advocacy of the ICC motivated them to or dissuaded them from negotiating
peace. They did, however, use the specter of international prosecution as a tool to keep
their troops in line. To the panoply of threats they used to keep soldiers from escaping,
they added the new menace of being turned over to a foreign Court upon return to their
villages.205 In the spring of 2002, Kony gave orders to reach out to Father Carlos
Rodriguez Soto, a priest who was a member of two prominent civil society organizations
that promoted human rights in Northern Uganda: the Justice and Peace Commission of
the Archdiocese of Gulu and the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative.206 Kony and
Soto met in early March, amidst the UPDF’s Operation Iron First, the government’s most
intense military offensive yet against the LRA.207 Soto emerged from the meeting with
the sense that Kony was open to making peace.208
Kony arranged for another meeting with Soto that August, and it backfired
tremendously. In his recounting to Matthew Green, a British journalist, Soto recollects
his first conversation with an LRA leader, who said “If Museveni doesn’t want peace,
then everybody’s going to die. Even small children are going to die. We’re going to kill
everybody.”209 The words were scarcely out of his mouth when GoU soldiers burst
through the bush and raided the camps. They arrested Soto as an LRA collaborator, and
205
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compelled him to sign a statement admitting responsibility for the incident.210 Ugandan
newspapers subsequently published stories that Soto had been smuggling drugs to the
LRA, that he sold them weapons, or that he was a Basque terrorist.211
That fall, the Ugandan government attempted to begin peace negotiations on its
own terms. Museveni established a Presidential Peace Team, and called on the LRA to
create safe zones from the fighting so that the Team could meet with local stakeholders to
begin to negotiate peace.212 The LRA completely ignored them.
Despite his run-in with the GoU troops, Soto remained undeterred. Upon the
death of Kony’s father in 2003, the archbishop of Gulu sent a letter to Kony, in which he
reminded him of the Acholi cultural tradition that the time after death was a time of
reconciliation.213 When the LRA responded that it was still willing to talk peace, Soto and
a delegation of local religious leaders travelled to the LRA camp on the first day of
March.214 The delegation gained access to the camp, where they spoke with Kony via
short-wave radio. He agreed to an LRA ceasefire, and asked Soto to pray for peace.215
However, later that day, Kony had four LRA soldiers executed for speaking to Soto’s
delegation, and he ordered that Soto himself be killed.216
The Presidential Peace Team remained both active and ineffectual in northern
Uganda. In April 2003, the GoU made and quickly rescinded an offer of a ceasefire to the
LRA.217 Four weeks later, the LRA raided Soto’s seminary, and abducted 43 priests in
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training.218 Fighting in the north continued throughout the end of 2003, even as the GoU
formally referred the conflict to the ICC on December 16, 2003. Very shortly after, and
several months before actually formally opening an investigation into the situation, ICC
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo publicly announced that the ICC would investigate the
situation.219
The prospect of the oversight of an international criminal court—and the Ugandan
government’s direct threats to use that court to arrest, apprehend, and prosecute LRA
leaders—clearly had no effect on the LRA’s willingness to negotiate peace with the
Ugandan government. It did not dissuade them from negotiating peace, as shown by their
attempts to reach out to Soto. However, as shown by the LRA’s numerous switchbacks in
their treatment of Soto and their willingness to discuss peace negotiations, the
establishment of the Court clearly did not compel the LRA to decisively and consistently
pursue peace negotiations.
There is no indication that the prospect of the Court influenced this calculation,
which affirms the theoretical expectation that, if the ICC is not playing a prosecutorial
role in the conflict situation, it does not deter rebels from arriving at the negotiating table.
Further, the fact that the LRA used the threat of prosecution to intimidate their troops
showed that they were well aware that it existed. Still, in the absence of arrest warrants
and threatening rhetoric from the Court, they simply did not see the threat of arrest as
credible enough to keep them away from the negotiating table.
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5.2 The onset of the Juba Peace Process
Even without arrest warrants, the ICC was clearly on the LRA’s radar, and for
good reason. In July of 2004, the ICC Prosecutor formally opened a full investigation into
LRA leaders for atrocities committed against civilians.220 This investigation was
explicitly focused on LRA high commanders, and did not include GoU leaders, even
though they had also been accused of overseeing human rights abuses.221 Soto, the human
rights advocate to whom the LRA had previously reached out to make peace, expressed
misgivings about this step, saying “Obviously, nobody can convince the leaders of a rebel
movement to come to the negotiating table and at the same time tell them that they will
appear in courts to be prosecuted.’’222 The human rights organizations that Soto worked
with, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Gulu archdiocese and the Acholi
Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, would also come to take up this stance,223 which both
emphasized the Court’s role as prosecutor, and questioned whether that role was
compatible with the goal of making peace.
However, not all human rights advocates contradicted the Court at this point. In
February 2005, shortly after the ICC announced its intention to open an investigation into
the LRA, the International Crisis Group (ICG) released a statement saying that ICC
involvement in northern Uganda was a positive development.224 Crucially, the ICG
characterized the ICC’s involvement as an investigation, and not as an impending
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prosecution, and said that it was increasing LRA and government incentives to make
peace.225 However, the ICG also hinted at problems to come when it urged the ICC to
hold off on issuing any arrest warrants until there was a clearer direction for the peace
process.226
When the ICC moved quickly towards preparing indictments and issuing
warrants, the ICG changed its stance. In April 2005, it released a report warning that ICC
indictments could deter the LRA from engaging in the peace process.227 The report was
neither fully supportive nor completely critical of the ICC’s role, saying that:
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is prepared to issue warrants against
LRA leaders suspected of committing crimes against humanity, a step that
if not handled carefully could drive the rebels definitively out of the peace
process. However, the ICC is well aware of the risk and is undertaking a
series of activities which have increased mutual understanding with
Northern Ugandan civil society.228
What is important about this statement is not so much the lack of critique or affirmation,
but the fact that, even at this early, stage, before it had issued indictments or arrest
warrants, a prominent international NGO was already portraying the ICC’s role in the
conflict situation as prosecutorial without expressing any support for the prospect of
prosecuting culpable leaders. This is the exact inverse of the approach that I argue most
enhances the ICC’s potential to be a guarantor in a conflict situation, precisely because it
casts the ICC as a prosecutor and not an overseer, and also portrays ICC involvement not
as promoting justice, but as threatening peace.
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Meanwhile, throughout 2005, the LRA reached out to experts to attempt to learn
more about the ICC and the threat it posed. Marieke Schomerus, a researcher with
unparalleled access to the LRA at the time, recalls:
One of the men handed Tim229 a note, requesting a private meeting. The young
men wanted to tell us that life outside the LRA was tough, but they also wanted
to know more about what was going on outside Uganda. What exactly was the
ICC planning to do?230
Schomerus does not specify how she answered the LRA’s question. However, as a
doctoral candidate doing field research on the war in Uganda, she very likely knew the
specific details of the Rome Statute that would be pertinent to the LRA’s situation. She
continued to speak with LRA leadership throughout 2005:
In the late summer of 2005, one of the young men told me that Otti wanted to
talk to me. It did not make any sense. Why would he want to talk to me? It
seemed like a scam. I heard someone laughing on the other end of the phone
line. “I am Vincent Otti,” the voice said.
It seemed ridiculously easy to get Otti on the phone. He was talkative,
telling me how the LRA was doing in their camp and that they were moving
around a lot. I asked where he was and why he wanted to talk to me. He knew
about me, he said, from his men. His men had told him that I had information.
He wanted to talk about the possibilities for peace, and he wanted to know
more about the ICC. The ICC had not yet issued warrants for the LRA
leadership, but rumours were rife that they existed. Otti did not know what the
ICC involvement meant. His understanding was that he would be taken to a
foreign location and executed.231
This conversation with Otti provides definitive evidence that the LRA leaders considered
the ICC primarily in terms of how it stood to impact their personal exit options, and that
they feared that the ICC had the potential to punish them post-conflict.
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Again, Schomerus does not reveal the information about the ICC that she gave to
the LRA leadership. However, she continued to speak to the LRA leaders for months; she
was granted access on the condition that she gave them “useful advice on the ICC.”232
For months prior to this, Schomerus had been in deep and constant contact with LRA
leadership, and had worked hard to build their trust long before the LRA broached the
issue of the ICC with her.233 The fact that the LRA asked Schomerus for insight on the
LRA, in light of their long-standing and established trust with her, shows that they
regarded it to be politically sensitive, and that they wanted their conversations about it to
be protected.
While the LRA was learning about the ICC and preparing for peace talks, human
rights advocates continued to criticize the role of the ICC in the conflict situation, and
publicly fret about its implications for the peace process. The ICG issued a report saying
that the prospect of ICC arrest warrants could drive important mediators away from the
peace process, and that the anticipation of ICC arrest warrants was already compromising
peace advocates’ faith in the process.234
In July 2005, the ICC issued arrest warrants for the LRA’s five most powerful
commanders, Joseph Kony chief among them.235 In an ominous signal, Betty Bigombe,236
one of the most important mediators in the peace process, decided to leave the process

232

Ibid, p. 5
Interview 3185
234
“Building a Comprehensive Peace Strategy for Northern Uganda” International Crisis Group. June 23,
2005. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/uganda/building-comprehensive-peace-strategynorthern-uganda Accessed March 25, 2019
235
Ocowun, Chris. “Kony Invites Four Lawyers.” New Vision. November 11, 2006.
http://allafrica.com/stories/200611120009.html Accessed March 25, 2019.
236
Bigombe played a prominent role in the informal talks leading to the Juba Peace Process because she
was the lead negotiator in the most successful formal peace negotiations between the LRA and the GoU up
to that point. Those negotiations took place in 1994, and in the subsequent decade, Bigombe maintained
sporadic contacts with LRA leaders.
233

118
because of the ICC warrants.237 The warrants coincided with South Sudan’s attempt to set
up an independent government, apart from the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The
LRA’s continued presence in southern Sudan made it extremely difficult for South
Sudan’s government to maintain security. Therefore, in the last months of 2005, South
Sudan began to work with the LRA on laying the groundwork for peace negotiations with
the GoU, in hope that LRA fighters could return home.238
That the LRA was no longer welcome as a military force in South Sudan had
important implications for its five leaders who were wanted by the ICC. Neither South
Sudan nor Sudan were parties to the Rome Statute, which was an important reason why
they maintained safe havens for the LRA. Uganda, as a party to the Rome Statute, was
legally obligated to arrest anyone wanted by the ICC, and either prosecute them
domestically, or turn them over to the Court for prosecution. Therefore, as long as Kony
and the other leaders remained in their bases in South Sudan, they were safe from ICC
prosecution, but if they were apprehended within Uganda, they risked being turned over
to the Court. There was no way for them to return to Uganda without risking ICC
prosecution.
During the fall of 2005, local and international human rights advocates continued
to publicly question the Court’s involvement in Uganda and contradict the Rome
Statute’s normative commitments. In a September 2005 report, Human Rights Watch
(HRW) wrote
Many traditional, civic and religious leaders as well as civil society
groups in northern Uganda have opposed the ICC investigation on the
grounds that it undermines the peace process and will lead to increased
violence against civilians. They have instead advocated amnesty for all
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members of the LRA, including the top leaders who would be the individuals
the ICC would most likely investigate and prosecute.
Opposition to the ICC also stems from the perception among many
northerners that it will only investigate the LRA and not government forces
despite the UPDF's long record of abuses. The ICC is to blame for such
perceptions: it has failed to undertake an effective outreach strategy to
actively engage civil society and the general population in northern Uganda to
explain its mandate and the scope of its inquiry. Despite its shortcomings,
however, the ICC remains the best option for achieving some measure of justice
and ending impunity for the people of northern Uganda.239
While HRW itself maintained support for the Rome Statute’s normative commitments,
and showed conditional support for the Court’s involvement in Uganda, local civil
society groups took a more explicitly critical stance. HRW recognized the importance of
promoting Rome Statute norms to local civil society groups, and urged the ICC to do
more on this front. Still, it is important to note that from almost the beginning of the
Court’s involvement in northern Uganda, local civil society groups were not only highly
critical of its actions, but skeptical of the anti-impunity norms it promoted. International
human rights advocates, such as HRW and ICG,240 maintained conditional support for the
ICC’s specific actions, and unconditional support of the Rome Statute’s anti-impunity
norms.
The LRA and the government of South Sudan collaborated on an initial proposal
for a peace agreement with the GoU. Kony personally reached out to NGO
representatives for support during the anticipated peace process.241 On February 12,
Vincent Otti, the LRA’s second-in-command after Kony, told Schomerus, who the LRA
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had come to trust, that the LRA wanted to talk peace, but only after the presidential
elections at the end of the month, as he did not want Museveni to use the prospect of
peace talks to bolster his re-election campaign.242 As motivated as the LRA was to build a
peace, they remained extremely suspicious of Museveni and his administration.
To the LRA’s disappointment, Museveni won re-election by a margin of 59%.243
Shortly after, the government of Sudan reached out to the LRA, attempting to re-establish
their old alliance, but the LRA rebuffed them.244 Close ties with Sudan would not have
bolstered the GoU’s trust in the LRA, given how Sudan had used its past support of the
LRA to destabilize Uganda.
As the LRA continued to collaborate with Southern Sudan on a prospective peace
agreement, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo became the first person to be arrested on an ICC
warrant and turned over to the Court.245 Like the LRA leaders, Lubanga was a rebel
leader accused of war crimes, whose case had been referred to the Court by the
government he fought against. His arrest was an important signal to the world, and no
doubt to the LRA, of the Court’s power to constrain exit options, and of the reality that an
ICC arrest warrant represented a credible threat to leaders’ exit options.
Still, on May 2, Kony and Riek Machar, the Vice President of South Sudan, met
to discuss peace talks. Machar paid $20,000 in exchange for the meeting, which was
broadcast internationally.246 The LRA continued to reach out to civil society
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organizations and the media to publicize its case, turning to Schomerus to arrange an
interview with the BBC.247
Meanwhile, the GoU announced its willingness to attend peace talks with the
LRA. Immediately upon the announcement, the ICC publicly reminded Uganda of its
obligation to detain and prosecute the five wanted LRA leaders, and Uganda promised
that it would uphold its obligations to the Court.248 With this statement, the Court
definitively cast itself in a prosecutorial role, and showed that its priority in the Juba
peace process was not so much ensuring post-conflict justice as it was insuring the
prosecution of indicted LRA leaders. No doubt in part due to the ICC’s public statements,
the LRA leaders continued to be extremely nervous about leaving their camps to engage
in formal negotiations, although they invited South Sudanese representatives, and civil
society representatives, into their camps to discuss peace, and promised to send a
delegation to any talks.249 Finally, at the onset of the actual formal negotiations, Kony
declared that he would not sign any final peace agreement and disarm until he was
guaranteed immunity from ICC arrest warrants.250
The LRA’s behavior in this time period does not correspond with the
conventional expectation that ICC arrest warrants alone create a fear of apprehension that
prevents rebels from engaging in peace negotiations. Indeed, it shows that the LRA
leaders’ desires to respond to the ICC warrants and neutralize the threat that the ICC
posed to their exit options spurred the LRA’s increased engagement in peace
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negotiations. The LRA relied on the same outsiders to understand its options vis a vis the
ICC and to help arrange peace talks with the Ugandan government. This evidence also
suggests that the LRA sought a complex understanding of the ICC, and that it had months
of conversations with informed outsiders specifically on the topic of the ICC arrest
warrants. Indeed, it was the combination of the LRA’s fear of the Court and its growing
understanding of the possibility of using peace negotiations to avoid arrest and trial at the
Hague that propelled it toward the negotiating table.
Museveni, aware that the LRA leaders were hesitant about appearing personally at
peace talks, and aware of Kony’s pronouncement that he would not sign any peace
agreement until granted immunity from ICC prosecution, announced that the GoU was
willing to grant amnesty to Kony and the four other wanted LRA leaders if they
“respond[ed] positively to the talks with the government in Juba, southern Sudan, and
abandon[ed] terrorism.”251 With this pronouncement, Uganda directly reneged on its
commitment to the Rome Statute, and set its stance on post-conflict justice in direct
contradiction to the ICC. In response, the ICC publically reminded Uganda of their Rome
Statute commitment to arrest leaders wanted by the ICC, thus heightening Uganda’s
uneasy stance.252
The GoU intended to use the threat of ICC prosecution as a stick, and the promise
of amnesty as a carrot, to gain leverage over the LRA in negotiations, and held that it
would only finalize its position on post-conflict justice “only upon the LRA’s signature
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and implementation of the agreement.”253 However, the LRA remained extremely aware
that any GoU assurance of amnesty was completely conditional, and that due to the
outstanding ICC arrest warrants, its leaders could be legally and legitimately arrested and
turned over to the Court in spite of any promises of amnesty. Again, this awareness was
not solely due to the fact that the ICC issued arrest warrants, but also due to the ICC’s
public messaging that they were committed specifically to prosecuting LRA leaders,
instead of simply promoting justice broadly.
5.3 The outcome of the Juba Peace Process
It was in this climate of mistrust and uncertainty that the Juba peace talks
officially began on July 14, 2006. The delegations quickly agreed on a five part
negotiating agenda, comprising “1) cessation of hostilities; 2) comprehensive political
solutions; 3) justice and accountability; 4) demobilization, disarmament and reintegration
(DDR); 5) a permanent ceasefire.”254 Kony entered talks saying that he would not sign
any peace agreement while the ICC warrants were still out for LRA leaders. In these
early days of peace talks, the GoU repeated its promise that the ICC would not prosecute
top LRA commanders, only to withdraw that statement four days later.255
On August 26, the delegations agreed to a settlement on the first order of
business, a cessation of hostilities. However, this agreement quickly fell apart, and the
LRA resumed attacks on civilians. Almost immediately upon attempting to implement
the cessation of hostilities, the LRA delegates conveyed Kony’s apprehensions that his
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post-conflict fate remained uncertain, and that the GoU did not seem willing to negotiate
a clear, firm compromise on this matter.256
Two weeks later, USAID released an influential report calling for a two-pronged
post-conflict justice strategy: amnesty for low-level combatants, and prosecution for
leaders. There was, conspicuously, no mention of the ICC, except to say that “the design
of the process [should] include the needs of the victims themselves rather than
exclusively incorporate the opinions of elite groups.”257 At the same time, ICG released a
report that showed a dramatic shift from their past support for the ICC’s role in the
conflict situation.258 The report suggested that negotiators at Juba consider offering
amnesty to LRA leaders in a state that was not a party to the Rome Statute as a way of
removing the threat of prosecution at the ICC.259 The ICG suggested that this would be a
way for negotiators to circumvent the fact that only the ICC or the UN Security Council
could lift ICC warrants against the indicted leaders while also meeting Kony’s condition
that he would not sign any peace agreement until he was immune from ICC prosecution.
In making this suggestion, the ICG respected the ICC’s institutional mandate and
structure, but deeply contracted the anti-impunity norms of the Rome Statute. This
suggestion also explicitly frames the ICC not as a promoter of post-conflict justice, but a
potential conflict spoiler that needed to be neutralized.
In the following months, Kony invited a team of lawyers to his camp outside of
Juba so that he could learn more about the ICC and his chances of arrest and
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prosecution.260 Kony attempted to discuss the ICC warrants with many international
representatives he met, including the UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs Jan
Egeland.261 Notably, in this meeting, Egeland refused to discuss the ICC, as he “tried to
make the alternative to continued war and terror as attractive as possible.”262 Kony
declared that, as long as the threat of arrest on an ICC warrant remained, he would not
authorize the LRA to rejoin talks.263 He took this firm stance in spite of the GoU’s offers
of amnesty, clearly indicating his understanding that these offers lacked credibility.
The contrast between the LRA’s initiative in collaborating with the government of
Southern Sudan to bring about the Juba process and its total refusal to continue peace
talks after the Ugandan government offered the prospect of amnesty yet retained the
threat of ICC prosecution could not be starker. It clearly demonstrates how crucial the
state’s positioning on post-conflict justice is to perceptions of its credibility and
commitment to peace talks, and how the presence of ICC arrest warrants limits the
positions that the state can credibly take. The ICC’s public statements only heightened
this dynamic—ICC reminders that amnesty was unacceptable only deepened the LRA’s
mistrust of Uganda, and decreased LRA agency in negotiations.
Kony’s refused to continue talks after the GoU declined to set a clear position on
post-conflict justice that credibly addressed the outstanding ICC warrants. This showed
his awareness that the GoU’s promises of amnesty could not be trusted not only because
of potential GoU government duplicity, but because he knew that as long as an ICC
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warrant remained for him and his comrades, they were liable to be arrested and turned
over to ICC for prosecution. It was precisely the GoU’s refusal to adequately address this
issue, and the LRA’s perceived constraints on negotiating, that led Kony to demand a
boycott of LRA participation in the Juba peace talks.
In early 2007, the UN appointed a Special Envoy to the LRA conflict in the hopes
of resuscitating the Juba peace talks.264 The Envoy, Joaquim Chissano, held several
meetings with the LRA in their camps throughout April. These meetings culminated in a
meeting of an LRA and Ugandan delegation in the Ri-Kwabanga clearing.265 There, the
LRA declared its willingness to return to talks as long as its security was assured, and as
long as there was oversight from several African states.266 The next day, the parties
announced they would reinstate the cessation of hostilities and that they would enhance
the monitoring team.267
The second round of Juba peace talks began on April 27.268 Upon commencement
of the talks, the ICG publicly said that ICC involvement in Uganda should continue.269
Two months later, the GoU and the LRA signed the Agreement on Accountability and
Reconciliation. The Agreement provided for the domestic prosecution of LRA leaders,
and was thus aligned with Uganda’s Rome Statute commitments. However, international
human rights advocates expressed concerns about the leniency of these domestic
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prosecution mechanisms.270 For instance, Article 5.3 of the treaty provided for
“alternative justice mechanisms” such as “traditional justice mechanisms” and
“alternative sentences,” which, since they are not specified, could be more lenient
procedures than those prescribed by the Rome Statute.271 In any case, the Agreement was
a strong signal that Uganda intended to use domestic justice mechanisms to prosecute the
LRA, and an even stronger signal that it understood the importance of upholding its
commitments to the Rome Statute. Indeed, the Ugandan government went about creating
the domestic justice mechanisms necessary to execute the Agreement in accordance with
the Rome Statute, including establishing a War Crimes division of its High Court in
2008.272 Even upon the completion of this agreement, Conciliation Resources, a
prominent international consortium for peacemakers, released a report saying that the
ICC has been an obstacle to the Juba Peace Process.273
The Juba peace process continued smoothly throughout the end of summer and
into the autumn of 2007. This, coupled with the LRA’s acceptance of the Agreement on
Accountability on Reconciliation, and the fact that its ICC arrest warrants still stood,
demonstrate that it is not the mere threat of prosecution, or even international
prosecution, that deters rebel groups from committing themselves to peace negotiations.
Throughout this period, the LRA understood that the ICC arrest warrants still stood, and
understood that they were still liable to be prosecuted once the peace agreement had been
270
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signed. They had confidence in the negotiating process not because they were assured
protection from prosecution, but because the Ugandan government made an
unprecedented, credible, specific agreement on post-conflict justice. This agreement
corresponded with its commitment to the ICC, which heartened international observers’
faith in the peace process, but did not dissuade the LRA from continuing to participate.
However, the ICC never definitively signaled that it would accept the justice
mechanisms outlined in the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and
international human rights advocates questions whether it actually corresponded with the
Rome Statute.274 Therefore, the ICC arrest warrants were still a major factor in the peace
process. Undermining stances from both local and international human rights advocates
heightened the ICC’s ongoing prosecutorial presence. For example, as the Agreement on
Accountability and Reconciliation was signed, ICG issued another report saying that
amnesty in non-Rome Statute signatory countries should be an option for LRA leaders,
and that ICC arrest warrants should only be acted upon as an absolute last resort.275 ICG
again framed this as a way of respecting the mandate of ICC, but the idea of amnesty for
LRA leaders inevitably contradicts the norms of the Rome Statute. Further, in framing
the Court’s role not as a promoter of justice, but as a complicating factor in the peace
process, stances like this further affirmed the ICC’s prosecutorial role.
The LRA’s internal power dynamics soon became so contentious as to further
derail the peace process. In November 2007, Kony executed Vincent Otti, his second-incommand, because he disagreed with Otti’s approach to the peace process, and
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particularly his trust in international mediators.276 The following January, Kony fired the
LRA’s lead negotiator, as well as three other members of the negotiating team, because
they remained too loyal to Otti.277 Kony designated a new delegation, which some
observers felt were “negotiators for hire.”278 Peace talks resumed a week later.279
The LRA and Ugandan delegations quickly signed a new ceasefire, and the new
head of LRA’s negotiating team expressed remarkable optimism about the negotiations’
prospects for success. He told an observer “when a peace agreement is signed by the end
of February, the LRA will cease to exist.”280 However, beyond this statement, all other
evidence from the time suggests that the LRA was determined to continue to exist, peace
agreement or no. This statement corroborated observers’ concerns that the new LRA
delegation did not truly represent the concerns of their leadership, and that they were not
in close enough contact with the LRA central command to represent their wishes. These
concerns were further corroborated by press reports that Kony continued to say that he
would never appear to sign a peace agreement until the ICC warrants were withdrawn.281
After three weeks of discussions, the LRA and the GoU signed an Annexure to
the previous Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation. The Annexure specified
that senior LRA leaders who ordered the commission of atrocities would be tried in
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Ugandan courts, while LRA soldiers would undergo traditional northern Ugandan justice
mechanisms of reconciliation and reintegration.282
The ICC welcomed the Annexure, which upheld Uganda’s commitment to the
Rome Statute, but also specified that Uganda’s domestic prosecutions would have to
meet its standards of legitimacy to fulfill the Court’s doctrine of complementarity.283
Again, by reminding the parties of their Rome Statute obligations, the ICC showed that it
prioritized a specific form of prosecution over justice more broadly. Further, the parties
never came to a consensus on specific measures to ensure that domestic prosecutions rose
to the ICC’s standards. This meant that LRA leaders’ exit options remained uncertain,
and showed that the ICC stood to threaten their exit options even if they succeeded in
negotiating a domestic justice alternative with the GoU.
Shortly after the Annexure was signed, the parties began working on a provision
to allow LRA leaders to be tried in Uganda.284 AI quickly criticized this provision for
contradicting the Rome Statute and undermining the ICC, saying
it would be up to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to decide whether Ugandan
courts are able and willing to genuinely investigate and prosecute the LRA
suspects named in the warrants. Amnesty International has called for LRA
members charged with crimes under international law to be surrendered to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) immediately.285
Although this statement supports the Rome Statute’s anti-impunity norms, it also starkly
casts the ICC in the role of prosecutor. Indeed, in taking this position, AI accentuates the
Court’s emphasis on the international prosecution, rather than on promoting post-conflict
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accountability more broadly. In this emphasis, and especially in supporting international
prosecution during a political moment when the rebels and the state were attempting to
design an alternate justice mechanism, this position deepens the ICC’s role as spoiler.
Nonetheless, as the negotiations continued over the subsequent months, “justice
was not on the agenda.”286 Afako, a member of the GoU negotiating team, and Hottinger,
a Swiss mediator, recall that, in the subsequent months, the LRA delegation seemed
increasingly divorced from the LRA leadership, and Kony only made rare appearances.
They both trace the shift to the execution of Vincent Otti, and some observe that the new
delegation was more interested in the credential of having successfully negotiated a peace
agreement than representing the LRA’s interests.287
In the spring of 2008, the LRA continued to negotiate to try to get ICC warrants
removed. On March 10, a legal team working for the LRA met with the ICC to discuss
procedural issues about the Uganda case,288 and two days after that meeting, the ICC
requested more information from the Ugandan government on the special courts that
would try the LRA leaders in lieu of ICC prosecution.289 Still, the ICC never affirmed
that it would accept these courts as credible alternatives to international prosecution.
Complicating matters, on the same day, President Museveni said that he could
“save” LRA leaders from prosecution once they signed the final peace deal.290 Such a
statement flies in the face of how leaders can use the peace process to avoid ICC
prosecution: in order to do so, once the ICC has issued arrest warrants, leaders need to
286

Afako, “Negotiating peace in the shadow of justice,” p. 23
Interview 3095 and Interview 3164
288
“Chronology of Recent Events.” Justice and Peace News: Newsletter of the Justice and Peace
Commission of the Archdiocese of Gulu. April 2008 https://www.cr.org/downloads/JPCNewsletter_200804_ENG.pdf, Accessed March 25, 2019. p. 11
289
Ibid.
290
Ibid.
287

132
use the peace process to design an alternative domestic justice system that the ICC deems
to be a credible, legitimate alternative to international prosecution. No state has the power
to “save” a leader from an international arrest warrant, and if the peace process did not
yield an ICC-approved alternative justice mechanism, President Museveni simply could
have arrested LRA leaders on the ICC warrant before the ink was even dry on the peace
deal. Therefore, throughout the spring, LRA leaders continued to insist that they would
not sign a peace deal until ICC warrants were removed,291 but also indicated that they
would be willing to be held accountable in a northern Ugandan venue.292
Notably, these efforts corresponded with domestic Ugandan efforts to circumvent
the ICC. On March 6, a coalition of Ugandan legislators and civil society organizations
released a statement calling for the UN Security Council to suspend the ICC arrest
warrants for LRA leaders.293 They framed this step as part of a necessary, longer-term
plan for definitively solving the LRA problem, again indicating that human rights and
peace advocates in Uganda approached the ICC not so much as a justice-promoting
institution, but as a body bent on advancing international prosecutions, even if it meant
spoiling peace negotiations.
Then, in April 2008, Kony failed to appear at a planned signing of a more
complete peace agreement, and a few days later, the LRA attacked civilians.294
Nonetheless, the delegations attempted to negotiate peace for several months, even as
Kony refused to attend more signings, saying that he refused to turn himself in and “be
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hanged.”295 Riek Machar, the Chief Mediator, attempted unsuccessfully to meet with
Kony that summer.296 At this point, LRA leadership became even more separated from
the people representing them at peace negotiations, with even Jaoquim Chissano, the
Special Envoy that the UN appointed to oversee the peace process, commenting, “There
is a lack of communication, and that is what the LRA leader wants. There are people who
are assisting in establishing that effective communication, and once that clarification is
made the peace process will be back on the road.”297
These setbacks were accompanied by increasing local civil society criticism of the
ICC’s role in the peace process. In April 2008, after Kony failed to appear for the signing
of the peace agreement, the Justice and Peace Commission for the Archdiocese of Gulu, a
very influential northern Ugandan civil society organization, released a newsletter that
said that northern Ugandans overwhelmingly supported the lifting of ICC warrants
against LRA leaders because they perceived them to be an obstacle to the peace
process.298
The negotiators continued to frame a peace agreement with the involvement of the
LRA delegation, but without Kony. Further, on May 24, the ICC released a public
statement calling on the GoU to intensify their efforts to arrest LRA leaders.299 This kind
of statement is perhaps the starkest example possible of the ICC playing a prosecutorial
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role—in a political moment when peace negotiations progress was stalled because leaders
would not engage for fear of arrest, instead of promoting efforts to ensure that these
leaders are held accountable after the conflict, the ICC instead publicly insisted that
military efforts to capture and turn them over to the Hague be intensified. The very next
day, the Ugandan press reported that Kony said he would not sign the peace
agreement.300
Negotiators communicated to Kony that he had until November 30 to sign the
agreement.301 Kony never appeared at peace talks during this time, in spite of giving a
radio interview in June of 2008 announcing his intentions to appear at talks and
immediately restart the peace process.302 At the same time, the UN Security Council held
a meeting discussing the situation in northern Uganda, where HRW publicly urged them
to support the arrest of LRA leaders on an ICC warrant.303 Perhaps unsurprisingly in light
of these conversations, LRA leaders never went back to the peace negotiations.
Negotiators arranged a meeting for November 30 in the Ri-Kwabanga clearing, and Kony
never appeared. The Juba peace process was over.
The fact that the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation spurred the
LRA’s confidence in negotiations and catalyzed their more active participation in the
peace process for almost a year shows that even the ICC arrest warrants will not deter
leaders from participating in peace negotiations if they perceive them to be an
opportunity to neutralize the threat of ICC prosecution. The ICC’s critiques of this
agreement corresponded with declining LRA engagement in the peace process as a
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whole, which shows that ICC signaling that it will not accept alternatives to international
prosecution is the necessary condition that deters leaders from engaging in the peace
process.
6.0 The implications for theory
Attempts to make peace between the LRA and the GoU clearly show the complex
and varying role that the ICC plays in peace negotiations to end civil wars. Efforts to
bring the LRA to the negotiating table from 2002 to 2005 clearly show that the threat of
prosecution from the ICC does not necessarily dissuade rebels from negotiating peace.
This shows that the latent threat of prosecution can propel leaders to the negotiating table,
because rebels who understand the principle of complementarity and who see the Court
playing an oversight, rather than prosecutorial, role, understand that peace negotiations
can be used to remove a latent threat to their post-conflict exit options. Indeed, the LRA’s
varying responses to attempts to start peace negotiations from 2002 to 2004 show that,
even though the Court was forming and the GoU was very public about its intention to
prosecute LRA leaders, the fact that the Court only represented a latent threat of
prosecution meant that it did not prevent LRA leaders from coming to the negotiating
table. Then, in 2005, the LRA’s efforts to learn about the Court both before and after
arrest warrants were issued, and the way these efforts coincided with LRA outreach to
peacemakers more broadly, show that even if rebel leaders understand that the specter of
prosecution could threaten their post-conflict exit options, if they understand the threat of
prosecution to be latent, and potentially neutralized by engaging in peace negotiations,
the prospect of prosecution—even arrest warrants—will not deter them from arriving at
the negotiating table, and might actually propel them further towards negotiations.
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During formal peace negotiations, however, the ICC had a very different effect.
The parties’ repeated failed attempts to create a post-conflict justice framework that
satisfied the ICC—and the Court’s willingness to repeatedly and publicly air its
dissatisfaction, and call for the arrest of leaders—meant that the Court assumed the role
of a prosecutor rather than an overseer, and fomented deep LRA distrust in the
negotiating process. The ICC’s assumption of the role of prosecutor, again, was not
simply a result of the formal legal status of its involvement in Uganda, nor on the issuing
of arrest warrants. Rather, it was a function of several factors: the issuing of arrest
warrants, the aggressive approach taken by Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, and the public
messaging of human rights organizations and other mediators that undermined the
normative commitment to prevent impunity. The fact that the Court was an increasingly
aggressive and increasingly isolated proponent of prosecution meant that it represented a
credible threat to leaders’ exit options, which undermined their trust in the peace process.
The LRA’s increasing distrust of the peace process was reflected in the LRA’s
internal politics when the LRA’s leader executed one of his most powerful commanders
for being too open to international mediators. With this event, the LRA’s most suspicious
and disenfranchised faction won out. This event coincided with repeated, public ICC
criticisms of the post-conflict justice provisions of the peace accord, thus further
confirming fears that the ICC, in its prosecutorial role, would make LRA leaders’ postconflict exit options worse.
Another important dynamic emerges from this case. The Court’s increasing
assumption of a prosecutorial, rather than an oversight, role was compounded by
Uganda’s varying stances throughout the peace negotiations. Uganda’s varying stances
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on post-conflict justice heightened the post-conflict threat to leaders fates that the ICC
could have posed, because after any peace agreement was signed, Uganda would not only
be legally able to arrest LRA leaders and turn them over to the ICC for prosecution, they
would be legally obligated by the Rome Statute to do so. Uganda’s varying stances on
amnesty for LRA leaders, combined with the ICC’s repeated public reminders that it
would not accept amnesty as an option, left open the possibility that LRA leaders could
be granted amnesty in a peace agreement but still be arrested by the GoU on an ICC
warrant after they had put down arms. This was an unacceptable possibility for LRA
leaders, and one more reason why the ICC’s prosecutorial role made it more rational for
them to continue the fight than continue to talk peace.
Further, the existence of the ICC warrants, and the ICC’s public reminders of
Rome Statute obligations, heightened the reality that LRA leaders could have been
arrested on these warrants at any point during the peace process. This uncertainty led
LRA leadership to stay physically removed from the talks, which created space for a
negotiating team that did not seem to either understand or deeply care about the LRA’s
interests. No LRA leader with a long history or stake in the talks was comfortable
attending them for fear of arrest and prosecution, thus consigning the LRA delegation to
a sub-par negotiating team. Thus, although the LRA delegation managed to negotiate a
comprehensive peace deal, the LRA leadership itself refused to sign it, as it did not
represent their interests.
7.0. The LRA and the ICC after Juba
After the Juba Peace Process ended, and after the LRA had resumed the fight, the fear
that had first propelled LRA leaders to and later repelled them from the table began to
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come to pass. The ICC issued arrest warrants for five LRA leaders: Joseph Kony, Vincent
Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen. The Court terminated
proceedings against Lukwiya during the Juba Peace Process, when reports of his death in
battle in 2006 were confirmed.304 Recall that Vincent Otti was executed during the Juba
Peace Process, on the orders of Joseph Kony, due to a dispute about how the LRA should
approach the peace process.305
After the Juba Peace Process ended, the three remaining LRA leaders—Kony,
Odhiambo, and Ongwen—resumed fighting with the LRA. In October 2013, one month
after an international coalition of forces, including the United States, increased the
military effort against the LRA, Odhiambo was reported to have died in battle.306
Odhiambo was certified deceased by the Ugandan government, and in 2015, the ICC
subsequently ended proceedings against him.307
One indicted LRA leader, Dominic Ongwen, has been apprehended, arrested, and
brought to trial at the ICC. On January 6, 2015, Ongwen surrendered to Seleka rebels,
with whom the LRA had been fighting, who turned him over to US forces.308 From there,
he was transferred to ICC custody, and ICC proceedings against him began later that
month.309 It is important to note that Ongwen’s trial has raised important dilemmas about
international justice, largely because Ongwen joined the LRA because he was abducted
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when he was around ten years old and forced to become a LRA solider.310 Although he is
only charged with crimes that occurred after he turned 18, observers grapple with the
implications of his history as a child solider.311 As of this writing, Ongwen is still
standing trial at the Hague.312
8.0 Conclusion
The failure of the Juba Peace Process illustrates how the ICC can act as a spoiler
for civil war peace negotiations when it assumes a prosecutorial rather than oversight
role. It also highlights the conditions under which the ICC assumes a prosecutorial role,
which go far beyond whether the Court has issued charges and released arrest warrants.
Indeed, this chapter shows that whether the Court assumes a prosecutorial role depends as
much, or more, on the public signals of the Prosecutor, as well as how they align with or
contradict the public signals of human rights advocates and mediators in the peace
process. The case of Uganda also shows that when other actors undermine the Rome
Statute’s anti-impunity norms—such as when human rights or pro-peace organizations
issue statements calling for amnesty for leaders—the ICC can be compelled to publicly
reiterate its commitment to assuring accountability, and thus assume a more prosecutorial
role in the conflict situations.
When the Court assumes this prosecutorial role, and repeatedly, consistently, and
publicly affirms that leaders should be prosecuted for human rights violations, the latent
threat that the Court presents to leaders’ post-conflict fates transforms to an active threat
to leaders’ exit options. If leaders calculate that they cannot neutralize this threat through
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peace negotiations, it makes them more likely to resume the fight in a gamble that victory
in the war, or simply continuing the war, will protect them from post-conflict
punishment. The case of Uganda illustrated this—when LRA leaders decided that they
could no longer use the Juba Peace Process to neutralize the threat of ICC prosecution,
they abandoned the peace negotiations and resumed the fight.
Still, my dissertation’s central contention is that it does not have to be this way.
Even when it is committed to prosecuting culpable leaders, the Court does not have to
serve as a spoiler of peace negotiations because it does not have to assume a prosecutorial
role. The next chapter examines the case of Colombia, and outlines the conditions under
which the Court can play an oversight role in peace negotiations and even act as a
guarantor of the peace.
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CHAPTER 5 | THE ICC AS GUARANTOR IN COLOMBIA
1.0 Introduction
This dissertation explores the various roles that the ICC can play in peace
negotiations, depending on the conditions of the negotiation, the positions taken by the
rebel group, and the ICC’s position within the negotiations. In Chapter 2, I argued that
under some conditions, the ICC can act as a guarantor in peace negotiations. This chapter
uses the case of the Colombian peace process to show how the ICC can act as a
guarantor, argue that the ICC did act as a guarantor of the peace between Colombia and
the FARC, and outline some generalizable conditions under which the ICC can act as a
guarantor.
Chapter 2 posited that the ICC can act as a guarantor when the ICC assumes the
role of overseer of peace negotiations, rather than of prosecutor. Whether the ICC acts as
an overseer is largely down to the ICC’s own decisions, and to how other actors involved
in the peace process or in promoting human rights talk about Rome Statute norms.
Regarding the ICC’s own decisions, two factors are especially crucial. First, if the Court
has not yet reached a formal prosecutorial phase of involvement, and is still in a
preliminary examination or investigation of a conflict, it can more easily assume the role
of an overseer, because no criminal charges have yet been issued. Thus, it has the latent
potential to prosecute, but is not yet in a formal prosecutorial role. Second, the approach
of the Prosecutor, and the way the Court publically signals about its work in the conflict
situation is crucial to whether the Court plays an oversight or prosecutorial role. If the
Prosecutor emphasizes that the normative commitments of the Rome Statute are about
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justice broadly, and do not necessitate international prosecution in every situation, the
Court remains in an oversight role, and remains a latent, not active, threat of prosecution.
It is important to note here that one of the ICC’s roles in all conflict situations in
which it conducts a preliminary examination is to remind the parties of the conflict of
their Rome Statute obligations. In the context of peace negotiations, this usually means
reminding the parties that, under the Rome Statute, perpetrators of grave atrocity crimes
cannot be granted amnesty and must face judicial accountability. When the ICC chooses
a public relations approach that emphasizes justice over prosecution, it is restrained about
how, when, and to whom it delivers those reminders. It often chooses to deliver those
reminders privately, eschewing press releases or public statements. When it does choose
to deliver public statements, these statements are often restrained and simply re-iterate
the terms of the Court’s involvement in and expectations for the situation, rather than
exhorting or condemning particular actions. Finally, ICC promotion of justice broadly
rather than prosecution narrowly often relies more on the ICC’s presence rather than
overt political declarations. For example, the ICC might simply announce that it is
visiting the country, or attending a diplomatic event, rather than commenting directly on
negotiations.
How the Court communicates its commitment to justice in a conflict situation
only partially concerns the approach of the Court’s Prosecutor. An extremely important
factor is other actors’ willingness to reinforce anti-impunity norms. When organizations
advocating for human rights and peace repeatedly and publicly insist on the need for
accountability, they allow the Court to act as an overseer for two reasons. First, they
remove the Court’s incentive to make public statements against impunity, freeing up
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space for it to act more as an investigator and an overseer. Secondly, they remind
belligerents of the latent threat of ICC prosecution without heightening the threat. Since
no other international institution advocating for human rights has the ability to issue
indictments for offenders around the globe, no other human rights advocates’ statements
against impunity carry the same threat to leaders’ exit options. In other words, when the
ICC states that it will not accept impunity for crimes, its ability to actually mount
prosecutions means that this statement can amount to an escalated threat to leaders’ exit
options. However, when another human rights organization states that impunity is
unacceptable, and the ICC is already involved in the situation, but stays silent, the
statement only serves to remind leaders of a latent, and still negotiable, threat.
In this chapter, I argue that all of these conditions were met in Colombia: that the
Court assumed the role of overseer because of it never elevated the status of the case past
a preliminary examination, because the Prosecutor took a careful approach that
emphasized justice over international prosecution, and because human rights and peace
advocates facilitated that quiet approach by amplifying the Court’s normative
commitment to end impunity. As a result, the ICC served as a guarantor of the
Colombian peace agreement of 2016, both during its negotiation and during its
implementation. Further, I argue that we can identify conditions of the Colombian case
that are generalizable to other peace negotiations, and that indicate when we can expect
the ICC to serve as a guarantor, rather than a spoiler, of peace.
Still, there were several key, context-specific aspects of the Colombian case that
enhanced the FARC’s agency and enabled the ICC to use lenient signaling: the role of the
InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the highly publicized commission
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of war crimes by Colombian state actors. These aspects bear much more elaboration.
Thus, this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief justification of
this chapter’s case selection, as well as a description of the data and methods used. The
third section details the historical context of the case, and also provides descriptions of
key conditions of the case, including how the role of the IACtHR and Colombian state
crimes conditioned debates on post-conflict accountability in Colombia, why the FARC
had considerable agency in peace negotiations, and how the ICC used lenient, subtle
signals to remind the government of Colombia (GoC) and the FARC of their Rome
Statute obligations. The fourth section presents a narrative of the ICC’s involvement in
the Colombian peace process, culminating in the signing of the peace agreement in
September 2016. The fifth section describes how the ICC continued to act as a guarantor
of the peace agreement after it was signed, and how all sides in the conflict directly
appealed to the ICC to act as a guarantor of post-conflict justice. The sixth section
concludes.
2.0 The case selection, data, and methods
The central reason I use this chapter to analyze the Colombian peace process is
because it exemplifies how the ICC can play an oversight role in peace negotiations. As
Sections 3.2 to 3.5 of this chapter will detail, the four conditions that help the ICC to play
an oversight role in a conflict situation are present in this case: the ICC’s formal role in
the case never advanced past the preliminary examination phase, the ICC took a public
relations approach that emphasized the pursuit of justice over its mandate to conduct
international prosecutions, the public support of a constellation of human rights and
peace advocates who were extremely savvy to the role of international criminal tribunals,
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and the involvement of a regional court that helped actors learn to incorporate an
international tribunal into their political calculations.
To show how the Colombian peace process demonstrates the ICC playing an
oversight role and therefore acting as a guarantor, I use a qualitative case study based
entirely on publicly available data sources. I draw from accounts of the peace
negotiations published by the FARC and the GoC, which are available on an online
archive. I also draw from the published accounts of observers who were in Colombia
during the period, and of analysts of Colombia, including Ana Arjona, June S. Beittel,
Jemima Garcia-Godos, Robin Kirk, Knut Andreas Lid, and Claire Metelis. I also relied
on reports from various think tanks, including the Wilson Center, the US Institute for
Peace, and the Rand Corporation.
For further corroboration, I also consulted the reports of international institutions,
especially the IACtHR and ICC, and NGOs, including Amnesty International (AI),
Human Rights Watch (HRW), and International Crisis Group (ICG). Finally, to
corroborate the timeline of events, I relied heavily on Colombian newspapers, principally
El Tiempo, La Semana, and El Colombiano, as well as international news services such
as IRIN, Reuters, the New York Times, The Guardian (UK), The Independent (UK) and
the BBC.
In this chapter, I analyze this data in two ways. In the following section (3.0), I
present a detailed analysis of how the four scope conditions that my theory specifies in
order for the ICC to assume an oversight role were present in the Colombian case: a
formal investigatory role for the ICC, the ICC’s emphasis of justice over prosecution in
its approach to the conflict, an empowered constellation of human rights and peace
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advocates who publicly insist on the normative commitments of the Rome Statute, and a
regional court that conditioned these advocates to be able to work effectively with an
international tribunal. I also present a detailed analysis of other conditions that affected
the success of peace negotiations, including the Colombian government’s established
culpability for human rights violations and the FARC’s relative power. Then, I present a
chronological narrative of the Colombian peace process beginning in 2002 and
culminating through the ratification of the peace agreement in 2016 and the ICC’s
continued role in monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement. In this
narrative, I trace out how the ICC played the role of overseer, and how that oversight role
promoted the success of peace negotiations.
3.0 The context
The Colombian civil war was a decades-long conflict with centuries-old roots.
Colombia’s location is indicated below, in Figure 5.3. Since its days as a Spanish colony,
Colombia has long struggled to equitably distribute land. In colonial days, land was
apportioned to benefit colonial elites, and upon independence, the government’s land
reforms maintained a status quo that favored the wealthy, and further marginalized many
peasants, who lost their land and earned a living working the land of wealthy landowners.
As a result, when agriculture boomed in Colombia, the peasants who worked the land
saw few of the benefits of the boom, as they did not own the land.
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Figure 5.3. Map indicating the location of Colombia313

Tensions over the distribution and regulation of land persisted through the early
twentieth century, and heightened throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Land was a
key wedge issue between the Liberal and Conservative political wings and undergirded
an increasingly hostile political arena. In the 1940s, the Liberals introduced a sweeping
reform agenda aimed at rectifying the social imbalances brought on by Colombia’s land
distribution, and Conservative opposition to this agenda stoked tensions. Political
animosity boiled over in April 1948, with the assassination of the Liberal leader.
April 1948 started a period still known as La Violencia. Protests that originated in
Bogota moved to rural regions, and soon spurred thousands of political activists to take
up arms. The country was, for a short period, convulsed by violent unrest, which was
then quelled by violent state repression. The state killed the key figures in the uprising,
and in response to these violent tactics, resistance groups formed.
313
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Since the uprisings lasted the longest in the rural regions of the country, state
repression was harshest in the countryside. As a result, peasants formed self-defense
organizations to protect themselves from government enforcers. At the same time, some
peasants were spurred on to fight for liberal or communist ideals, and were galvanized by
ideology, rather than self-preservation, to join armed groups. Further, due to ongoing
government violence, the territories held by peasant self-defense groups became the
safest places for many rural civilians, thus furthering the peasant resistance groups’ reach
and increasing their civilian support.
These insurgent peasant groups continued to grow, and by the early 1950s they
controlled enough territory to threaten the cohesion of the Colombian state. Realizing
their strength, these peasant insurgencies began a project of national consolidation, in
hopes of using their combined power to institute political reforms. At the same time, in
the cities, the Liberals and Conservatives came to a power-sharing agreement, known as
the National Front, that disproportionately empowered the executive branch and the
military. This political arrangement paved the way for more military crackdowns on rural
insurgents, and conflict continued.
The state’s renewed military offensive spurred the peasant insurgent groups to
keep meeting. In 1966, at the second annual national conference of these groups, the
FARC was formed. The FARC combined several kinds of peasant insurgent groups:
those who still fought mainly for self-defense, those who fought for agrarian reforms, and
those who were fully-fledged communists. Although, at that time in Colombia,
communists also had roots in the cities, the FARC’s base was distinctly rural, and had
little reach in Colombia’s cities.
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In its first years, the FARC existed largely as a peasant defense group. Due to this
focus, it carried out many social welfare functions, as well as its armed operations. As the
FARC was able to see successes in both goals and observed how peasants organized
themselves for their collective welfare and protection, they expanded their agenda and
articulated a sweeping set of political goals. Following a Marxist ideology, the FARC
fought against social inequality and inequity in agrarian policies and political
participation in Colombia. Throughout these early years, the FARC carried out many
state-like functions in the areas it occupied: it provided social services, taxed civilians,
and was careful to limit violence against civilians.
During the 1970s, the FARC restructured to form many fronts throughout its
territory, as its territorial holdings had expanded considerably. Correspondingly, the
Colombian government intensified its efforts against the FARC, and right-wing
paramilitary groups arose to fight the FARC in the rural areas it controls. In the early
1980s, the FARC used increasingly offensive tactics to fight the war.
In the mid 1980s, the FARC signed a ceasefire with the Colombian government
and began a round of peace talks with President Betancour’s administration. During this
period, the FARC and other leftist groups formed the Union Patriotica (UP), a political
party. The UP had four representatives elected to the Colombian Congress and forwarded
two presidential candidates.
During this period, the FARC pioneered its strategic kidnapping of wealthy
civilians. Armed peasant groups had used kidnapping as a tactic during La Violencia; the
FARC re-discovered this tactic to make political statements and to raise funds by
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demanding ransoms. As the conflict progressed, the FARC continued to use kidnapping,
but its primary revenue stream began to come from its control of the illicit drug trade.
In 1998, the GoC attempted to hold peace talks with the FARC, but they ended
when the FARC kidnapped key political figures. Then, in 2000, the Colombian
government and the American government launched Plan Colombia, a militarized
attempt to stem the flow of drugs out of Colombia, and to fight the drug trafficking
within Colombia that benefitted the FARC. In 2004, the Colombian government launched
Plan Patriota, designed to uproot guerrilla groups in Colombia, gain military control over
rural areas controlled by rebel groups and introduce social programs into those areas.
To counter these offensives, the FARC launched Plan Resistencia in 2006. It was
timed to coincide with the re-election of President Uribe, and to use violent attacks create
the impression that Uribe had not succeeded in increasing security in Colombia.
Nonetheless, Uribe won re-election, and in 2006, the FARC and Uribe entered
preliminary peace talks. 2007 and 2008 saw two major scandals about GoC crimes—in
2007, the parapolitica scandal exposed the deep and pervasive links between Colombia’s
paramilitaries and central government figures, and in 2008, the false positives scandal
showed how the paramilitaries colluded with government officials to kill thousands of
innocent civilians.
In 2008, the FARC lost three of its top commanders, and returned to a traditional
guerilla military strategy. In late 2010, after the inauguration of President Santos, and the
death of a fourth top FARC commander, secret informal peace negotiations between the
GoC and the FARC began. These talks continued despite the FARC’s increased military
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offensives in 2011, and the death of another top FARC leader. In August 2012, Santos
and the FARC announced that they would begin formal peace talks.
3.1 State war crimes
Throughout the civil war, the GoC had several highly public scandals concerning
war crimes committed by its soldiers, or by members of state-affiliated paramilitary
groups. Most notably, the false positives scandal showed that killing civilians was a
widespread, coordinated, and strategic practice of Colombian paramilitary groups. The
Attorney General of Colombia found that 4,475 civilians were killed in attempts to
bolster body counts of guerrilla soldiers, and that 5,137 state officials were connected to
the scandal. 931 people were convicted for their involvement in this scandal, with 862 of
them being members of the National Army.314 Further, the parapolitica scandal, in which
scores of Colombian politicians were linked to paramilitary groups accused of war
crimes, showed the extent to which the paramilitary groups carried out the agendas of
factions within the Colombian government.315
Indeed, imprisoned Colombian soldiers are an important constituency of the peace
process, and their experiences are well-known.316 This matters for rebel leaders’
calculations during peace negotiations, as the very existence of soldiers imprisoned for
war crimes demonstrates that, in Colombia, criminal accountability for war crimes is not
simply a tool that the government uses to prosecute the rebels, or a cudgel of government
power against dissidents. Perhaps more importantly, the GoC itself came under ICC
314

colombiareports, “Colombia’s False Positives | Fact Sheet,” Colombia News | Colombia Reports (blog),
March 14, 2017, https://colombiareports.com/false-positives/.
315
Holmes, Jennifer S., and Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres. "Violence and the state: Lessons from
Colombia." Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no. 2 (2014): 372-403.
316
Cox, Aubrey and Maria Antonia Montes. “Colombia—War Crime Prisoners Face Past, Plan Future.”
United States Institute of Peace. December 26, 2017. https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/12/colombiawar-crime-prisoners-face-past-plan-future Accessed March 25, 2019.

152
scrutiny for the false positives scandal, demonstrating that the ICC was not a tool that the
state could manipulate to use against the rebels, and could also be used to hold the state to
account for its crimes.317
3.1.1

The paramilitaries
It is crucial to note that paramilitary troops committed many of the war crimes for

which the GoC was held responsible. Paramilitaries occupied a grey and shifting area
between state and non-state actor,318 and this was crucial to the FARC’s understanding of
post-conflict justice for several reasons. First, as the paramilitaries were an irregular
military force, the FARC could observe how domestic and international justice was
discussed and meted out to a fellow non-state armed group. Secondly, although the
paramilitaries were not a state military, to the FARC—and to many other observers of the
conflict—the paramilitaries were functionally a state party, and so when the
paramilitaries were held accountable for their conduct, it demonstrated that state parties
could be held accountable, and that justice was not only a tool of state power. Both of
these reasons bear further discussion.
Although the paramilitaries were widely understood to be agents of members of
the Colombian government, the Colombian government was unable to extend to them all
of the protections and privileges that would have been extended to military actors, and in
public maintained a distinction between the paramilitaries and the military. As a result,
discussions about transitional justice and disarmament options for the paramilitaries bore
many parallels to discussions about the post-conflict fates of non-state fighters. In
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observing discussions about disarmament and reintegration of paramilitaries, the FARC
gained an important opportunity to assess the options available to them after the conflict,
and to assess the political possibilities of those respective options. Further, in observing
the processes of negotiating and implementing these disarmament and reintegration
measures, the FARC gained an important opportunity to learn from the paramilitaries’
mistakes. They could add these lessons to their strategic playbook, and therefore could
enter peace negotiations with more information.
Perhaps more importantly, since the FARC viewed the paramilitaries as state
supported, seeing them held accountable through international justice mechanisms
disabused the FARC of any notion that international justice is a tool that states can
unilaterally wield against less powerful actors. Several cases at the IACtHR held
Colombia to account for failing to address human rights abuses committed by
paramilitaries. One of the most important was the 19 Merchants case, in which nineteen
tradesmen were found executed by a paramilitary group, an event “masterminded by and
with the support of Colombian Army officers.”319 Throughout the course of the case, the
IACtHR clearly established the connections between the paramilitary perpetrators and
Colombian military officers who coordinated the attack on the merchants, and ruled that,
in its failure to hold the perpetrators accountable, the GoC had abrogated its
responsibility to give its citizens a fair trial.320 The IACtHR ordered the GoC to properly
investigate the incident and to hold the perpetrators accountable, hold a public ceremony
commemorating the victims, and pay reparations to the families of the victims. This
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ruling demonstrated that if the GoC attempted to use its own justice system to shield the
paramilitaries from accountability, an international court could force the GoC’s hand in
holding them accountable. In this case, the IACtHR acted as an external guarantor to
ensure that the GoC could not manipulate justice for its own strategic interests and
demonstrated that an international court could function as a guarantor of justice.
Also important was the timing of the 19 Merchants ruling. The final judgment in
the case was delivered in July 2004,321 while the ICC opened its preliminary examination
into the Colombian situation less than a month before.322 It is extremely significant that at
almost the precise political moment that the ICC opened its preliminary examination in
Colombia, both the FARC and the GoC saw another supranational court demanding that
fighters acting on the behest of the state be held accountable for human rights violations.
This definitively demonstrated that an institution like the ICC was just as well situated to
hold state actors to account as it was to hold non-state actors to account.
3.2 The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights
The IACtHR was a crucial player on questions of post-conflict justice not only
due to its role in cases such as the 19 Merchants, but by virtue of its institutional design.
It was created and structured to hold states accountable for their international human
rights obligations, and so all of the cases that it tries either hold the state accountable for
its own wrongdoing or for its failure to adequately address another actor’s wrongdoing.
The IACtHR can only bring cases against states, and thus holds the state responsible for
human rights abuses it sanctioned or failed to prevent. Further, the IACtHR’s rulings as
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legally binding for state parties, which include Colombia.323 As a result, the FARC had
years to observe the GoC being brought to account in front of an international court for
failure to live up to its human rights obligations, and could be under no illusion that such
institutions necessarily protected the state. By the time of the 2016 peace process, the
IACtHR had brought sixteen cases against the GoC, and more than half of them were for
human rights abuses committed by paramilitary troops.324
Further, the FARC had the opportunity to witness an international court exerting
pressure on the state to live up to human rights obligations, and to see how this pressure
actually led to changes in the GoC’s policy.325 In response to IACtHR rulings, the GoC
has paid reparations to families of victims, located the remains of victims of paramilitary
massacres, issued public apologies, and changed domestic laws to better uphold its
international human rights treaty obligations.326
Finally, the fact that the IACtHR’s expectations on compliance with human rights
norms mirrored the ICC’s expectations on compliance with human rights norms bolstered
the ICC’s influence in the Colombian peace process. Crucially, the IACtHR also does not
allow amnesties,327 meaning that the ICC would not be the only international judicial
body acting as a veto player on the amnesty question in the peace process. Perhaps even
more importantly, due to its more limited mandate of only prosecuting the state, the
IACtHR was perfectly situated to advocate for international criminal accountability
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norms, and to move against amnesty, without acting as a direct threat to the FARC, since
the IACtHR did not have the mandate to hold the FARC directly accountable for war
crimes. Indeed, throughout its history, the IACtHR publicly and repeatedly condemned
the GoC’s human rights abuses328, playing a role of vocal anti-impunity advocate that the
ICC did not have to play.
3.3

NGO advocacy
The ICC’s position was also bolstered by NGO advocacy, both from local

grassroots organizations, and powerful international NGOs. Several major NGOs were
vocal, consistent, and insistent advocates of criminal accountability for GoC and FARC
leaders, and they often made the ICC’s case against impunity without the ICC ever
having to say a word in public. For instance, the International Crisis Group (ICG) issued
32 public reports on the Colombian peace process, and had over 500 meetings with
stakeholders.329 The imperative of avoiding impunity and holding high-level perpetrators
criminally accountable was a consistent refrain throughout these reports. Likewise, HRW
holds international justice as a major issue area in their priorities for Colombia, and has
been a consistent advocate of criminal accountability for high-level perpetrators of war
crimes.330 AI has also consistently advocated against impunity in Colombia,331 and issued
numerous reports on its consequences for Colombian civilians.332
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3.4

The FARC’s agency
The FARC had considerable agency in peace negotiations. It was empowered to

exercise leverage over the GoC and navigate the complex legal, political and diplomatic
issues of the peace process for several reasons. These reasons can be roughly categorized
as the FARC’s hard power—its military power, the territory in controlled, and the
influence it exerted through the drug trade—and the FARC’s soft power—the FARC’s
legal and political habituation, and the pressure the Colombian government faced to make
peace.
The FARC enjoyed considerable power for three reasons: its military capability,
its territorial control, and its role in the drug trade. The FARC was a militarily weak
organization in terms of troop size, with only about 5,000 to 11,000 troops during the
2012-2016 peace negotiations. However, the FARC exerted considerable territorial
control in Colombia, largely due to its rural, remote geographic base. Most importantly,
the FARC’s involvement in the illicit drug trade deepened its hard power because it
constituted an important revenue stream, and was another important way for the FARC to
control territory. The FARC is estimated to have earned between $200 million and $3.5
billion each year from cocaine revenue.333 Further, the FARC’s system of taxing the drug
trade enhanced its territorial control, as it underscores the fact that the FARC undertakes
many government functions in the areas it controls. The FARC taxes the cultivation, sale,
production, and shipping of drugs that takes place on its territory,334 just as the state
would tax local businesses. Further, an estimated 300,000 Colombians’ livelihoods
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depend on the drug economy, meaning that the FARC’s role in the drug trade means that
they have deep influence over 300,000 Colombians’ economic well-being.335
The FARC also possessed considerable legal and political savvy, which it gained
over years of attempting negotiations with the GoC and navigating a highly legalized
conflict environment. The FARC became legally strategic because the law has long been
a force to be reckoned with in Colombia’s civil war. Due to the deep legalization of
Colombia’s public sphere, the FARC evolved to become very informed about the role of
the law and courts, and adept at navigating around judicial actors.
Throughout the most intense decade of the conflict, the FARC’s main military
opponent was a constellation of pro-government paramilitary groups. In a sense, this
adversary was created by Colombian law—in 1968, the Colombian Congress adopted a
decree legalizing the formation of private self-defense groups,336 which quickly evolved
to become the paramilitary groups that would be major forces in the subsequent five
decades of the conflict. Just as a law created one of the FARC’s main adversaries, a law
changed how these adversaries fit into the landscape of the conflict. After they realized
the extent to which the paramilitaries were responsible for the civilian toll of the conflict,
in 1989, the government passed laws eliminating the paramilitaries’ legal status, and
formalizing measures to disarm and weaken them.337 These measures worked, the
paramilitaries were greatly weakened, and as a result the rebel groups regained
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strength.338 To combat a re-invigorated FARC, the government again used the law to
create a new adversary for them: in 1994, Decree 356 legalized the creation of
“cooperatives for vigilance and private security” (CONVIVIR).339 These cooperatives
were functionally paramilitaries, with the only functional difference between most
CONVIVIR groups and the paramilitaries being their legal status.340
The GoC not only used the law to determine who the FARC would fight against,
but the tools it could use in its political struggle. In an attempt at peace in 1982, the
FARC learned that the legal status that the government afforded them could open or close
options for political contestation beyond the battlefield. As part of this peace attempt, the
GoC passed a broad amnesty law that offered costly concessions to the FARC:
“unconditional amnesty for all acts of rebellion and all crimes connected with the
rebellion, …[excluding] only the murder of defenseless persons, atrocities such as
indiscriminate murder or disfigurement, and gratuitous acts of violence such as rape.”341
The FARC received this amnesty without having to disarm, and the FARC and the GoC
entered a three-year ceasefire. During this period, due in part to the ceasefire but also
largely due to the amnesty extended to them, the FARC created a political party, the
Union Patriotica (UP). In its short lifespan, the UP won eight seats in Congress, six seats
in the Senate, hundreds of city council seats, and a few mayorships.342 The creation of the
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UP was part of a strategic plan, hatched by the highest members of the FARC’s command
structure, for the traditionally rural FARC to better embed itself in cities.343 However,
when scores of UP members were assassinated, the FARC dismantled the party to
concentrate on its military efforts.344 Even so, the UP would not have existed in the first
place without a legal concession granted by the Colombian government.
The FARC’s habituation to Colombia’s legal system can perhaps most clearly be
seen in its attempts to control the local justice systems of the territory it occupied. Robin
Kirk, a HRW researcher, affirmed that the FARC would not permit independent judges or
prosecutors in the territory it controlled.345 In contexts where they had the capacity, and a
compliant civilian population, the FARC set up their own justice systems to supplant the
state’s.346 A liberal councilmember of the city of Viota told Ana Arjona, a researcher, that
the FARC “became a valid interlocutor” of legal disputes, and a communist leader of the
same city told her of how policemen would turn to the FARC when they could no longer
handle their cases.347 Another politician told Arjona that the FARC “became like a center
to mete out justice; like a court, and [the commander] was the judge.”348
All of this suggests that, even prior to the involvement of the ICC, the FARC was
perhaps especially habituated among rebel groups to understand and respond to legal
changes in the context of a conflict. Through these examples, it is clear that the FARC
could use the law and the institutions enshrining it as tools to promote their own interests,
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or that they understood them as obstacles to be strategized around. In any case, the FARC
had ample understanding of the fact that, even in wartime, the rule of law can matter.
Further, the Colombian government faced considerable domestic and international
pressure to end the conflict. President Santos campaigned strongly on a promise for
peace, and when he was elected in 2010, observers commented that his campaign
promises amounted to a mandate to succeed in the peace process.349 The GoC also faced
economic pressure to reach peace, as declining oil prices after 2010 confronted it with
new, compelling incentives to develop its rural economy in FARC-controlled areas to
offset the economic losses.350 The fact that the GoC faced these pressures to make peace
enhanced the FARC’s political positions going into the formal peace negotiations that led
to the 2016 agreement.
3.5

The ICC’s role as justice promoter
The ICC avoided directly criticizing the parties in the peace process, and instead

expressed any concerns through requests for information or clarification. When there was
concern that Colombia’s legal principles or policies did not align with the Rome Statute,
the ICC submitted a public request for clarification of the policies, and in a few cases,
directly expressed concerns that they did not align with the Rome Statute. In two cases,
the ICC directly articulated the legal concept as outlined in the Rome Statute, still
without directly condemning how Colombia’s conceptualization did not align with the
Rome Statute definition.
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It is worth noting that, in a review of all Colombian newspaper articles on the
ICC’s role in the peace process, Prosecutor Bensouda only seemed to make one direct,
oral statement to the press, and that this statement was supportive of the work of
Colombia’s courts in implementing the peace agreement.351 All other ICC statements on
the Colombian conflict were written, either as public statements, pieces in Colombian
newspapers, open letters to Colombian government actors, or as reports on the
preliminary investigation. This suggests that all of the ICC’s public statements on
Colombia—especially those that could be construed as critique—were carefully
calibrated and controlled.
Further, the ICC used carefully timed visits and statements to evidence its
consistent, but not overwhelming, involvement in the peace process. Sometimes, these
statements and visits seem to be timed in response to controversies raised by others,
either members of civil society or the state or rebels themselves. At other points, these
visits emphasized the ICC’s ongoing preliminary examination in Colombia.
4.0 The case study
On August 5, 2002, Colombia ratified the Rome Statute. Colombia had signed the
document four years before, in 1998, as President Pastraña initiated a new round of
negotiations with the FARC. At that point, the FARC enjoyed a state-sanctioned safe
haven of territory in the eastern part of Colombia. It was roughly the size of Switzerland.
Indeed, the late 1990’s was an era of strength for the FARC. In July of 1999, a majority
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of Colombians expressed in a Gallup poll that they thought the FARC could one day
depose the government by force.352
The period between Colombia’s signing and ratification of the Rome Statute saw
a series of fits and starts in peace negotiations with the FARC. In October 2001, the
FARC and the GoC signed the San Francisco Agreement—the FARC agreed to negotiate
a ceasefire, and the government agreed to extend the FARC’s safe zone until January of
2002.353 In January, the Colombian government extended the FARC’s safe zone through
April 2002; however, in February of 2002, after the FARC hijacked a plane to kidnap a
high-ranking senator, President Pastraña revoked the safe zone and called off peace
negotiations.354 In a televised address, he said of the FARC, “No one believes in their
willingness to reach peace.”355
It was in this context of renewed hostilities that President Uribe was elected, in
May 2002. A tougher strategy against the FARC was one of Uribe’s central campaign
promises. Throughout the campaign, Uribe had been a “staunch critic” of the safe zone
granted to the FARC, and of the fact that the government negotiated peace with them
despite the continuing hostilities they mounted.356
Colombia ratified the Rome Statute during President Pastraña’s final days in
office, after Colombia’s Constitutional Court held an extraordinary session to be sure to
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approve its ratification before Uribe took office.357 Upon its ratification, Colombia’s UN
Ambassador said, “The ratification of this instrument is a very important step for us and
demonstrates our commitment to strengthening international law.”358
While ratification signaled Colombia’s commitment to international law as a
concept, Colombia held a crucial reservation to the Rome Statute that showed its
hesitance about the ICC’s reach within its borders. Colombia’s ratification stipulated a
reservation on Article 124, which meant that the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes
committed in Colombia would be delayed for seven years. The Court itself accepted this
reservation, and welcomed Colombia’s ratification of the Rome Statute.
Human rights advocates, however, were more critical. In September 2002, HRW
called on President Uribe to remove the reservation on Article 124, and ratify the Rome
Statute in full. HRW critiqued the reservation itself, calling it a “prelude to impunity.”359
Perhaps more tellingly, it critiqued the opacity of the process by which the reservation
was added, saying that the reservation was not made known to Colombia’s public or
Congress, and that “The government of President Andrés Pastraña made the declaration
two days before President Uribe took office, reportedly in consultation with the new
president.”
Several aspects of these events should be noted. First, it is important that the ICC
accepted such a significant deferral of its jurisdiction concerning war crimes in a country
that was currently at war without public comment or protest. Second, it is important that
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the GoC did in fact receive protest and pressure regarding its ascension to the Court, and
its attempt to insulate its citizens from accountability for war crimes. It is equally
important that this protest did not come from the Court, but from human rights advocates.
This set an important precedent, which was to exemplify a pattern to come—while the
ICC would be an important factor in discussions of justice in and after Colombia’s
conflict, and an actor with a clear point of view and set of priorities, the Court rarely
aggressively advocated on its own behalf. Instead, when Colombia’s interactions with the
ICC raised doubts about its commitment to criminal accountability, a constellation of
other powerful and vocal human rights actors advocated for accountability and against
impunity, while the ICC itself stayed silent.
Third, it is significant that after consultation with Uribe, Pastraña’s administration
added a last-minute protection shielding the GoC and Colombians from prosecution. This
sent an important signal that Uribe felt that his coalition had something to fear on that
front, which served as an important reminder that the ICC was designed to hold both state
and non-state actors to account. This tacit admission that Uribe had something to fear
from the Court showed that, in Colombia, the ICC could not be used unilaterally as a tool
of state power against rebel fighters, as other governments had tried to do. Further, it
showed that the ICC had the potential to constrain and punish both state and non-state
actors.
In spite of Colombia’s Article 124 reservations, and the ICC’s celebration of its
ratification of the Rome Statute, the ICC quickly showed that it considered Colombia’s
situation to be serious and important. In June 2003, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo stated in
a report and at the UN that he felt that Colombia was one of the three “gravest
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occurrence[s] of crimes under its treaty jurisdiction.”360 The other two countries that
merited this dubious distinction were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
Uganda—both African countries that, in later years, were used as evidence of the Court’s
“Africa problem.”
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s pronouncement did not meet any public response
from President Uribe. Instead, at the same time, Uribe launched Plan Patriota, an initially
covert attempt to retake the Switzerland-sized zone that had been granted to the FARC
under Pastraña, destroy the FARC’s drug production infrastructure, and demobilize the
many paramilitary groups that fought the FARC and increased the civilian toll.361
As Plan Patriota continued throughout 2004, the ICC prepared to launch a
preliminary examination of the Colombia situation.362 The preliminary examination was
launched in June 2004; however, this was not made known to Colombia’s government
until March 2005. At that time, President Uribe was told that the ICC had “received
information on alleged crimes that could fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.”363
These crimes were allegedly committed by both state and non-state armed groups.
As the ICC worked in secret to hold GoC and FARC leaders accountable for
atrocity crimes, several banner events for transitional justice happened in public. On June
23, 2005 Colombia passed the Justice and Peace Law (JPL), which created a
demobilization and transitional justice scheme for paramilitary groups. The JPL was the
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latest and most dramatic in a long line of government attempts to legislate an end to the
war, and by the time of its issuance, the paramilitaries had grown used to interpreting and
strategizing around the government’s creation of laws governing the terms of the
conflict.364 Unlike its predecessors, the JPL was explicitly designed to help the
paramilitaries lay down arms and re-enter Colombian society. Applying only to
paramilitary fighters, and not the FARC, the JPL “placed a statute of limitations on
prosecuting individuals, required lighter sentences than courts had normally been
imposing, and blocked extradition for those wanted by the United States.”365 In the event
that the ICC issued arrest warrants for paramilitary leaders, the terms of the JPL also
protected them from extradition to the Hague.
Although the terms of the JPL would have made it materially more difficult for
the ICC to carry out prosecutions of Colombian paramilitary leaders, the ICC issued no
protest, condemnation, or indeed, comment, about the new law. However, a slew of
statements from human rights advocates advanced messages in line with the Court’s
founding principles—that those who were responsible for atrocities should be held
accountable, and should not be afforded impunity. Indeed, the JPL was met with an
onslaught of criticism from human rights groups, including both NGOs and international
institutions. The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights released its own statement
on the JPL, reminding the GoC of its obligations under international law, and especially
as a member of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.366

364

Garcia-Godos and Lid, “Transitional justice and victims’ rights before the end of a conflict,” p. 496.
Metelis, Inside Insurgency, p. 107.
366
“Statement by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights on the Application and Scope of the
Justice and Peace Law in Colombia.” Organization of American States. August 1, 2006.
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Colombia2006eng/Pronunciamiento.8.1.06eng.htm Accessed March 25,
2019.
365

168
Notably, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
issued a statement titled “The regulations of the “Justice and Peace Law” do not
adequately ensure due respect for the rights of victims.” The quotes around the name of
the law are a notable part of the original title, and the statement asserts “the Attorney
General’s Office should take into account the international obligations of the Colombian
State with regard to the administration of justice and the fight against impunity.”367 One
of Colombia’s central international obligations was, of course, its ratification of the Rome
Statute. Thus, a major international human rights advocate reminded the GoC of its Rome
Statute obligations after NGOs raised concerns about impunity. Importantly, however,
the ICC itself did not have to do any reminding, as other organizations had taken up the
call. Furthermore, many of the JPL’s critics based their critiques on the ideals
undergirding the Rome Statute—the idea that perpetrators of atrocities should expect
prosecution, and that justice should not be contingent on political exigencies.
The GoC responded to some of these criticisms. In May 2006, the Constitutional
Court struck down some of the most widely condemned aspects of the law, and
demanded clarification of others.368 Several months later, external observers said that one
of the main paramilitary groups, the AUC, had fully demobilized.369
The next few years were marked with important signals of FARC’s willingness to
negotiate. In 2007, FARC attempted to negotiate peace using Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez as a main external mediator. These negotiations fell through because of a conflict
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surrounding Chavez’s role, but the FARC continued to send signals of its willingness to
de-escalate the conflict. It released several high profile hostages throughout 2007 and
2008.
These signals also occurred, however, due to the FARC’s weakening military
status. In March of 2008, one of the FARC’s central leaders were killed in strikes by the
military, which was the first time the military succeeded in killing such a high ranking
FARC commander.370 In the same month, another central FARC commander was
murdered by his security guard.371 Then, in May, the founder of the FARC died of a heart
attack.372 On top of these losses of central leadership, the FARC’s morale was lowered by
a military operation that successfully freed Ingrid Betancourt, their highest-profile
hostage.373 In response to these military setbacks, the FARC and another major rebel
group, the ELN, had decided to cease their hostilities against each other and concentrate
their military efforts on fighting the Colombian government.374
Most likely as a function of their military weakness, the FARC offered to hold
peace talks with Colombia’s new president, Juan Manuel Santos, upon his election in
August 2010.375 However, Santos refused that offer, holding that the FARC needed to
release its hostages before the GoC would enter talks. In response, the FARC stepped up
its military actions. Due to its lowered military capacity, these actions increasingly took
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the form of guerilla warfare. The GoC continued its military strikes against the FARC,
and these strikes continued to do significant damage.
In May of 2011, President Santos sent an important signal about the future role of
the ICC in Colombia by becoming the first Latin American president to sign an
agreement on the enforcement of ICC sentences.376 By signing this document, Colombia
agreed that the Court could sentence perpetrators to serve prison time in a list of
approved states that did not include Colombia. On another level, the GoC signaled its
commitment to the mission of the Court, and its desire to be considered a state that was
on the right side on international justice.
Shortly after signing the agreement on ICC sentencing, Colombia signed an
agreement on land restitution for victims of the civil war. The objective of the agreement
was to restore internally displaced people back to the land that had been taken from them
in the conflict, or provide them restitution for their losses. This agreement was lauded by
domestic and international human rights advocates, and also signaled that the Colombian
government thought it had the military capacity to enforce the law. In order to ensure that
these land restitution measures came to pass, the GoC needed to be able to hold territory
from paramilitary and rebel groups.
Correspondingly, the GoC publicly changed the military tactics it used against the
FARC.377 President Santos announced that the military would use smaller units to fight a
reduced and more guerilla-like FARC. The military continued to successfully fight the
376
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FARC, which was steadily weakening and driven into the most rural areas of Colombia.
The FARC was likely feeling significant military strain, and facing challenging questions
about its future.
It was in this context that, in September of 2011, Jose Noruega, the GoC’s former
head of intelligence and a close ally of President Uribe, was sentenced to 25 years of
imprisonment for his role in ordering atrocities committed by paramilitary groups.378 This
sentencing further exposed the extent of GoC collaboration with paramilitaries, but also
evidenced that state actors could be held accountable for their human rights abuses in the
conflict. Noruega’s sentencing was another important indication that justice in Colombia
would not be unilaterally applied, and was not merely a tool that the state used to repress
its enemies. Further, the close attention paid to this case, and the international response to
the verdict, shows that even if the GoC had wanted to use its justice system as a lever of
power against the FARC, there would be a vocal chorus of human rights advocates to
loudly critique any excesses. Although this chorus spoke up to celebrate the Noruega
verdict, the ICC again remained silent.
Two months later, the Colombian military again succeeded in killing the FARC’s
central commander, who was then succeeded by Timoleón Jimenez, known as
Timochenko.379 The FARC was significantly weakened, and in January of 2012, it again
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joined with ELN to concentrate its fight against the government. Meanwhile, both sides
laid the groundwork for peace.
In June of 2012, the Colombian Congress approved a peace framework law,
which established an outline of an eventual peace process between the GoC and the
FARC. This framework specifically concentrated on a transitional justice structure, which
was an important signal that transitional justice would not be arbitrarily or unilaterally
applied and designed.380 At the end of the summer of 2012, it emerged that this law was
passed while the GoC was in an ongoing dialogue with the FARC about arranging formal
peace negotiations.381 On September 4, 2012, President Santos and Timochenko
announced that formal peace talks would begin that October in Norway.382
Formal peace talks began on October 25, 2012.383 A week after these talks started,
HRW released a public letter to Santos that was extremely critical of the transitional
justice framework designed in that summer’s law, and with a proposed constitutional
amendment to expand military jurisdiction.384 This letter critiqued the potential use of
military courts to try crimes committed by military members during the conflict, again
showing that there was a loud constituency of human rights advocates who would ensure
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that the state could not use the justice system to evade accountability without
encountering vociferous resistance. Again, the ICC remained silent.
As peace negotiations continued, the proposed amendment expanding the
jurisdiction of military courts continued its march toward ratification. At the end of
December 2012, this measure passed in the legislature, and was met with loud criticism
from human rights advocates.385 Again, these advocates protested the extent to which the
amendment might facilitate the impunity of military members. Although the ICC
remained silent, the chorus of critics again made arguments that aligned closely with the
Rome Statute—that there should be no impunity for people responsible for large-scale
violations of human rights, and that the state is responsible for ensuring that there is no
impunity.386
The ICC had been quiet throughout all of these public discussions of transitional
justice and criminal accountability, although it had an ongoing preliminary examination.
A remarkable break in this pattern occurred on June 26, 2013, which Prosecutor
Bensouda sent a letter to Colombia’s Constitutional Court, reminding the Court of its
Rome Statute Commitments, and arguing that the GoC could not offer amnesty to
military leaders without reneging on its international legal obligations.387 In her letter,
which was leaked to the press, Prosecutor Bensouda warned that justice outcomes that
too closely resembled impunity threatened to “invalidate the authenticity of the national
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judicial process.” Prosecutor Bensouda re-iterated this advice in a letter dated August 7,
which was also leaked to the press.
When the letter appeared in Colombian newspapers, it provoked a domestic
outcry. Colombian observers wryly noted that the advice that Prosecutor Bensouda
provided the Constitutional Court was not solicited by it, or by any other Colombian
actor.388 Colombians were dismayed by how the Prosecutor’s recommendations might
threaten the peace process. By arguing that military leaders needed to experience
prosecution and, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments commensurate with their
crime, Prosecutor Bensouda was publicly (albeit unintentionally publicly) opposing an
important incentive propelling leaders to the successful conclusion of peace talks—the
promise of favorable post-conflict fates. The idea that someone from outside of Colombia
could throw a wrench in the delicate balance of good faith that had been established
between the government and rebels outraged many Colombians. The ICC remained silent
in the face of this criticism, and a similar letter was never again leaked to the public.
As negotiations continued, each side continued to show good faith to the other
through mutual ceasefires. Importantly, on February 23, 2015, the head of the FARC’s
negotiating delegation expressed his confidence that FARC members would not face
imprisonment, saying “for fighters, no jail. No peace process in the world has ended with
the leaders of an insurgency behind bars.”389 This statement was reported as evidence of
the FARC’s confidence in the peace process, although it still contains the possibility that
rebel fighters would meet a bloodier and more definitive end than prison.
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In the ICC’s next major public statement about the Colombia situation, in May of
2015, the Court reverted back to its quiet, unobtrusive stance. In a conference, the Deputy
Prosecutor said of the situation, “the relationship between peace and justice is a settled
issue under the Rome Statute.”390 He went on to explain that the 2005 Justice and Peace
Law did not violate complementarity norms, and that the ICC is not concerned when a
state decides to offer amnesties for crimes that fall outside of the jurisdiction of the Rome
Statute. This statement is an important indicator of the Court’s measured and
conservative approach to the preliminary examination into Colombia. First, it is
important that it was delivered by the Deputy Prosecutor, and not the Prosecutor herself;
this helped the Court to avoid drawing significant international attention to its role in
Colombia. Further, the explicit declaration that the Court would not oppose—privately or
publicly—the extension of amnesties to anyone who had not committed crimes under the
Rome Statute effectively signaled that in the Colombian peace process, the framers of the
peace agreement would be able to extend amnesties to all but the highest-ranking leaders
of the conflict without any protest from the ICC. This was a significant signal that the
Court was willing to give negotiators wide latitude, and was interested in being a
consistent overseer of the peace process without acting as a spoiler, or complicating an
already densely complex situation.
In September 2015, the rebels and the government set up special courts to try
crimes committed during the conflict, and also created truth and reconciliation
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commissions.391 Again, human rights advocates expressed concerns that these courts
would facilitate impunity, and would not allow victims to achieve justice but would
instead facilitate an overly smooth reintegration of the perpetrators.392 The ICC was again
silent, and did not modify its assertion that amnesty was acceptable for all but the worst
perpetrators of the worst crimes.
Then, in December 2015, the FARC and the GoC signed a key portion of the
peace agreement encoding a justice system and a scheme of reparations for victims of the
conflict.393 While this agreement was met with the usual critiques from human rights
advocates that it would enable impunity,394 others heralded it.395
There was dissent even within Colombia’s government on the post-conflict justice
agreement signed in December 2015, and those who opposed the agreement appealed to
the ICC. Notably, on January 19, 2016, Colombia’s Attorney General sent a public letter
to Prosecutor Bensouda saying that the December 2015 accountability agreement
constituted an impunity pact with the FARC, arguing that it violated the Rome Statute,
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and presenting fifteen reasons why the ICC should reject the agreement.396 He wrote that
the agreement would provoke the commission of more atrocity crimes because upon
signing it, rebel groups would gain “the certainty of not being subject to prison sentences
and thus guarantees them impunity for past, present, and future crimes.” He also wrote
that in limiting the GoC’s investigative power over rebel crimes, the agreement violated
the Rome Statute.
The ICC did not publicly respond to the Attorney General’s appeal. However, less
than a month later, Prosecutor Bensouda met with Colombia’s Minister of Justice to
discuss the implementation of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP), a new
government office outlined by the agreement on post-conflict justice that would be
responsible for implementing the peace agreement’s accountability provisions.397 The
Minister of Justice travelled to the Hague to present an outline of the new system of the
Office of the Prosecutor, and reiterated Colombia’s commitment to comply with the
Rome Statute.
Still, the ICC’s preliminary examination into the Colombian situation continued.
In June 2016, the Prosecutor of the ICC released a statement saying that the GoC needed
to act decisively in cases of false positives and of FARC sex crimes to avoid a formal
investigation by the ICC.398 It is significant that this statement focused on an atrocity
attributed to state actors—the false positives—and an atrocity attributed to the FARC—
sex crimes during the conflict. It is also significant that the ICC called on the GoC to act
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in these cases, instead of saying that the Court would act. The inclusion of both crimes in
this statement makes clear that the ICC was not targeting a particular side in the conflict,
and was committed to accountability for both the rebels and the government. Urging the
GoC to act to avoid a formal ICC investigation made it clear that the Court was
committed to promoting justice, and not necessarily ensuring international prosecution.
The last week of August 2016 was a heady one for Colombia. After 52 years of
civil war, and 54 months of the most current round of peace negotiations, the GoC and
the FARC reached an agreement that both would sign.399 The framers of the peace
agreement had the ICC’s blessing. On September 1, 2016, Prosecutor Bensouda released
a statement affirming the Court’s support to the public, and subtly reminding
stakeholders of the Court’s role in the process. It read, in part:
The paramount importance of genuine accountability – which by definition
includes effective punishment – in nurturing a sustainable peace cannot be
overstated. As a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Colombia has recognised that grave crimes threaten the peace, security
and well-being of the world and stated its determination to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators and thus contribute to the prevention of such
crimes. I note, with satisfaction, that the final text of the peace agreement
excludes amnesties and pardons for crimes against humanity and war crimes
under the Rome Statute… I have supported Colombia's efforts to bring an end
to the decades-long armed conflict in line with its obligations under the Rome
Statute since the beginning of the negotiations. I will continue to do so during
the implementation phase in the same spirit.”400
These words reflect not only the Court’s priorities, but also its role within the peace
process. In congratulating the architects of the peace agreement for constructing a
document that accorded with the Rome Statute, Prosecutor Bensouda continued to play
399
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the role that the Court had throughout the peace process—to be a consistent but fairly
unobtrusive presence that reminded the players of the ways that the Rome Statute bound
or threatened them, cajoled them when they did not act accordingly, and congratulated
them when they did. Like the tone of this statement, the ICC’s role in the Colombian
peace process was carefully calibrated. This calibration was one of many reasons that the
Prosecutor was able to issue a statement that celebrated rather than condemned its
outcome, and why the Court ultimately acted as more of a guarantor than a spoiler of this
peace process.
5.0 The ICC as guarantor: implementing the agreement
After the peace agreement was signed, the ICC’s role as a guarantor of the peace
process was heightened. From September 2016, through to the end of 2017, both
Colombian civil society and the FARC have made direct, public appeals to the Court to
intervene when they thought that the state’s stance violated the Rome Statute or
threatened transitional justice. Further, the GoC’s public displays of acquiescence with
the ICC’s monitoring of the peace process also indicate an understanding of the ICC as a
guarantor of the peace process—by showing that it respected the ICC, the GoC could
show that it respected international law, which could be designed to lend increased
legitimacy to the implementation of the peace agreement.
The peace agreement established the JEP, which was to be the central transitional
justice mechanism responsible for investigating members of the FARC, government
forces, and third parties for their actions in the conflict, and, if necessary, for holding
them accountable. Upon the peace agreement’s ratification in 2016, the process of
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forming the JEP was underway, but the JEP needed Senate ratification to become fully
active.
Early on in the process of forming the JEP, in November 2016, Prosecutor
Bensouda released a statement saying that she had not yet taken a position on how it was
constituted, but that she would continue to review the process of its formation to make
sure that there were no gaps between the final form of the JEP and the Rome Statute.401
In the same statement, the Prosecutor also reiterated the Court’s request for more
information on the false positives cases, as well as the Court’s commitment to
investigating sex crimes committed by the FARC.
After this initial statement, the ICC remained publicly silent on the
implementation of the peace agreement and on the construction of the new transitional
justice system. Nonetheless, in January 2017, HRW wrote to the Colombian Congress
protesting how GoC implementation of the transitional justice provisions of the peace
agreement violated international legal standards surrounding command responsibility.402
Command responsibility, which was to become a contentious issue in the coming months,
is the legal concept that commanders can be held responsible for the crimes of their
subordinates under certain conditions. What was under debate was whether the conditions
specified under Colombian law during which commanders could be held responsible for
their subordinates’ crimes adhered to the Rome Statute’s standards on when commanders
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should be held responsible. This debate stood to impact leaders’ exit options, because
human rights advocates held that the JEP’s definition of command responsibility was too
narrow, and if the definition was broadened—meaning that the circumstances under
which commanders could be held accountable for their subordinates’ actions was
expanded—that meant that more leaders could be prosecuted in domestic courts. In
particular, human rights advocates and FARC leaders worried that the current definition
of command responsibility would allow Colombian leaders to evade accountability for
atrocities committed under their command.
In response to these events, in January of 2017, Prosecutor Bensouda published a
piece in La Semana, a major Colombian newspaper, in which she argued that
accountability was key for peace.403 She also argued that several of Colombia’s main
accountability laws were directly related to the ICC’s preliminary examination, and that it
was her responsibility as prosecutor to make sure that all of Colombia’s laws complied
with the Rome Statute. She expressed concern that Colombia’s concept of command
responsibility did not align with the Rome Statute, and clarified that the ICC’s concept of
command responsibility says that commanders are responsible for the crimes of their
subordinates when commanders “had the material capacity to prevent or punish crimes.”
In September 2017, Prosecutor Bensouda visited Colombia to monitor the
implementation of the peace deal and discuss the ICC’s ongoing preliminary
examination. President Santos received her in his official residence.404 On her visit,
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Prosecutor Bensouda asked for more information on the false positives cases, and
specifically on the possibility that high-level commanders had evaded accountability. She
also said that the ICC was examining the FARC’s recruitment of minors during the
conflict.405 She also said that she would continue to carefully monitor the implementation
of the peace accords. During her visit, she publicly praised the work of Colombia’s
courts, saying
I was impressed by the commitment, the invaluable experience, and the
high standards of the Colombian courts. Their commitment to ensure
genuine accountability in relation to the largest criminals, as well as
respect for the victims.406
She affirmed that the ICC Prosecutor’s office would act “in faith with the government
and the Colombian people on a path that leads to sustainable peace.”
Still, on October 18, Prosecutor Bensouda sent Colombia’s Constitutional Court a
letter asking for clarification on six aspects of the JEP: the definition of Colombia’s
concepts of command responsibility, war crimes, active or decisive participation in
crimes, as well as the effective restriction of freedoms and rights of people in the JEP
system.407 On October 23, Colombia’s Minister of Justice responded, writing that
Colombia was “always ready to meet the requirements of the ICC” and that “we respect
the opinions of the ICC and we respect what the Constitutional Court finally decides on
the legislative act.”
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On the same day, the Prosecutor’s Office of the ICC released a 22-page document
reviewing the JEP and how it accorded with the Rome Statute.408 Much of the document
concerned the concept of command responsibility, particularly as it related to
paramilitary commanders. The document also questioned several other aspects of the
JEP, including its definition of “grave” crimes. This document’s message was amplified
when El Colombiano, a major Colombian newspaper, published an editorial urging the
government to fix the problematic aspects of the JEP, saying that several of them had
been correctly identified by the ICC Prosecutor.409
On November 8, the Colombian government responded to the questions put
forward by the ICC’s document on the JEP.410 This did not quell the controversy, and the
FARC remained extremely concerned that the loose definition of command responsibility
would allow senior Colombian military officials to evade responsibility for crimes
committed, and that this would call the legality and legitimacy of the whole peace
process into question. Thus, Rodrigo Lodoño, the FARC’s highest commander, wrote a
public letter to the ICC warning of the risk of impunity from Colombia’s implementation
of the peace accord, and specifically the JEP.411 Lodoño wrote that the JEP “was
conceived as an exceptional mechanism of transitional justice, whose objective was not
only to end the conflict, but to ensure that impunity ends for state crimes and for serious
408
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violations of international law by third parties.” He argued that the Constitutional Court’s
ruling that excluded non-military state agents and third parties from the JEP’s jurisdiction
opened the door to impunity and “mocks the rights of victims.” Lodoño requested a
meeting with Prosecutor Bensouda to discuss this issue, and also requested that the UN
intervene.
A week later, a coalition of 141 major victims’ organizations and human rights
organizations created an international legal team to bring the cases that would not come
before the JEP before the ICC. They wrote a public letter to Prosecutor Bensouda
informing her that they would do this, a clear signal that stakeholders in the peace process
saw the ICC as a guarantor of post-conflict justice.412 Again, this also cast the ICC in the
role of justice promoter, and is perhaps the starkest example possible of human rights
advocates pushing international prosecution while the Court itself promotes
accountability broadly, while remaining more agnostic about its form. The ICC did not
comment on the creation of this legal team, which meant that in this situation, the Court
itself was not threatening leaders’ exit options.
The debate over the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the JEP, and the ICC’s role
in commenting on that ruling, was a highly important political event in Colombia. Major
newspapers dedicated considerable space to analysis pieces,413 explanatory pieces,414
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commentary,415 and editorials on how the government should or should not proceed with
the Constitutional Court’s ruling and adapt the JEP, as well as on the role of the ICC in
this debate.416
For this dissertation, what is most notable about this debate is how the FARC
leadership explicitly turned to the ICC to serve as a guarantor of the peace. FARC leaders
were concerned about GoC overreach in protecting their own from criminal
accountability, and to prevent this, they publicly appealed to the Prosecutor of the ICC
and explicitly appealed to the terms of the Rome Statute. In his letter, Lodoño used
international law as the standard to which Colombia should comply in its implementation
of the JEP, and clearly identified the Prosecutor of the ICC as the enforcer of that
standard. This constitutes clear recognition of the ICC’s role as a guarantor of the peace
process, and especially of their role in preventing state circumvention of accountability.
Further, the coalition of victims and human rights advocates also showed that
Colombia’s civil society saw the ICC as a guarantor of the peace. Their public efforts to
use the ICC to try the crimes that, according to the Constitutional Court’s ruling, could
not be tried under the JEP, showed that they understood the ICC’s role as an international
enforcer that could ensure that the peace agreement’s provisions on accountability were
met, even when the Colombian government seemed unwilling to meet them.
Finally, it should be noted that the Colombian government’s hosting of ICC visits
and very publically prompt responses to ICC requests for information or clarification can
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be construed as attempts to use the ICC as a guarantor of the peace. In showing that they
were cooperating with the ICC, the Colombian government could demonstrate that they
prioritized ensuring that the implementation of the peace agreement, particularly its
justice and accountability provisions, fell within the bounds of international law. Gaining
the ICC’s public stamp of approval—such as when Prosecutor Bensouda publicly
commended the work of Colombia’s courts—could help legitimate the state’s actions
regarding post-conflict justice mechanisms. In this way, the Colombian government also
sought to use the ICC as a guarantor of the peace.
6.0 Conclusion
This chapter is meant to show how the ICC can act as a guarantor in formal peace
negotiations between rebel groups and the state in a civil war. In Chapter 2, I outlined the
theoretical expectation that the ICC could act as a guarantor in peace negotiations when
the ICC plays an oversight, rather than prosecutorial, role in peace negotiations. The ICC
can play an oversight role in peace negotiations when the ICC is only investigating a
situation, and has not issued charges, when the Prosecutor uses lenient, subtle signals to
remind the players of their Rome Statute obligations, and when human rights and peace
advocates amplify the ICC’s anti-impunity stance, thus allowing the ICC itself to remain
quiet.
To illustrate this theoretical mechanism, this chapter traced the ICC’s role in the
formal peace process between Colombia and the FARC from August 2012 to September
2016, and also began to examine the ICC’s role in the implementation of the peace
agreement. I first showed how the FARC was very legally habituated, in part due to
Colombia’s particular context and previous experiences with the IACtHR. Then, I
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showed how the ICC successfully used subtle and lenient signaling, by issuing statements
that simply reminded the parties of their Rome Statute obligations, by requesting
clarification or further information, and by staying silent as human rights advocates
condemned proposals for peace that would not have respected the Rome Statute.
Colombia arrived at a comprehensive peace agreement, and further, both the Colombian
government and the FARC appealed to the ICC throughout the peace process to act as a
guarantor of the implementation of the accord. This shows that the ICC did indeed act as
a guarantor throughout the Colombian peace process, and that both the FARC and the
Colombian government recognized and helped shape this role.
This case shows that when the ICC emphasizes justice over prosecution, and
when other human rights advocates amplify its anti-impunity message, the ICC can act as
a guarantor in peace negotiations. However, since this is only a single case, there are
other factors that emerge as important. Notably, Colombia’s legal environment and the
complementary role of the IACtHR, a regional human rights tribunal, were important
conditioning factors in the FARC’s legal habituation, the skilled advocacy of civil society
organizations, and the role of the ICC.
This case also raises important questions about alternative explanations. In this
chapter, I argued that the ICC could play an oversight role in the peace negotiations
because of the more vocal advocacy of other human rights actors. This begs the question
of whether the ICC was simply epiphenomenal, and whether these actors’ calls for
accountability were what mattered in keeping belligerents at the table, not the prospect of
accountability at the ICC. To address these questions, I now turn to the case of Sri Lanka,

188
where there was a cacophony of voices crying out against impunity, and no ICC
involvement whatsoever.
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CHAPTER 6 | THE ACCOUNTABILITY VACUUM IN SRI LANKA
1.0 Introduction
In this dissertation, I argue that the ICC has distinctive effects on the onset and
outcomes of peace negotiations because it is an international actor with the power to
mount criminal prosecutions. I argue that it is the Court’s international nature and its
prosecutorial nature combined that result in its distinctive influence on peace
negotiations. I also argue that the Court’s influence on peace negotiations is conditioned
by the role of other human rights advocates, especially domestic and international NGOs,
international organizations, and even external states.
In the chapters on Uganda and Colombia, the role of other human rights
promoters emerges as essential in conditioning the ICC’s effect on the onset and
outcomes of peace negotiations. Indeed, I argue that the ICC played a very different
role—and resulted in very different peace outcomes—precisely because the constellation
of other human rights actors also behaved so differently in each case. This argument begs
the question of whether the Court was epiphenomenal in these cases, and whether its role
in peace negotiations generally is epiphenomenal. It is possible to argue that the ICC does
not exert a particular and separable influence on peace negotiations, and that whatever
effect I argued the ICC has on peace negotiations is actually down to the role of other
actors. Instead, I argue that the ICC’s very involvement in peace negotiations enhances
the power of other human rights actors to influence the peace process, and particularly
that it sharpens the impact of their messaging on accountability for human rights abuses.
To make this argument, and to show that the ICC’s effect on peace negotiations is
not epiphenomenal, this chapter will discuss the case of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka saw a
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twenty-seven year civil war, and several attempts at peace, including one extremely
internationalized peace process that lasted from 2000 to 2006. All of the actors that
condition the influence of the ICC were extremely involved in this peace process:
domestic human rights organizations, international human rights organizations,
international institutions, and external states. However, Sri Lanka was not a signatory to
the Rome Statute, the ICC never even informally examined human rights abuses in Sri
Lanka, and there was not significant advocacy for ICC involvement or international
prosecution in Sri Lanka.
As such, Sri Lanka serves as an excellent case to test a main counterargument to
my dissertation’s claims: if the ICC’s effect is epiphenomenal, and without the ICC,
human rights advocates would have the same effect on peace negotiations, then we
should observe that human rights accountability would play a central role in the
Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and Lieutenant Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
decisions to come to and stay at the table. Instead, concerns about post-conflict
accountability had no observable effect on the GoSL’s and LTTE’s willingness to talk
peace, or on the way they behaved in peace negotiations.
This chapter closely examines the peace process that occurred from 2000 to 2006,
which resulted in the signing of a ceasefire agreement in 2002 and several attempts at
more substantial peace agreements throughout 2003. Although this process occurred
throughout the period when the ICC was designed and implemented, and although the
peace process was extremely internationalized, accountability at the ICC was never
discussed throughout this peace process. Indeed, substantial conversations about criminal
accountability for human rights abuses in the conflict only began after the GoSL declared
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victory over the LTTE in 2009, even though domestic and international human rights
advocates mobilized against impunity from the earliest days of the peace negotiations.
Thus, this chapter argues that in the absence of the ICC, even in the presence of the
constellation of actors that support the ICC’s human rights work, international criminal
accountability will not be a substantial issue on the agenda of peace negotiations, and will
not affect belligerents’ decisions to come to and stay at the table.
This chapter proceeds in five subsequent parts. The second part provides a brief
justification of case selection, and explains the data and methods used in the chapter. The
third part provides information on the foundations of the conflict and Sri Lanka’s status
vis a vis the Rome Statute and the ICC. The fourth part presents a case study of peace
negotiations onset and outcome, as well as the outcome of the civil conflict. It details
how the GoSL and the LTTE decided to come to formal peace negotiations in 2002, and
shows that the prospect of prosecution played no role in leaders’ decisions to come to the
table. It then details the formal peace process and its dissolution, showing that the
question of post-conflict accountability did not affect how the GoSL and LTTE
negotiated peace, or their decisions to leave the table. Next, it details the resumption of
major hostilities in April 2006, after the disintegration of the peace process, and shows
how the belligerents’ lack of concern for post-conflict accountability affected their
wartime conduct. Finally, it discusses another short-lived attempt at peace negotiations
that occurred in 2009, and then discusses the LTTE’s military defeat.
The fifth part of the chapter breaks with the chronology and details five
transitional justice processes that occurred during and after the conflict, and explains why
none of them mattered to the conflict or the peace the way that the ICC could. The sixth
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part of the chapter discusses implications for the ICC, and explains why none of the
human rights actors involved in the conflict—including those who strenuously advocated
against impunity—managed to raise the issue as a major topic in the peace process in the
absence of the ICC. The seventh part concludes.
2.0 The case selection, data, and methods
This case of the Sri Lankan civil war is included in this dissertation to serve as a
counterfactual. It explores the alternate explanation that the role of the Court is
epiphenomenal because it has the same constellation of actors that would help the Court
act as a guarantor advocating for international accountability for culpable leaders, but the
Court itself was not involved. Therefore, it provides a good test case for the alternative
explanation: given all of the actors advocating for accountability in Sri Lanka, if the
alternative explanation holds, we would expect the question of post-conflict justice to
galvanize leaders to make peace.
I use the same methods in this chapter as I did in the Colombia chapter: I use
publicly available information to construct a case narrative to show how the constellation
of human rights and peace advocates that the ICC works within cannot have the same
effect on civil war termination when the ICC is not present. I relied most heavily on
statements and reports issued by international organizations and NGOs. The international
organizations featured most prominently are the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), and several UN offices: United
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Security Council, the
Secretary General’s office, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR). The NGOs I drew most upon were Amnesty International (AI) and Human
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Rights Watch (HRW). I also drew extensively from reports of various international
commissions and panels convened specifically to investigate and advocate about the
human rights situation in Sri Lanka. Most prominent among these was the extremely
detailed report compiled by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which was
convened to monitor the ceasefire implemented by the Norwegian peace process.
I corroborated these sources with newspaper reports and the works of several
analysts who specialize in Sri Lanka. I drew most heavily from the Colombo Telegraph,
but also consulted the Washington Post, BBC, and Guardian (UK). Finally, I consulted
the work of Sonia Buffard, David Carment, John Stephen Moolakkattu, Jonathan
Goodhand, and Oliver Walton.
3.0 The context
Sri Lanka has struggled with ethnic conflict since it became independent from the
United Kingdom in 1948.417 The country, whose geographic location is indicated in
Figure 6.3, is dominated by the Sinhalese ethnic group, which constitutes about 80% of
the population, with the Tamil and Moor minorities, which make up about 9% and 7% of
the population. However, during the colonial era, the British treated the Tamil as a
favored minority, which both created and exacerbated ethnic tensions that undergirded
the civil war and persist to the present. When Sri Lanka became independent, the
Sinhalese majority took power, and the Sinhalese government quickly took steps that
politically, economically, and culturally disenfranchised the Tamil minority.
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Figure 6.3. Map indicating the location of Sri Lanka418

In response to this discrimination, the Lieutenant Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
formed in 1976. Most of Sri Lanka’s Tamil population lives in the northern and eastern
regions of the country; they became LTTE’s geographic and political power base.
Throughout the vast majority of the conflict, the LTTE fought to make this region an
independent state for Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority. The LTTE was formed as a successor
to an earlier Tamil nationalist group, but sought to distinguish itself as “elite, ruthlessly
efficient, and highly professional fighting force.”419 However, during its first six years as
an organization, the LTTE only carried out small-scale attacks against local government
targets.
Most date the beginning of the Sri Lankan civil war to July 23, 1983, when the
LTTE ambushed a Sri Lankan army patrol and killed thirteen soldiers. This led to
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massive rioting and communal violence against Tamil civilians, culminating in largescale casualties and a mass flight of Tamil civilians into the northern and eastern regions
of the country. In the next two years, as the LTTE fought to dominate smaller Tamil
militias, violence against civilians became a key part of its military strategy, with largescale attacks on civilians winning it both notoriety and territorial control of the north and
east.
In 1985, the GoSL attempted peace negotiations with the LTTE, but talks failed.
As the LTTE continued to target civilians, the GoSL launched a major military offensive
against the LTTE in 1987. This offensive was aided by an Indian military intervention,
which led to peace talks and the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord in June
1987. In this accord, the GoSL agreed to make Tamil an official language of Sri Lanka,
to merge the north and the east into one province to give Tamils more political power,
and to grant increased political power to the provinces. After the accord was signed, India
kept a peacekeeping force in the country.
Most Tamil militant groups gave their arms to the Indian peacekeepers, but the
LTTE refused to disarm. The Indian peacekeepers then attempted to disarm the LTTE by
force. These hostilities continued for two years until India elected a new president, who
withdrew the Indian peacekeeping force in 1990. LTTE violence continued.
Throughout 1990, the LTTE continued large scale attacks against government
targets and civilians. In June 1991, a battle between 5,000 LTTE fighters and 10,000
GoSL troops left 2,000 dead. In 1992 and 1993, the LTTE succeeded in assassinating
several very high-ranking military and political leaders and in November 1993, they
defeated the GoSL military in a major battle.
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After elections in 1994, a new GoSL administration announced a new approach to
the conflict: “war for peace.”420 However, in January 1995, the LTTE agreed to a
ceasefire and to peace negotiations in Jaffna.421 The fact that the LTTE agreed to a
ceasefire when they were in a position of military strength suggests that they hoped for
major GoSL concessions. However, these concessions were not forthcoming: the LTTE
refused to discuss substantive political issues until an economic embargo was lifted, and
the new GoSL administration refused to lift the embargo.422 Attempts at negotiations
continued until April 19, 1995, when the LTTE attacked a government installation.423
The GoSL began a corresponding military offensive aimed at reclaiming the
LTTE-held city of Jaffna. During this offensive, there were several incidences of
government troops targeting civilians, resulting in large-scale civilian casualties. AI
wrote to GoSL President Chandrika Kumaratunga asking for an investigation of reports
of “deliberate killings of defenceless people, whether they are civilians or combatants
incapacitated by injuries or who have surrendered and offer no resistance.”424
The LTTE also committed large-scale attacks on civilians, and AI also issued an
urgent action appeal calling for investigations of LTTE killings of civilians.425 In
response, the LTTE released a statement claiming that these killings had not violated
international humanitarian law because the civilians had been supporting a side in the
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conflict.426 In releasing this statement, the LTTE showed that they understood that the
politics surrounding compliance with international humanitarian law were important, and
that it was worthwhile to attempt to portray themselves as a force that complied with
international humanitarian law. Although the LTTE’s justification of this action as
compliant with international humanitarian law shows an incorrect understanding of the
principle of distinction between combatant and civilian, the fact that the LTTE drew on
the principle of distinction in its justification of its military actions shows that it was
sensitized to international law, and to the reasons that it could benefit from being
perceived to comply with it.
The fighting continued. The government continued to launch military offensives
in LTTE territory throughout 1996 and 1997, retaking significant amounts of LTTE
territory. The LTTE fought off the offensives, and also conducted extensive suicide
bombing campaigns throughout the entire country, which a special focus on the capital
city, Colombo. In 1998, the tide of the military conflict began to turn, and throughout
1998 and 1999, the LTTE successfully reclaimed territory throughout the north and east
of Sri Lanka. By 2000, they controlled an unprecedented amount of territory.
3.1 Sri Lanka and the ICC
As the LTTE fought to reclaim territorial control of northern and eastern Sri
Lanka, international human rights advocates achieved a key advance in a different kind of
fight, when the Rome Statute was created in July 1998. Sri Lanka did not play an active
role in the creation of the Rome Statute, and sought to avoid coming under its
jurisdiction. The Rome Statute came into force on July 1, 2002, and only a few months
426
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later, on November 22, 2002, Sri Lanka signed a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA)
with the US.427 BIAs were an attempt by the US to co-opt the Court, and limit its reach
around the world,428 and Sri Lanka signing a BIA showed first that they did not embrace
Rome Statute norms, and second, that the GoSL cared more about aligning itself with a
powerful state than about whatever reputational benefits it could garner by embracing
anti-impunity norms. Further confirming this, in 2014, Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister in
2002, Ranil Wickremesinghe publically said that he considered Sri Lanka’s nonratification of the Rome Statute to be a personal political achievement, and one that he
undertook specifically to shield GoSL leaders from international accountability.429 Sri
Lanka still has yet to sign or ratify the Rome Statute. Therefore, all of Sri Lanka’s peace
negotiations, even after 2002, took place outside of the shadow of the ICC.
4.0 The case study
4.1 Peace negotiation onset
As the international community celebrated the creation of the ICC, exhaustion
with the Sri Lankan war was at its peak. By the middle of 2000, roughly one million Sri
Lankans were internally displaced by the conflict, and the peace movement was at its
peak.430 Both the GoSL and the LTTE worked quietly to set the scene for peace talks, and
both turned to Norway to help broker these talks.
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Norway had first offered mediation assistance in 1991, when the Indian
peacekeepers pulled out of LTTE-held areas.431 Throughout the early 1990s, Norway
made it clear to both the GoSL and the LTTE that it was willing to help with the peace
process, and in 1995, they were asked to head a monitoring mission of the ceasefire that
did not last.432 After the 1995 talks collapsed, the LTTE expressed that Norway was their
preferred negotiating partner, and the ICRC brokered a meeting between Jan Egeland and
LTTE lead negotiator Anton Balasingham.433
The GoSL knew of the LTTE’s preference for Norwegian mediation, and in May
1999, the Kumaratunga administration secretly gave Norway a formal mandate to begin a
dialogue with the LTTE.434 Concurrently, the GoSL approached the ICRC to help broker
an arrangement to deliver humanitarian aid to designated checkpoints on the front lines of
the conflict, as a gesture of goodwill to the Tamils.435 These efforts were born of the
GoSL’s confidence that it had the military upper hand.436
However, the military balance of power changed throughout the later months of
1999, with the LTTE successfully taking more territory. In negotiations with Norway,
President Kumaratunga said that she would only sign a ceasefire when they had made
substantial progress on negotiations.437 Shortly thereafter, the LTTE and GoSL signed an
“Agreement following an understanding on humanitarian measures,” in which parties
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agreed to stop targeting civilians and asked Norway to establish a Humanitarian
Monitoring Group.438
The LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire in December 2000, as a gesture of
goodwill and commitment to ending the conflict.439 Again, the LTTE acceded to peace
negotiations from a position of relative military strength, suggesting that they expected
considerable political concessions. However, this declaration of a unilateral ceasefire
dismayed the GoSL, as it was unexpected and made it more difficult for them to negotiate
from a position of strength either in terms of military power or public opinion.440
The LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire was met with considerable domestic civil society
advocacy for peace. Still, the minute the previous ceasefire expired in April 2001, the
GoSL launched a military attack on the LTTE, which was quickly defeated.441 These
hostilities only emboldened domestic advocates for peace. The Center for Policy
Alternatives’ Peace Support Group was extremely active in 2001 advocating for peace:
on January 4,442 March 15,443 June 7,444 August 15,445 and October 1,446 they released
statements calling for substantive peace negotiations. Throughout this time, they were
also highly critical of the government: on July 18, they called for a new government,447
saying that current Sri Lankan leaders should step down to facilitate the creation of an
Interim Government for Peace and Reconciliation.
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This did not happen, meaning that the electoral process would be key for
prospects for peace. Therefore, the Center for Policy Alternatives sought to influence the
peace platforms of all parties in the December 2001 parliamentary elections. On October
30, 2001, they released an open letter to all political parties suggesting an agenda for
peace, containing “cardinal ideas” they argued were key for resolving the conflict. These
ideas included the contention that there could be no military solution to the ethnic
conflict; the creation of a cessation of hostilities and an effective monitoring mechanism;
a lifting of the current embargo on goods going to the north; an end to human rights
violations, particularly the conscription of child soldiers; involving an international third
party in negotiating a political solution to the conflict; a power-sharing agreement for the
north and east of Sri Lanka; and comprehensive plans for reconstruction, reconciliation,
and remembering the dead. Notably, criminal accountability was not part of their
suggested agenda.
The electoral process was indeed crucial for the lead-up to peace negotiations.
The elected Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, had been in secret peace negotiations
with Norway and the LTTE prior to his election, and immediately upon his election, a
temporary ceasefire was put in place.448 The Center for Policy Alternatives welcomed
this announcement. Further, upon his election, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe privately
insisted that Norway isolate President Kumaratunga and the military from the peace
process, clearing the way for negotiations to move forward. 449
Now that peace negotiations were openly underway, the Center for Policy
Alternatives shifted its focus to advocating that human rights be central on the agenda. In
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January of 2002, they issued a statement insisting that human rights and humanitarian
stipulations be explicitly included on whatever agreement the LTTE and GoSL arrived
at.450
On February 22, 2002, the GoSL and LTTE signed a full ceasefire agreement
(CFA).451 In addition to a ceasefire, they agreed to several confidence-building measures,
including, “in accordance with international law abstain[ing] from hostile acts against the
civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and
harassment,” “introduce[ing] systems to prevent the harassment of the civilian
population,” and “refrain[ing] from engaging in activities or propagating ideas that could
offend cultural or religious sensitivities.” Further, the CFA created the SLMM, which
was a monitoring mission staffed by Nordic countries. Its mandate was to investigate any
violations of the CFA, take immediate action based on any complaint, and help mediate
disputes on the CFA. The CFA was meant to pave the way for further peace negotiations
throughout 2002.
4.2 Peace negotiation outcome
4.2.1

The Oslo Declaration
The February 2002 CFA was an important step, but it cannot be considered a

peace agreement in and of itself. Rather, it paved the way for further negotiations of a
more comprehensive peace agreement throughout 2002 and 2003. Norway continued to
play a substantial role, as did competing factions within both the GoSL and the LTTE.
Initially, Norway facilitated monthly meetings between the GoSL and the LTTE, and
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planned for another round of formal negotiations in September 2002.452 Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe spent the preceding summer on diplomatic trips, including to India and
the US, to gain security guarantees and international support for Sri Lanka’s new
economic program.453
The Center for Policy Alternatives continued to advocate for the implementation
of the CFA and the timely negotiation of a more comprehensive peace agreement.454
They were especially vocal in July, when the LTTE held two SLMM monitors captive on
their ships, a clear violation of the CFA.455
In the first round of formal negotiations, which took place on September 16-18,
the GoSL and LTTE discussed the implementation of the CFA and economic
normalization.456 Much of the purpose of this round of talks was to raise public
confidence and establish good will and optimism about the peace process.457 A second
round of negotiations took place from October 31 to November 3, where the sides
established three subcommittees to cover the substantive areas of the negotiations: the
Subcommittee on Political Affairs, the Subcommittee on De-escalation and
Normalization, and the Subcommittee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation
Needs.458 Notably, accountability and amnesty were not items on the agenda, and none of
the subcommittees were tasked with addressing them.
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The fact that, to this point, the Sri Lankan peace process did not address postconflict accountability did not affect the international community’s support. Indeed, a
conference between the GoSL, LTTE, and major donors took place in November of 2002,
where the GoSL garnered $70 million in pledges of humanitarian aid.459 Further,
Norway, a state that is sensitized to international humanitarian norms and has carved out
an international role for itself as a promulgator of those norms, did not advocate raising
this issue on the agenda.
This oversight did not go unnoticed by domestic human rights advocates. In
December 2002, the Tamil-dominated University Teacher’s Association for Human
Rights (UTAHR) published a bulletin criticizing the neglect of human rights and
international accountability in the peace process. It read, in part:
For a country like Norway, which portrays itself as a front-runner in human
rights and child rights, legitimising repression in the interests of making peace,
could cause enormous problems in the future. There are grave implications for
the entire region. One hopes that before it is too late, Norway will see that the
road to real peace lies in demanding accountability from all the actors, especially
the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE, and not in strategic appeasement.460
In this statement, the UTAHR was appealing to Norway’s reputation as a human
rights promoter, and, on that basis, attempting to shame it to including the post-conflict
accountability on the negotiating agenda. However, this appeal was unsuccessful, and in
spite of this advocacy, provisions for accountability were not seriously discussed during
the peace process.
Three more rounds of formal negotiations occurred in December 2002, January
2003, and February 2003.461 Neither human rights nor criminal accountability were on
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the agenda in any of these talks, although they did focus on humanitarian needs and a
political solution to the conflict. The Oslo Declaration, issued on December 5, 2002,462
did not mention human rights, international humanitarian law, or criminal accountability.
At the behest of Ian Martin, a UN-appointed human rights advisor, human rights was first
put on the agenda during the sixth round of formal negotiations, which took place in
March 2003.463 At this round of talks, the GoSL and LTTE agreed to another round of
talks in the late spring of 2003, and agreed that at this round, they would draft a joint
statement on human rights and humanitarian principles.464 Further, to bolster confidence
in the peace talks, and gain more international support for a post-conflict Sri Lanka, the
GoSL and LTTE attempted to schedule another donor conference in Japan.
However, the joint statement on human rights and humanitarian principles was
never actually drafted, which shows how little pressure each side felt to show their
commitment to human rights in the peace process. It is extremely significant that even
after pressure from a UN official, and even after public pledge to create a statement on
human rights, each side did not place priority on even making the low cost commitment
of drafting a statement on human rights. This suggests that neither side’s leaders’
considered that demonstrating commitment to human rights would be important to
preserving good post-conflict exit options, a calculus conditioned by the lack of ICC
involvement in the conflict situation.
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4.2.2 Fragmentation
Part of Norway’s strategy in brokering the talks was to build a strong network of
international support around the peace process, and part of Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe’s political agenda was to cultivate good relationships with donor states
and international organizations.465 After the Prime Minster forged connections with the
World Bank at other diplomatic negotiations, a preparatory meeting for the Japan donor
conference was scheduled to coincide with a World Bank conference in Washington,
D.C. However, the LTTE had been designated a terrorist organization by the American
government—a well-known fact—and therefore could not travel to the US to attend this
meeting.
This jeopardized the peace process. In the first two weeks of April 2003, the
LTTE released two press statements criticizing their clear exclusion from the
Washington, D.C. meeting and saying they were reassessing attending the Japan donor
conference.466 The GoSL did not answer either press release, and on April 21, 2003, the
LTTE’s top negotiator, Anton Balasingham, wrote to Prime Minister Weremensinghe and
said that the LTTE had decided to suspend its participation in the peace negotiation:
The exclusion of the LTTE from a critical aid conference in Washington, the
non- implementation of the terms and conditions enunciated in the truce
document, the continuous suffering and hardship experienced by hundreds of
thousands of internally displaced Tamils, the aggressive Sinhala military
occupation of Tamil cities and civilian settlements, the distortion and
marginalisation of the extreme conditions of poverty and deprivation of the
Tamils of the northeast in the macro-economic policies and strategies of the
government have seriously undermined the confidence of the Tamil people and
the LTTE leadership in the negotiating process.467
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However, in private, Balasingham affirmed that the LTTE had no intention of
withdrawing from talks altogether.468
Still, this heightened an existing division undergirding the talks: the GoSL
enjoyed a much closer relationship with the international community than the LTTE
could. Indeed, Balasingham spoke of a “peace trap,” saying that the LTTE was on uneven
ground because the international players in the peace process inherently favored state
over non-state actors.469 The Japan donor conference took place on June 9, 2003, and the
LTTE did not attend.470
The GoSL continued to collaborate closely with Norway, other states, and
international organizations in pursuing peace, while the LTTE became increasingly
inaccessible, even to Norway, its previously preferred negotiating partner.471 Throughout
the fall of 2003, each side worked on parallel plans for the LTTE’s role in governing the
north and east of Sri Lanka, but never met directly to discuss these plans.472 Throughout
this time, the LTTE continued to commit human rights violations against civilians,
particularly those from non-Tamil ethnic minorities, in the north and east.473 This met
with no condemnation from the government or from Norway, who were eager to protect
the peace process.474 Meanwhile, only domestic advocates raised the issue of human
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rights accountability, with the UTHR releasing another statement criticizing the exclusion
of human rights violations as an issue of contention in the peace process.475
On October 31, 2003, the LTTE proposed a plan for the governing of the north
and east that stopped short of full Tamil Eelam secession, but stipulated that the absolute
majority of the regional government must be held by the LTTE, and the LTTE must
appoint all executives.476 This sparked considerable fears among non-Tamil minorities
living in the north and east. In response, President Karamunga declared a state of
emergency, which effectively curtailed Prime Minister Weremesinghe’s political power
and severely limited his ability to participate in the peace process. Further, impending
elections made the GoSL’s future stance in peace negotiations unclear, and so in
November 2003, Norway announced that it would suspend its direct involvement in the
peace process until the Sri Lankan administration had more political consensus.477
Norway continued to try to drum up international support for the peace process, but the
international coalition that had emerged prior to the Japan conference had fragmented.
4.2.3

Disintegration
2004 brought many more major challenges to the peace process. In March 2004, a

faction led by Colonel Karuna Amman split from the LTTE proper, taking thousands of
LTTE troops and demanding status as a separate signatory of any peace agreement.478
Further, following victory in the April 2004 elections, President Kumaratunga
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consolidated her power and took a more hardline stance during peace negotiations.479
Finally, in December 2004, a tsunami decimated Sri Lanka, killing over 35,000 Sri
Lankans and displacing over 550,000.480
The tsunami precipitated an influx of international aid and attention into Sri
Lanka, which created new political openings in the stalled peace process. The GoSL and
the LTTE agreed on a joint management structure to administer the regions affected by
the tsunami, but it was scuttled by protests from the Muslim political party.481
Additionally, the influx of international aid heightened the asymmetry between the GoSL
as a state actor and the LTTE as a non-state actor.
The LTTE continued its strategy of targeted killings, which escalated on August
12, 2005, when a sniper killed the GoSL’s Foreign Minister.482 Some designate this event
as the re-ignition of the conflict.483 The domestic and international reactions were swift
and severe. The GoSL put in place emergency measures that enhanced the armed forces’
powers of search and detention, and that authorized preventative detention.484 This did
not provoke immediate international condemnation, although months later, human rights
organizations would take issue with this measure. However, international censure of the
LTTE was swift, and the EU quickly announced that it would no longer receive LTTE
delegations.485 Still, the LTTE continued their attacks on government targets, with an
especially intense spree surrounding the elections in December 2005.486
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Norway convinced both sides to come to formal negotiations in February of
2006.487 Because the EU had imposed a travel ban on the LTTE, the talks were held in
Geneva, which also allowed for a series of talks on human rights and humanitarian issues
at the ICRC.488At this round of negotiations, the GoSL extracted a promise from the
LTTE to stop conscripting child soldiers, and the GoSL pledged to stop sponsoring
paramilitary groups.489 Participants in the talks expressed skepticism that either pledge
was requested and made in good faith, and instead observed that they seemed to be
attempts to set each other up to not meet their commitments, and thus granting
themselves a pretext to withdraw from negotiations.490 According to the SLMM, neither
promise was met.491 The LTTE refused to come to another scheduled round of formal
talks, citing GoSL noncompliance.492 By the end of April 2006, full-scale hostilities had
resumed.
Again, it is significant that both the GoSL and LTTE felt that they could exact and
make commitments to adhere to international humanitarian law that even contemporary
observers believed were not made in good faith. This suggests that neither side’s leaders’
perceived obeying international humanitarian law to significantly affect their postconflict exit options.
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4.3 Battle resumes
4.3.1

International condemnation
The resumption of full-scale hostilities was met with swift condemnation from the

international community. Canada and the Council of the EU officially classified the
LTTE as a terrorist organization,493 and Japan refused to meet with the LTTE.494 At the
same time, India increased its military support of the GoSL.495
International and domestic civil society increased their criticism of the human
rights situation in Sri Lanka. On June 22, UNICEF released a statement about abductions
of children and called on the GoSL to act.496 On the same day, the Center for Policy
Alternatives called for an end to the violence and a return to peace negotiations.497 Three
days later, President Rajapaksa offered a two-week ceasefire, but the LTTE did not trust
the offer and rejected it.498
Less than a week later, the GoSL launched a full-scale military offensive in
northern Sri Lanka. Government forces executed 17 French humanitarian aid workers in
their compound, and the GoSL forbade the SLMM from investigating the attack.499 In the
subsequent weeks, the GoSL severely limited humanitarian access to the conflict zone,
and by the end of August, only the UNHCR and the ICRC were allowed to provide
humanitarian aid.500
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In the later months of 2006, significant international attention on the humanitarian
situation in Sri Lanka began, and the issue of impunity for atrocities entered the
international conversation. The member states of the Tokyo Donor Conference insisted
that the GoSL provide humanitarian access and security guarantees for NGO and
international organization staff.501 Germany froze all aid to Sri Lanka due to the
humanitarian situation.502 HRW issued a report in September 2006 in which they wrote
“Perhaps more than anything else, impunity for human rights violations has helped to
perpetuate the cycle of violence and reprisal that continues to plague the country.”503
In response to international pressure, on September 4, 2006, the GoSL announced
that it would invite an International Independent Commission “to inquire into abductions,
enforced disappearances, and unlawful killings in all areas of the country.”504 This
commission was never convened; in its place, President Rajapaksa appointed a
Presidential Commission of Inquiry staffed by three Sri Lankan Supreme Court judges
and two other Sri Lankans, with international actors only acting as observers.505 He also
created a Presidential Commission on the Disappeared to examine disappearances that
happened after September 13, 2006.506
This did little to deflect international attention from the humanitarian situation. In
October 2006, the UN Secretary General released a report on recruitment of child soldiers
501
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in Sri Lanka.507 In response, the LTTE’s Tamil Eelam Justice Division announced a new
Child Protection Act, which outlawed the conscription of 17 year olds and the
participation of 18 year olds in armed conflict.508 In November, the UN Special
Representative for Children and Conflict publicized the same allegations of conscription
of child soldiers, and in response, President Rajapaksa said he would order an
investigation.509 The UN Special Representative wrote to President Rajapaksa to follow
up on the status of the investigation,510 and but no investigation was opened. HRW wrote
to both President Rajapaksa511 and SP Tamilsevan512, the head of the LTTE’s political
wing, asking them investigate the conscription of child soldiers. President Rajapaksa
delegated a response to the Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights
Management513; SP Tamilsevan responded a week later.514 In December 2006, the GoSL
army began investigating child abductions.515
In November 2006, 20,000 civilians fled northern and eastern Sri Lanka516 amid
reports that GoSL forces either failed to distinguish between combatants and civilians or
even purposefully targeted civilians.517 The LTTE was cited by the SLMM for failing to
allow civilians to leave the combat zone and deliberately restricting their movements.518
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The GoSL was acutely aware of the need to respond to humanitarian critiques. In
the middle of December, a letter from the Foreign Minister to the President leaked.519 The
letter warned that the GoSL must do more to protect human rights, saying:
Whether or not [abuses] were committed by terrorist groups or government
agencies, it is the responsibility of the government to investigate and
prosecute the perpetrators in keeping with Sri Lanka’s treaty commitments…
Even when fighting a ruthless terrorist group like the LTTE, the government
must not be seen as using the same tactics as a terror group. The rule of law
must always be respected by all arms of the government.520
The fact that these concerns were raised within the government showed that leaders
understood that international concerns about human rights abuses could be a threat, but
the fact that these concerns were met with measures that were widely characterized as
smokescreening shows that the GoSL did not perceive this potential threat to be serious
enough to warrant real concessions. Instead, the GoSL deflected international criticism
not by setting up robust investigatory and accountability mechanisms, but instead by
contextualizing its war against the LTTE as part of the global war on terror, and by
arguing that a domestic solution to the conflict would be more effective than any
international intervention that would violate sovereignty.521
The following year saw the GoSL continuing to go on the offensive, both in terms
of its military strategy and its approach to human rights concerns. In April 2007, the
Secretary of Defense called the editor of the Daily Mirror and warned that he would
“exterminate” a journalist who wrote on human rights issues in eastern Sri Lanka.522 In
May, the GoSL announced that it was holding 452 people under emergency detention
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regulations; 372 of them were Tamil.523 They did not reply to a HRW request for more
information on these detainees.524
International pressure on the human rights situation continued. On August 5,
HRW published a report arguing forcefully that the GoSL’s Presidential Commission of
Inquiry was an insufficient accountability and investigative body.525 Perhaps more
important, the HRW report called for the establishment of “a human rights monitoring
mission under United Nations auspices to investigate abuses by all parties, report publicly
on abuses to enable prosecutions, and facilitate efforts to improve human rights at the
local level.”526 Two months later, the US echoed this called for a UN human rights
monitoring mission.527
Shortly after this US move, the GoSL invited and hosted the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights.528 Two months later, in December 2007, the UN
Secretary General’s Senior Representative on Internal Displacement visited Sri Lanka to
observe human rights conditions and report back to the UN. 529 These actions showed that
the GoSL was compelled to respond to international human rights critiques, but these
fairly superficial responses still indicate that the GoSL did not calculate that it would
need to make serious concessions to address the international community’s concerns
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about human rights. This could very well be due to the fact that GoSL leaders did not
perceive their exit options to be threatened.
4.3.2

Ceasefire collapses
On January 2, 2008, the GoSL officially withdrew from the CFA.530 Therefore,

the SLMM withdrew its monitors, and two weeks later, the monitoring mission officially
disbanded.531 The conflict, accordingly, intensified. There is no evidence that the
international community’s attention to human rights issues, and civil society’s protests of
impunity for abuses, affected the dissolution of the CFA. While both the GoSL and the
LTTE made gestures in response to human rights critiques, there is no evidence that these
critiques, or the prospect of increased attention on human rights issues, affected their
strategy towards the conflict or the peace in any way. Further, the persistent critiques of
impunity at this time, as well as the critiques of the GoSL’s investigatory mechanisms,
suggest that the prospect of future accountability was not a factor in the GoSL or the
LTTE’s decision making. There was no reason to fear prosecution; indeed, both sides’
leaders’ actions suggested that they only feared the punishments that would come with
defeat.
Each side’s approach to the remainder of the conflict suggests that culpability for
human rights violations was not a primary concern, even in spite of sustained
international attention to the human rights situation. In March of 2008, the GoSL
established a new internment policy for IDPs532. In response to reports of limited freedom
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of movement533, the UN Secretary General’s Representative on Internally Displaced
Persons reminded Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council that IDPs
as citizens of their country {remained] entitled to all guarantees of international
human rights and international humanitarian law subscribed by the state…while
the need to address security may be a component of the plan, it should be
humanitarian and civilian in nature. In particular, IDPs’ freedom of movement
must be respected, and IDPs may not be confined to a camp.534
The GoSL did not change the IDP policy. At the end of August, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) sent a public memorandum to the GoSL
reminding them of the rights of refugees and IDPs, and stating that UNHCR support of
Sri Lanka was contingent on its government’s respect for these rights.535
A banner signal that the GoSL was willing to ignore the international
community’s concerns about human rights was its expulsion of aid workers for the
conflict zones in September 2008.536 The UN agreed to this withdrawal.537 President
Rajapaksa affirmed that the GoSL ordered the humanitarian withdrawal to pave the way
for a GoSL military victory, saying to journalists that the order was short term because
the GoSL army would soon “crush” the LTTE.538
The LTTE also showed a similar disregard for human rights—and future human
rights accountability—when it announced a new policy that civilians avoiding service in
the LTTE would have ten of their family members arrested and sentenced to forced
labor.539 Following the passage of this policy, the LTTE substantially increased its
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conscription of child soldiers.540 In December of 2008, HRW released a report
documenting the LTTE’s extensive abuses of civilians, especially the effects of its new
conscription policy.541
International observation and condemnation of the human rights situation
continued into 2009. On January 21, 2009, the GoSL unilaterally created a no fire zone in
LTTE territory, and asked civilians to move into this zone to ensure their safety, in an
attempt to constrict the LTTE to a smaller operating area.542 In response to an outcry
about this, the GoSL’s military spokesman claimed that there were no civilian casualties,
saying “We are not targeting any civilians, so there can’t be any civilians killed.”543 This
explanation did not satisfy the international community, and the EU Commissioner for
Development and Humanitarian Aid condemned the situation on January 29.544
4.3.3. Attempt at limited ceasefire
Perhaps in response, the GoSL declared a limited ceasefire from February 1-3,
explicitly to allow civilians to leave the conflict zone and into government territory.545
The LTTE did not observe the ceasefire, and instead attacked fleeing civilians in an
attempt to keep them in LTTE territory.546 LTTE leaders thought that the GoSL would
continue to advance in spite of the certainty of civilian casualties, and that these civilian
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casualties would lead the international community to push harder for a longer ceasefire,
which the LTTE could use to recoup its forces.547
The humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate. On February 12, the GoSL
violated its no fire zone and then declared a smaller no fire zone, asked civilians to move
there, and then went on the offensive to push the LTTE front lines into the new no fire
zone, suggesting that they too wanted to set their opponent up for civilian casualties.548
This same week, UNICEF released a statement criticizing the LTTE’s conscription of
children.549
On February 24, the LTTE wrote to the EU, US, Japan, and Norway, asking for
help brokering a ceasefire.550 In spite of the constant and strong international scrutiny of
the human rights situation, and of each side’s violation of human rights and international
humanitarian law, the GoSL rejected the request for a ceasefire, even with the
international community and major donor states watching. Observers agreed that the
GoSL thought that they would soon win the conflict, and a ceasefire would decrease their
odds of victory because it would allow the LTTE time to recoup their forces.551
The GoSL’s rejection of this ceasefire offer is significant in terms of how the
prospect of accountability affects leaders’ decisions to come to the negotiating table. The
decision to reject the offer of a ceasefire was not made with the prospect of any criminal
accountability for human rights violations in mind. Since Sri Lanka was not a signatory
of the Rome Statute, if the GoSL won the conflict and leaders retained incumbency, the
only way they would face prosecution for their failure to prevent civilian deaths would be
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if the UN Security Council referred the case to the ICC. India and in some cases China
had repeatedly showed their willingness to shield the GoSL from human rights
consequences in the international community552, which made the prospect of GoSL
leaders facing international prosecution even more unlikely. Further, while human rights
advocates mobilized against impunity, at this phase in the conflict they were not
explicitly advocating for international criminal accountability. Therefore, the extremely
low likelihood of prosecutorial accountability undergirded the GoSL’s decision to keep
fighting, even with the certain prospect of continued civilian casualties.
4.4 Decisive victory
As the GoSL and the LTTE kept fighting, the international community continued
to raise the alarm about the human rights situation. Remarkably, in a March 2008 visit to
the US, India’s Foreign Minister raised the issue of civilian protection in Sri Lanka.553
The same month, Japan raised serious concerns about civilian casualties and the
treatment of internally displaced people at a meeting of the Human Rights Council.554 At
the same time, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released a
statement saying that serious violations of international law were taking place in the Sri
Lankan conflict.555 Finally, the UN Secretary General released a strong statement on the
human rights situation.556
At the same time, the GoSL’s offensive reached the heart of LTTE territory, the
GoSL army started successfully killing many of the LTTE’s highest commanders. Still,
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the LTTE continued recruiting child soldiers through April 2008,557 while also attempting
an exit. Severely weakened, on April 26, the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire and
asked the GoSL to also call a ceasefire.558 The GoSL called this a “joke.”559
On May 18, 2009, the LTTE surrendered to the GoSL, eliminating the need for
any peace negotiation.560 Prior to the surrender, the LTTE contacted the UN, the ICRC,
Norway’s chief negotiator from 2002, President Rajapaksa, and other members of the
GoSL cabinet.561 The GoSL promised security during the surrender, but refused to allow
an international monitor to be present.562 Several LTTE commanders died during the
surrender.563 On May 19, the GoSL declared victory.564
Immediately after the declaration of victory, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon
visited northern Sri Lanka.565 Three days later, Secretary General Moon and President
Rajapaksa issued a joint statement.566 The Secretary General said that an accountability
process for addressing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law was
crucial for Sri Lanka to move forward.567 Soon after, the Secretary General convened a
panel of experts to investigate the final days of the conflict and make recommendations
concerning accountability.568 However, the Secretary General did not explicitly call for
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international prosecution, or for prosecution of leaders. President Rajapaksa said that Sri
Lanka was committed to protecting human rights in keeping with “international human
rights standards and Sri Lanka’s international obligations.”569 The fact that these
obligations did not include the Rome Statute meant that international prosecution of
leaders would not be a concern for how the GoSL architected the peace.
5.0 The attempts at accountability
This dissertation argues that the role of the ICC is singular in peace processes not
because it is an accountability mechanism, but because it is an international prosecutorial
accountability mechanism. It is both the fact that its scope is international and the fact
that it has a prosecutorial accountability mechanism that allows the ICC to play the role it
does. The case of Sri Lanka demonstrates this because although the ICC was not involved
at any level, there were numerous accountability mechanisms employed throughout the
conflict, and after the conflict. However, since none of these accountability mechanisms
were both international in scope and prosecutorial in design, none of them affected the
peace process in the ways that the ICC can affect peace processes. In particular, since
none of them could seriously threaten leaders’ exit options, they could not have the same
effect as the ICC. In this section, I detail these accountability mechanisms, and argue that
none of them substantially affected the Sri Lankan peace process because they were not
designed to constrain actors, but only to satisfy various stakeholders, and because,
although advocates had been railing against impunity since the 2002 peace process,
powerful stakeholders only began advocating for international prosecution years after the
conflict had ended.
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5.1 Presidential Commission of Inquiry
The earliest investigatory and justice mechanism, as well as the only one created
during the conflict, was the President’s Commission of Inquiry (COI) created in
September 2006. President Rajapaksa formed the COI largely in response to increased
international scrutiny of the human rights situation in Sri Lanka. However, it is worth
noting that the Sri Lankan legislation that gives presidents the mandate to appoint such
commissions stipulates that these commissions should not be appointed to investigate
grave human rights violations.570
President Rajapaksa first announced that he would appoint an international COI,
which independent, international members who would be tasked with investigating
“abductions, enforced disappearances, and unlawful killings in all areas of the
country.”571 However, the COI appointed was not international or independent, and did
not accomplish this mandate. The COI appointed consisted of three Sri Lankan Supreme
Court Judges, two other Sri Lankans, and international observers who were not officially
members of the COI.572 AI asserts that President Rajapaksa appointed these international
observers to fend off international pressure to have an OHCHR monitoring presence in
Sri Lanka.573
The COI was designed to investigate a pre-specified list of human rights
violations associated with the conflict, and was not given the mandate to investigate
ongoing human rights violations.574 The fact that the COI did not have the mandate to
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investigate ongoing violations meant that neither the GoSL or the LTTE needed to take
the COI’s gaze into account when planning their future steps, either as they pertained to
fighting war or making peace.
The COI did not successfully execute even this limited mandate. Of the sixteen
cases it was tasked to hear, it investigated four by January 2009.575 Issues with the COI
prompted an outcry from both domestic and international human rights advocates. In
November 2008, Sri Lankan human rights organizations withdrew their participation
from the COI.576 AI released critical reports577, and HRW called it a “smokescreen.”578
President Rajapaksa dissolved the commission in June 2009, when it had completed
seven of its sixteen mandated cases.579 The fact that the COI was appointed by the
President of Sri Lanka, and was run entirely by the governing administration that also
oversaw the conflict, is indication enough that it could not constrain leaders’ exit options,
and therefore, I argue, did not substantially affect their decisions about conflict and
peace.
5.2 Permanent People’s Tribunal on Sri Lanka
The Permanent People’s Tribunal (PPT) characterized itself as “an international
opinion tribunal, independent of any State authority.”580 This independence meant it had
no prosecutorial power, and the fact that it was an “opinion tribunal” meant that it could
not affect leaders’ exit options. Importantly, Tamil expatriates and civil society advocates
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convened the PPT almost immediately following the end of hostilities. Planning for the
PPT started in July 2009, and it was held in January 2010.581 The mandate of the PPT
was to collect and evaluate testimony on allegations of human rights violations
committed by the GoSL.582 The PPT contextualized its findings in terms of the Rome
Statute, and alleged that the GoSL violated several aspects of the Rome Statute.583 The
PPT called on the GoSL to establish a Truth and Justice Commission that would ensure
that those culpable for war crimes would be prosecuted,584 and to sign and ratify the
Rome Statute.585 Due to its affiliation with the Tamil diaspora, and the fact that it
unilaterally condemned the GoSL and glossed over LTTE crimes, external stakeholders
did not take it seriously,586 another reason that it could not constrain leaders’ exit options
and thus did not impact the peace.
5.3 Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
In response to the UN Secretary General’s insistence that violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law be investigated, and impunity be
prevented, President Rajapaksa established a Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation
Commission (LLRC) in May 2010.587 The LLRC began to hold hearings on August 11,
2010.588 At the opening, the chair of the LLRC defined its mandate not as preventing
impunity or ensuring accountability, but as identifying the causes of the failure of the
2002 CFA and formulating proposals to ensure “national unity and reconciliation
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amongst all communities in Sri Lanka.”589 As with the Presidential COI, the fact that the
LLRC was called by the incumbent President of Sri Lanka and staffed by the same
administration that oversaw the final days of the civil war shows that it was not situated
to affect leaders’ exit options. Indeed, it is much more likely that it was created to prevent
government leaders’ exit options from being affected by calls for post-conflict
accountability.
From almost its inception, the LLRC faced scrutiny from international human
rights advocates. In September 2010, the LLRC released an interim report that discussed
neither specific human rights violations nor accountability.590 Following this, AI, HRW,
and the ICG declined an invitation to testify before the LLRC because of its inadequacy
to address human rights issues.591 Further, the Center for Policy Alternatives, while
welcoming the LLRC’s interim recommendations, issued a report criticizing its failure to
protect witnesses and victims from harassments and to garner sufficient sourcing and
corroboration of witness accounts.592 Nonetheless, the GoSL created a committee to
implement the LLRC’s interim recommendations.593
In response to international pressure about how the LLRC would pursue
accountability, Sri Lanka’s Attorney General told a UN panel that any human rights
violators identified by the LLRC would be referred to the Attorney General’s office.594
The Attorney General said that this had not yet happened because the LLRC had failed,
after a more than twenty-seven year civil war, to identify any perpetrators who merited
589

Ibid, p. 13
Ibid, p. 19
591
Ibid, p. 6
592
“Release of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC Report” Centre for Policy
Alternatives January 4, 2011 http://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Release-of-theLessons-Learnt-and-Reconciliation-Commission.pdf Accessed March 25, 2019.
593
Amnesty International “When Will They Get Justice?” p. 54
594
Ibid, p. 16
590

227
further investigation.595 The international community continued to criticize the LLRC.
Most damningly, the April 2011 report issued by the UN Secretary General’s Panel of
Experts (see Section 5.4) said that “the LLRC is deeply flawed, does not meet
international standards for an effective accountability mechanism and, therefore, does not
and cannot satisfy the joint commitment of the President of Sri Lanka and the SecretaryGeneral to an accountability process.”596
The LLRC released its final report in November 2011.597 The report concluded
that the GoSL never targeted civilians intentionally but had nonetheless been responsible
for civilian casualties. On the other hand, it argued that the LTTE had repeatedly and
deliberately broken international humanitarian law. The report recommended that many
further investigations be carried out, with the possibility that cases could be referred to
the Attorney General.
The international community was nearly unanimous in its assessment that the
LLRC, its reports, and the implementation of its recommendations, were at best
insufficient and at worst a smokescreen to help leaders avoid accountability. In response
to these critiques, the LLRC became a main topic of the HRC’s March 2012 Meeting.598
The HRC resolved to urge the GoSL to conduct further probes into the most serious
human rights violations.599
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5.4 UN Panel of Experts
On June 22, 2010, the UN Secretary General announced that he had appointed a
panel of experts to investigate the credibility allegations of violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law during the civil war,600 focusing on September 2008
to May 2009.601 The panel gathered information from public documents, confidential
written submissions from governments and international organizations, written
submissions from the public, and meetings with individuals and organizations “directly
involved in the final stages of the war.”602 The GoSL did not allow the panel to visit Sri
Lanka while it did its work, and so the panel could not directly interview many GoSL
actors.603 This is significant, as it shows that the GoSL considered the panel to be a threat
to be neutralized.
The reason that a panel of experts could be this much of a threat is the fact that it
was mounted by perhaps the highest-profile international institution in the world, which
could amplify the political implications of its findings. However, it is crucial to note that
the Panel of Experts was not endowed with any prosecutorial capacity, and they could
only investigate and make recommendations.
In April 2011, the Panel issued a report on which allegations of human rights
violations it found to be credible. It painted a very different picture than the reports issued
by the Sri Lankan COI and LLRC mechanisms. Instead, the Panel said that it found
credible evidence of “a wide range of serious violations of international humanitarian law
and international human rights law was committed both by the GoSL and the LTTE,
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some of which would amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.”604 Further, it
said that the way the war was fought by both sides “represented a grave assault on the
entire regime of international law designed to protect individual dignity during both war
and peace.”605
The Panel recommended that the GoSL “immediately convene genuine
investigations” into grave human rights violations that occurred during the conflict,606
issue an apology for civilian casualties incurred during the end of the war,607 and create a
reparations program for victims of the conflict.608 They also recommended that the UN
Secretary General establish an independent international mechanism to monitor the
GoSL’s domestic accountability process, conduct independent investigations into human
rights violations, and continue to collect information relevant to accountability.609
Immediately after the report was issued, the GoSL released a statement rejecting
its findings, while also admitting that they had not read it closely.610 On April 25,
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon released the report to the public, but said that he did not
have the power to convene the suggested international accountability mechanism.611 The
GoSL later released a more elaborate critique of the report.612 However, in spite of its
initial critiques, the report did not significantly change the GoSL’s behavior, or its
approach to post-conflict accountability, even through it presented damning conclusions.
This conforms with my dissertation’s theory, because even though the UN Secretary
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General is arguably the most influential human rights advocate in the world, and any
body he convenes is automatically endowed with a considerable megaphone, the Panel of
Experts had no prosecutorial capacity. Therefore, in spite of its clout, this Panel did not
stand to directly affect leaders’ exit options, and so it would be enough for the Sri Lankan
government to condemn its findings and move on without having to adjust their policies.
On the other hand, the Tamil National Alliance welcomed the report, praised its
findings, and urged the GoSL to act on its recommendations.613 The international
community also welcomed the report, with the United States,614 the European Union,615
and the UK616 all releasing statements welcoming the report and saying that the its
allegations should be more fully investigated. International human rights organizations
also welcomed the report, and tried to use it to push for increased accountability in Sri
Lanka. The OHCHR urged the GoSL to respond to it more seriously, saying that unless
the GoSL reversed its trend of impunity, there would need to be “a full-fledged
international inquiry.”617 AI called for the UN to create this more fully-fledged
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international investigation, and to ensure accountability for perpetrators.618 HRW echoed
the call for an inquiry.619
5.5 OHCHR Investigation
In March of 2014, the HRC formally requested that the OHCHR
undertake a comprehensive investigation into alleged serious violations and
abuses of human rights and related crimes by both parties in Sri Lanka
during the period covered by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation
Commission (LLRC) and to establish the acts and circumstances of such
alleged violations and of the crimes perpetrated with a view to avoiding
impunity and ensuring accountability, with assistance from relevant experts
and special procedures mandate holders.620
The final report of the OHCHR’s investigation stated that it had been given this mandate
because of widespread concerns about the LLRC’s inadequacy and “lack of
credibility.”621 Although the OHCHR was only tasked with investigation, the HRC
stipulated that the investigation be conducted with the goal of avoiding impunity and
ensuring accountability.622 The report also stressed that its mandate was to conduct a
human rights investigation of systematic and widespread abuses, but it was not to conduct
a criminal investigation.623 Nonetheless, the report repeatedly criticized the “impunity
that is deeply embedded in Sri Lanka to this day.”624
Like the Secretary General’s panel of experts, the OHCHR was refused access to
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Sri Lanka during their investigation.625 The report also states that the GoSL engaged in “a
campaign of intimidation, harassment, surveillance, detention and other violations against
human rights defenders and others, which was clearly intended– directly or indirectly - at
deterring engagement with OISL.”626 The LTTE was more cooperative with the
investigation, but in interviews, still sought to obscure “any practices or policies by the
organization which might not accord with international law.”627
The report found that grave, systematic violations of human rights were
committed both by the GoSL and the LTTE. The report also strongly criticized impunity
in Sri Lanka, and argued that “it is essential that absolute priority be given to carrying out
deep seated reforms which bring about institutionalised accountability.”628 The report
also recommended that the GoSL implement a sweeping transitional justice program that
included investigations, prosecution, and punishment of perpetrators of abuses.629 The
report also pointed out that Sri Lanka lacked legislation to prosecute international
crimes,630 and suggested that the Sri Lankan legal system might lack the capacity to
prosecute systematic, large-scale violations of international human rights.631 Therefore,
although it stopped short of recommending international prosecution, the report
recommended that Sri Lanka incorporate international elements into its domestic justice
system for large-scale human rights cases.632 It suggested hybrid courts or integrating
international investigators and legal professionals into the current system.633
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The GoSL’s response to this report differed dramatically from previous instances.
Remarkably, a spokesperson for the Sri Lankan cabinet expressed their commitment to
investigating and prosecuting any perpetrators of human rights abuses, up to and
including former President Rajapaksa, saying “Where even the president or other
commanders or defence secretaries - whoever - is involved, our government is ready to
take action.”634
This report did not lead, however, to a more internationalized approach to
prosecution. Shortly after its publication, the US sponsored a HRC resolution supporting
Sri Lanka’s domestic justice mechanisms dealing with systematic violations of human
rights.635 In doing this, the US threw its weight against an international probe and
international involvement in criminal accountability for Sri Lankan perpetrators. In
September 2015, about six months after the publication of the report, the GoSL revealed
plans for a truth and reconciliation commission that did not include prosecution.636
I submit that it is not a coincidence that the report that contained the strongest call
for some kind of internationalized accountability mechanism provoked the strongest
response from the Sri Lankan government, and the most credible commitment to make
changes in the area of post-conflict accountability. The Sri Lankan government reacted to
the OHCHR’s report not only with resistance and condemnation, but by publicly stating
that they were willing to hold leaders to account and by creating a new domestic justice
mechanism in direct response. This reflects one of my theory’s central contentions: when
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faced with the prospect of being held accountable in an international venue, leaders will
elevate post-conflict justice on the peace-building agenda in an effort to evade
international accountability.
However, a reasonable counterargument is that the Sri Lankan government only
committed to creating a truth and reconciliation commission, which on paper, is not
substantially different from the presidential commissions of inquiry and the LLRC that
had come before. This is true, and further throws the ICC’s singular role into relief. The
OHCHR report stopped short of calling for full international prosecution, and instead
called for prosecution with internationalized elements. Further, the fact that the ICC was
not involved in the situation meant that Sri Lanka was not bound by the Rome Statute to
create a domestic alternative that would meet the standards of the Rome Statute. In other
words, while calls for internationalized prosecution can elevate post-conflict justice on
leaders’ agendas, due to its unique institutional design, the presence of the ICC is far
more powerful in promoting the inclusion of actual accountability for leaders on the postconflict justice agenda, because the ICC is the only human rights promoter that can
directly threaten leaders’ exit options.
6.0 The implications for the ICC
Sections 4 and 5 of this chapter shows that Sri Lanka’s peace process was heavily
internationalized, and that human rights advocates were vocal about the issues of
impunity and accountability. Nonetheless, the prospect of post-conflict human rights
accountability for leaders did not affect either side’s decision to come to the negotiating
table, nor did it affect how they engaged in peace negotiations. In this section, I argue
that this was because although domestic human rights NGOs, international human rights
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NGOs, international organizations, and external states were deeply involved in
advocating against impunity in the conflict, in the absence of the ICC, none of these
actors’ messages on avoiding impunity could credibility affect leaders’ calculations about
their exit options.
Further exacerbating the futility of these messages was the fact that Sri Lanka’s
justice system, both due to capacity issues and due to government intransigence, was not
a viable option for post-conflict prosecution, meaning that, in the absence of the ICC,
there was no appropriate venue for prosecutions of grave, large-scale human rights
violations. In this section, I draw on evidence from the previous seven sections to make
this argument, which applies equally to domestic human rights NGOs, international
human rights NGOs, international organizations, and external states.
Domestic human rights NGOs advocated vocally against impunity throughout the
conflict and the peace process, and at times advocated for criminal prosecution. Most
notably, the UTAHR pointedly criticized Norway’s approach to the 2002 peace process,
saying they were enabling impunity for leaders in the conflict, and calling for criminal
accountability.637 However, this statement did not change Norway’s approach to the
peace process, and, in the absence of a potential prosecutor, could not represent a credible
threat to leaders’ post-conflict exit options.
International human rights NGOs were arguably the most vocal, persistent, and
strident advocates against impunity and for criminal accountability for grave human
rights abuses. Again, their messages did not seem to prompt belligerents to come to the
negotiating table or change their behavior once there. Perhaps the starkest example of
how international human rights NGOs’ advocacy against impunity did not affect leaders’
637
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calculations about their exit options is the fact that the period where these messages
increased in volume and in insistence also saw an increase in civilian targeted and mass,
grave human rights violations by both the GoSL and the LTTE. Further, international
NGO pressure did not affect the GoSL or the LTTE’s approach to peace negotiations, as
shown most starkly by both sides’ empty commitments to improved compliance with
international humanitarian law during a February 2006 negotiation brokered by the
ICRC.638
Perhaps the most dramatic example of advocacy for international criminal
accountability mattering less in the absence of the ICC is the role of international
organizations in the Sri Lankan civil war. In particular, many organs of the UN advocated
consistently and strongly against impunity, and even their calls for accountability were
met with no demonstrable change in each side’s approach to peace. Take for example,
each side’s March 2003 pledge that they would draft a joint statement on human rights
and humanitarian practices.639 The fact that they made this commitment at the behest of a
UN Special Representative on Human Rights, combined with the fact that they never met
to draft the pledge after the commitment, suggests that UN advocacy against impunity
was not enough to make leaders treat human rights accountability as a serious issue
during negotiations. Further, throughout the most intense period of the fighting, the
UNHCR, the UN Special Representative on IDPs, and UNICEF issued several strong
statements condemning human rights violations and calling for accountability. None of
these statements seemed to affect how either side fought the war, nor did they incentivize
either side to come to the negotiating table.
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This shows that although UN organizations have powerful megaphones, they have
neither the institutional mandate nor the raw capacity to constrain leaders’ exit options.
UN organizations can issue calls for accountability, and even recommend prosecution,
but they do not have the wherewithal to mount prosecutions themselves. Therefore, even
when a UN organization recommends prosecution, if this recommendation is not matched
by the involvement of the ICC, this recommendation cannot represent a credible threat to
a leader’s prospects for a good post-conflict future.
Finally, even powerful external states’ calls for human rights accountability could
not constrain leaders’ exit options because they were not backed by an institution that
could actually carry out prosecutions. Most dramatically, in October 2007, the US called
for a UN human rights monitoring mission in Sri Lanka to collect information about
ongoing human rights violations and ensure accountability.640 However, the US did not
call for a corresponding international institution to actually mount an accountability
mechanism in the likely event that Sri Lanka did not. The fact that there was no
prosecutor in place to act on whatever information collected from such a monitoring
mission meant that even though a state as powerful as the US advocated for such a
mission, it could not represent a credible constraint on leaders’ exit options.
Unsurprisingly, neither the GoSL nor the LTTE changed their strategy for war or peace
in response.
7.0 Conclusion
This chapter shows that Sri Lanka’s peace and post-conflict transition process had
a louder, bigger, and more diverse set of anti-impunity advocates than either Uganda’s or
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Colombia’s. If the ICC only promotes peace because it galvanizes anti-impunity
advocacy, then anti-impunity advocacy should matter in the same way with or without
the involvement of the ICC. If this explanation held, the strength of anti-impunity
advocacy in Sri Lanka should have promoted the creation of a robust negotiated
settlement to end the civil war. Instead, it barely mattered.
This suggests that the involvement of the ICC in a conflict situation makes antiimpunity advocacy matter differently than it would otherwise. I argue that this is because
the ICC is the only institution with a global reach that actually has the capacity to make
good on the normative commitment to prevent impunity. When the ICC is involved in a
situation, a chorus of anti-impunity advocates mean that leaders need to consider what the
Court’s involvement means for their exit options, and how they can neutralize this threat
using the peace process. When the ICC is not involved, as the case of Sri Lanka shows,
for leaders, this chorus is nothing more than noise.
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CHAPTER 7 | CONCLUSION
1.0 The objectives
Since the ICC’s inception, researchers, practitioners, and human rights advocates
have debated whether the ICC lives up to its promise. This dissertation is situated within
this conversation, but instead of assessing the ICC broadly, it sought to understand how
the ICC affects ongoing conflict situations. In light of the especially robust debate on
how international criminal accountability impacts the possibilities for peace, this
dissertation sought to do several things.
First, out of a conviction that it is impossible to understand prospects for peace
without breaking the peacemaking process into its constituent parts, this dissertation did
not seek to broadly understand how the ICC affects post-conflict transitions, but instead
sought to narrowly understand how the involvement of the ICC in a peace process affects
leaders’ willingness to arrive at a comprehensive peace agreement. Since building peace
after conflict is almost always predicated on the establishment of a comprehensive peace
framework, this dissertation examines how the ICC promotes or prevents the
establishment of such frameworks. To my knowledge, this is the only piece of
scholarship that specifically holds the establishment of a peace agreement as its
dependent variable, and that does not conflate the existence of such an agreement with
lasting peace.
Second, this dissertation sought to reconcile the viewpoints of ICC proponents
and ICC skeptics into a theoretical framework that incorporates the observations of both
groups. To do this, I argued that the ICC’s effects on peace processes are fundamentally
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conditional, and used cross-national quantitative analysis and three case studies to make
this case.
Finally, and relatedly, this dissertation sought to merge understandings of the ICC
as a prosecutor and the ICC as an international promoter of anti-impunity norms. In
particular, this dissertation shows how the ICC’s prosecutorial function, even when it is
not wielded, conditions and in some cases enhances its work promoting anti-impunity
norms. In doing so, this dissertation asserts that, in peace-building situations, the ICC
cannot and should not function the way other human rights advocates do, simply because
it has the potential to prosecute culpable leaders.
2.0 The findings
Chapter 2 established a theoretical framework that argued that the way the ICC
affects peace processes depends on the role it plays in the conflict situation, and that the
role it plays in the conflict situation in turn depends on a set of conditional factors. I
argue that the Court can act either as an overseer or as a prosecutor in conflict situations,
and that its role can evolve from overseer to prosecutor. When the Court acts as an
overseer, I argue that peace negotiations are more likely to result in a comprehensive
peace agreement. When the Court acts as a prosecutor, I argue that peace negotiations are
more likely to fail because it moves from a latent to active threat to leaders’ exit options,
thus incentivizing leaders to leave peace negotiations in hopes that continuing the fight
will secure them better post-conflict futures.
Chapter 2 also argues that whether the Court plays an oversight or prosecutorial
role depends both on the actions of the Court and on the actions of the constellation of
peace and human rights promoters that surround it. Two of these factors are within the
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Court’s control: whether the Court moves from an investigation to the issuing of
indictments, and whether the Prosecutor adopts a publicly prosecutorial presence.
However, one crucial factor is not within the Court’s control: whether other actors
magnify or contradict the Court’s anti-impunity commitments also conditions whether it
functions as an overseer or as a prosecutor.
Chapter 3 offers empirical evidence for the dual role that international
prosecutorial bodies can play in peace negotiations. In this chapter, I conducted
quantitative analysis of a dataset of 367 peace negotiations between 48 states and 89 rebel
groups, spanning 1989 to 2010. By specifying logistic regression models, I found that,
when controlling for other justice mechanisms, the involvement of an international
prosecutorial body made peace negotiations both more likely to fail, and more likely to
succeed. In other words, international prosecution made peace negotiations more to see
one party not come to the table, and more likely to result in a comprehensive agreement
that established a framework for a new government. This suggests that in some cases,
international prosecution spoils peace negotiations, and in other situations, it promotes
their success. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 were dedicated to parsing out what differentiates these
two sets of situations, and to illustrating the theory articulated in Chapter 2.
Chapter 4 examines what is perhaps the classic case of the ICC acting as a spoiler
in peace negotiations: the attempts to end the LRA insurrection in northern Uganda
through a negotiated settlement.641 In this case, I assert, the Court played a prosecutorial
role, and it was only after it began to play this role in Uganda that it acted as a spoiler of
the peace. Crucially, I contend that this case shows that the Court issuing indictments is
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not enough, by itself, to make the Court play a prosecutorial role. Instead, the case of
Uganda shows that it is this event, combined with the Court’s public stances and the
public skepticism of human rights advocates and peace guarantors, which results in the
Court playing a prosecutorial role.
Chapter 5 then turns to the Colombian peace process, in which I demonstrate that
the ICC acted as a guarantor642 because it played the role of overseer, rather than
prosecutor. Again, I argue that the fact that the Court did not issue indictments in
Colombia, and only remained in an investigatory phase, was not the only reason the
Court was able to act as an overseer and not a prosecutor. Also crucial was the careful,
quiet public stance taken by the Prosecutor’s Office, always emphasizing the ICC’s
presence in Colombia and normative commitments of the Rome Statute, but never
specifically calling for international prosecution and thus elevating international
prosecution from a latent to an active threat to leaders’ exit options. Finally, I argue that
human rights and peace advocates’ vocal insistence that the peace process live up to the
Rome Statute’s normative commitments enabled the ICC itself to stay quiet, and thus
facilitated its oversight role.
This leads to the obvious question of whether other advocates’ insistence that
impunity for culpable leaders is unacceptable is actually what results in a more robust
peace agreement, and if the ICC’s role is more epiphenomenal than my theory admits. To
examine this question, Chapter 6 turns to the case of Sri Lanka, which saw a similar set
of advocates arguing vociferously and constantly against impunity, but without the
involvement of the ICC at any point in the conflict situation. Chapter 6 closely examines
the highly internationalized peace process that occurred from 2000 to 2006. Although
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there was intense advocacy against impunity, the ICC was not involved and international
criminal accountability was not discussed. I argue that this laid the groundwork not only
for the failure of the peace process, but for the final battles of the war, during which both
sides used human rights abuses as the backbone of their battle strategies.
3.0 The findings’ limitations
One potentially important conditioning factor that this dissertation did not
systematically take into account is the balance of military power in the conflict. Chapter 3
mentioned that one possible alternative explanation for the fact that international
prosecution promotes more comprehensive peace agreements is that it might be used in
situations where there is a clear military victor, meaning that the losing side is too weak
to do anything but accept the terms of the peace agreement.
The consensus in the peace negotiation literature is that both sides will come to
the table when neither has the military wherewithal to definitively defeat the other,643
meaning that there is a certain range of military power balances during which peace
negotiations will happen.644 It is also likely the case that there is a certain range of
military power balances during which the ICC has the conditional effects described in
this dissertation. Future work should more systematically take military power dynamics
into account and endeavor to specify this range.
This study also says nothing about whether the peace lasts. The signature of a
peace agreement is far from a guarantee that the country will see lasting peace; many
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counties that achieve comprehensive agreements devolve into civil war again, 645 or see
governments that commit massive human rights abuses during “peacetime.”646 Chapter 5
analyzed some encouraging evidence from Colombia indicating that the ICC can act as a
guarantor of peace agreements once they are signed, and thus act to implement peace
agreements in a fragile phase. Still, much more systematic work needs to be done to see
whether the ICC can act to ensure that peace agreements are successfully implemented in
ways that promote lasting peace.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this study does not shed any light on
whether criminal accountability is necessary for long-term peace and healing. This is,
perhaps, the central limitation on only asking about how international criminal
accountability affects the prospects for signing a comprehensive peace agreement. The
finding that not explicitly wielding the prosecutorial stick during peace negotiations
makes the ICC an effective guarantor only sheds light on what happens during peace
negotiations, and should absolutely not be misconstrued as the flawed argument that in
order to achieve peace, justice should be withheld. Instead, this dissertation only sheds
light on the reality that criminal accountability is almost certainly more constructive at
certain phases of the peace process than others.647 Future work needs to be done to
determine exactly when it is most effective.
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4.0 The research implications
Skeptics of prosecution and proponents of amnesty argue that the ICC spoils
peace negotiations because, when the ICC is involved, leaders do not see peace
negotiations as an opportunity to negotiate good post conflict fates, and for this reason,
they will not engage.648 Amnesty proponents are right on the charge that leaders will not
engage in negotiations if they think they cannot use them to avoid post conflict
punishment. However, I find that the involvement of the ICC does not mean that leaders
will decide that they cannot use peace negotiations to secure favorable post conflict fates.
Instead, I find that this perception partially depends on whether the ICC plays a
prosecutorial or oversight role.
When the ICC plays a prosecutorial role, Court skeptics and amnesty advocates
are right about its effects, as shown by what happened in Uganda. And yet, when the ICC
plays an oversight role, the case of Colombia shows that the ICC’s involvement in a
conflict situation might enhance leaders’ confidence that they can use negotiations to
protect their post-conflict self-interests, and thus might incentivize them to engage in
peace negotiations.
Proponents of the Court argue that true peace is impossible when it is not
accompanied by accountability.649 As Prosecutor Bensouda stated to an audience of peace
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negotiators, “Violence left untamed by the virtues of justice will beget a cycle of
violence.”650 There are countless examples to suggest that this is often true. Still, it is not
within the scope of this dissertation to systematically investigate this claim; future work
should.
What this dissertation does suggest is that the way that the virtues of justice are
applied matter for whether they secure peace or beget more violence. The case of Uganda
shows that when justice is presented as a cudgel that will inevitably descend on leaders
once peace is made, the specter of that cudgel will spur more violence, as culpable
leaders will decide to fight in hopes of avoiding it. Put succinctly, when the specter of
international criminal accountability is not strategically deployed, it can further
incentivize leaders to fight.
Further, the case of Sri Lanka suggests that the absence of credible mechanisms to
hold leaders to account for their decisions in conflict can change leaders’ incentive
structures to make battle strategies that are predicated on massive, deliberate human
rights violations more attractive. In other words, even the most latent threat of
accountability may deter leaders from ordering mass atrocities. Taken together, this
suggests that although international criminal accountability requires careful, strategic,
constant calculation, its absence is perhaps even more dangerous. As Julian Barnes
writes, “All solutions are flawed, but the most flawed was to do nothing, and to do
nothing slowly.”651
This suggests that ICC optimists and skeptics are both partially, but not,
completely right, and that we need to move beyond the binary question of whether the
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ICC helps or hurts in conflict situations, and whether international prosecution promotes
or prevents peace. Rather, we should turn our attention to the circumstances in which the
ICC promotes peace. Further, we should ask these questions not with the central goal of
evaluating the Court’s efficacy or worth overall, but rather of discerning which
approaches it should use to best accomplish its mission.
5.0 External Validity
5.1 For criminal tribunals writ large
The ICC is far from the only criminal tribunal that might constrain leaders’ exit
options, and so to understand this dissertation’s external validity, I turn to the question of
whether these findings might extend to other mechanisms of criminal accountability that
might be involved in conflict situations: domestic courts, regional courts, and hybrid
courts.
These findings are not applicable to domestic courts for the simple reasons that
domestic courts are domestic and not international, and because they are, by virtue of
institutional design, less able to play the same oversight role that the ICC can. The fact
that domestic courts are domestic means that rebels are likely to view domestic courts as
a tool of government power. 652 The ICC was able to serve as a guarantor in Colombia
precisely because its gaze was on both the government and the rebels—a much less likely
situation in the case of domestic courts.
The ICC was also able to serve as a guarantor in Colombia because, by virtue of
the fact that its involvement remained in the preliminary examination phase, it was able
to play an oversight role. Most domestic courts do not have a preliminary examination
phase: the goal of their investigations is not to determine whether a case should be
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brought, but to gather enough evidence to actually bring a case.653 Thus, they are
designed to only play a prosecutorial function, and not the kind of oversight function that
the ICC can play.654
It is impossible to generalize about whether these findings apply to regional
courts because the institutional designs and mandates of regional courts vary so broadly.
The key reason why the ICC can act as both a guarantor and a spoiler of civil conflict is
that, by virtue of its institutional design, it has the capacity to not only act as a prosecutor,
but as an overseer with the potential to prosecute. To the extent that a regional court is
designed similarly, it should have the same effects as the ICC. For example, there is
evidence that the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights might be able to play the role of
guarantor. Its long and well-institutionalized investigative process, which highly
incorporates human right advocates from civil society,655 equips it to play an oversight
role that is similar to or perhaps even more effective than the ICC’s. However, the fact
that it does not have the capacity to punish leaders, and instead relies on states to
implement its rulings through the domestic justice system656 means that it cannot directly
threaten leaders’ exit options and is unlikely to play the same role as a spoiler.
However, if a regional court, by virtue of its institutional design or capacity
limitations, cannot play both an oversight and prosecutorial role, it is unlikely that it will
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affect peace negotiations in the same way that the ICC can. A possible example of this is
the European Court of Human Rights, whose “docket crisis”657 constrains its potential to
act as either an overseer or a prosecutor.
Whether a hybrid court can play the same dual role as the ICC depends, again, on
its institutional design, but also on the timeline of its implementation. Some hybrid courts
are established during the peace process, and are often implemented along with the
negotiated settlement. The theory articulated in this dissertation should not be applicable
to these courts, as it presupposes that the prospect of international prosecution exists
throughout the informal and formal phase of peace negotiations, and does not arise once
the peace process is already underway.
However, if the hybrid court is extant, and has jurisdiction over a conflict
situation where the parties are attempting to make peace, these findings might hold if it
has the institutional capacity to play both an oversight and prosecutorial role. One
potential example is the ICTY after the first five years of its mandate, which lasted from
1993 to 2017. A key part of this is the fact that the ICTY’s mandate gave it jurisdiction
for crimes committed from 1991 onwards,658 meaning that leaders fighting in later
phrases of the conflict had been habituated to the tribunal’s existence and knew that they
fell under its jurisdiction.
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5.2 For international institutions
The ICC brings leaders to the table precisely because it has the ability to constrain
their exit options, and they negotiate peace with the hopes of definitively removing that
potential constraint. However, if leaders perceive that the Court will inevitably constrain
their exit options, ICC involvement can galvanize them to abandon talks and resume the
fight. This is the prosecution paradox: the ICC can act as a guarantor in peace
negotiations precisely because it has the capacity to prosecute culpable leaders, but once
this capacity is actually wielded, the ICC becomes a spoiler of the peace. The mechanism
is similar to that by which Harry Potter recovers the Sorcerer’s Stone in his first year at
Hogwarts. As Albus Dumbledore said, “It was one of my more brilliant ideas, and
between you and me, that’s saying something. You see, only one who wanted to find the
Stone – find it, but not use it – would be able to get it…”659
The prosecution paradox raises questions that strike to the core of how
international institutions work, and how they can best carry out their mission. Skeptics of
international institutions often point to the fact that they are not endowed with sufficient
resources to actually comprehensively carry out their missions as they are elucidated on
paper. My dissertation suggests that perhaps, at least in the case of the ICC, this is not the
point. Perhaps international institutions work best not so much by fully executing their
missions, but by sheer virtue of the fact that they have a mandate to do so.
Other skeptics of international institutions point to the primacy of the sovereignty
norm in the international system, and state that no international institution can be truly
effective while states remain the highest power in the international system. This
dissertation also suggests that this reasoning is flawed. The ICC deters atrocity and
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promotes peace not by coercing leaders, but by slightly changing their cost-benefit
analyses so as to make restraint in conflict and engaging in the peace process slightly
more attractive. By simply adding the remote threat of prosecution to the set of leaders’
possible post-conflict fates, the ICC makes engaging in peace negotiations more
attractive to leaders, and thus more likely. Thus, the ICC works most effectively to deter
future human rights violations not by overcoming or contravening sovereignty, but by
slightly modifying the attractiveness of options leaders already face. Perhaps
international human rights institutions do their best work not by compelling leaders to act
according to human rights norms, but by changing their incentives so that promoting
human rights norms become more attractive.
6.0 The policy implications
This argument has policy implications for states attempting to negotiate peace to
end civil wars, human rights and peace advocates, and most importantly, the ICC itself.
This section addresses each group in turn.
These findings strongly suggest that state attempts to use an ICC investigation as
a lever of compellance to get rebels to the table is too risky to ever be worthwhile if the
state’s intention is actually to create a negotiated settlement.660 As the GoU learned
during the Juba Peace Process, once an ICC investigation has been opened, the state loses
even more control of a crucial variable in the peace process: the menu of options for rebel
leaders’ post-conflict fates. States should be aware that, in inviting the ICC to open an
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investigation into a conflict situation, while they may indeed get the leverage they need to
get the rebels to come to the table, they also may be setting the stage for the collapse of a
negotiated settlement. Therefore, states for which the peace process is really about
making peace should not invite the ICC to open investigations into their rebel
counterparts.661
The biggest implication that these findings hold for human rights and peace
advocates is that they should refrain from public statements that contradict the ICC’s
normative commitment against impunity. Such statements can prompt the ICC to
publically reaffirm its commitment to prosecuting culpable leaders, and thus transition
from an oversight to a prosecutorial role. In particular, civil society organizations—
especially those who claim the same normative commitments as the ICC—should refrain
from publicly even hinting at acceptance of the possibility of amnesty for culpable
leaders. A better way of reframing such suggestions would be public affirmations that a
panoply of justice options should remain in consideration throughout the peace process,
and that the commitment to prevent impunity does not necessitate a specific, prescribed
course of action. In this way, advocates can signal that international prosecution is a
possibility, and thus galvanize leaders to be at the table in an effort to remove the
possibility, while maintaining assurance that it is not a certainly, thus helping to prevent
leaders from deciding that resuming the fight is more likely to result in better postconflict fates.
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One reason human rights advocates will publicly contradict the Court’s normative
commitments is that they perceive its involvement to be counter to the interests of the
people directly affected by the conflict. In these cases, it is absolutely essential to keep in
mind that it is almost always possible to elevate the viewpoints of these people without
directly contradicting the Court’s work or normative commitments. Elevating the voices
of local populations who are perhaps skeptical of how international criminal
accountability affects prospects for peace is absolutely essential, but instead of explicitly
framing their perspectives in contrast to the ICC’s work, human rights advocates should
simply amplify their voices. Where local perspectives explicitly contradict the ICC’s
work, advocates’ first steps should be to raise these issues with the Court directly,
insistently and quietly, and broker more opportunities for the Court to directly connect
with the locals expressing these views.
This dissertation has two key implications for the way the ICC works in conflict
situations. First, the finding that whether the ICC plays a prosecutorial role is not solely
about whether the ICC has issued arrest warrants for culpable leaders is absolutely
essential. The ICC should keep at top of mind that whether culpable leaders perceive
them to be potential punishers has as much to do with the public statements they make
about their work as it does with the work they are actually doing.
Second, this dissertation calls into serious and unsettling question whether the
ICC should ever unseal or even issue arrest warrants for leaders involved in either formal
or informal peace negotiations in a conflict whose only foreseeable end is a negotiated
settlement. The case of Colombia shows that it is completely possible for the Court to
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advance its anti-impunity mission, and to ensure criminal accountability for leaders,
without issuing arrest warrants or even opening a formal investigation.
If, however, the conflict is likely to end not in negotiated settlement, but in
decisive victory, what happened in the final days of the Sri Lankan Civil War suggests
that the threat of ICC prosecution might save lives. Empirical analysis of civilian
casualties in Libya during the ICC involvement there bears this out.662
In the case of Sri Lanka, the government’s military strategy to end the civil war
was predicated on the tactical use of practices that the Rome Statute defines as atrocity
crimes. Since the government was confident of its victory, and since the ICC was not
involved in the Sri Lankan Civil War, government forces decided on this strategy with
the assurance that they would not be held accountable for the massive abuses they
committed. Upon consideration of the counterfactual situation in which the ICC had been
involved in Sri Lanka, it is very possible that Sri Lankan leaders would have decided that
the risk of international prosecution did not outweigh the benefits of a quick, decisive end
to the conflict. Therefore, while ICC involvement might backfire in civil conflicts where
negotiated settlement is the only foreseeable end, the ICC might also fulfill its mission
and save lives by involving itself in conflicts that are likely to end in decisive victory.
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